Collaborative tele-rehabilitation: A strategy for increasing engagement

This paper examines the influence of a collaborative rehabilitation environment that encourages a long-distance collaborative "play" using two robot-mediated environments. This study presents a strategy for increasing motivation on able-bodied persons, applicable to impaired persons, to engage, sustain play and relate during a shared task. The study consisted of a series of eighteen single case studies, each involved in two distinct phases and assessed using a multidimensional measurement intended to assess participant' subjective experience. The results showed a clear positive trend in favour of the robot-mediated game environment. Subjects found the collaborative environment more valuable and more interesting and enjoyable. As a consequence, it appears subjects were willing to spend more time at a task.

On the principal eigenvalue of a Robin problem with a large parameter

We study the asymptotic behaviour of the principal eigenvalue of a Robin (or generalised Neumann) problem with a large parameter in the boundary condition for the Laplacian in a piecewise smooth domain. We show that the leading asymptotic term depends only on the singularities of the boundary of the domain, and give either explicit expressions or two-sided estimates for this term in a variety of situations.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.