Essays on the political economy of European integration

Recently, a rising interest in political and economic integration/disintegration issues has been developed in the political economy field. This growing strand of literature partly draws on traditional issues of fiscal federalism and optimum public good provision and focuses on a trade-off between the benefits of centralization, arising from economies of scale or externalities, and the costs of harmonizing policies as a consequence of the increased heterogeneity of individual preferences in an international union or in a country composed of at least two regions. This thesis stems from this strand of literature and aims to shed some light on two highly relevant aspects of the political economy of European integration. The first concerns the role of public opinion in the integration process; more precisely, how economic benefits and costs of integration shape citizens' support for European Union (EU) membership. The second is the allocation of policy competences among different levels of government: European, national and regional. Chapter 1 introduces the topics developed in this thesis by reviewing the main recent theoretical developments in the political economy analysis of integration processes. It is structured as follows. First, it briefly surveys a few relevant articles on economic theories of integration and disintegration processes (Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina et al. 2000, Casella and Feinstein 2002) and discusses their relevance for the study of the impact of economic benefits and costs on public opinion attitude towards the EU. Subsequently, it explores the links existing between such political economy literature and theories of fiscal federalism, especially with regard to normative considerations concerning the optimal allocation of competences in a union. Chapter 2 firstly proposes a model of citizens��� support for membership of international unions, with explicit reference to the EU; subsequently it tests the model on a panel of EU countries. What are the factors that influence public opinion support for the European Union (EU)? In international relations theory, the idea that citizens' support for the EU depends on material benefits deriving from integration, i.e. whether European integration makes individuals economically better off (utilitarian support), has been common since the 1970s, but has never been the subject of a formal treatment (Hix 2005). A small number of studies in the 1990s have investigated econometrically the link between national economic performance and mass support for European integration (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Anderson and Kalthenthaler 1996), but only making informal assumptions. The main aim of Chapter 2 is thus to propose and test our model with a view to providing a more complete and theoretically grounded picture of public support for the EU. Following theories of utilitarian support, we assume that citizens are in favour of membership if they receive economic benefits from it. To develop this idea, we propose a simple political economic model drawing on the recent economic literature on integration and disintegration processes. The basic element is the existence of a trade-off between the benefits of centralisation and the costs of harmonising policies in presence of heterogeneous preferences among countries. The approach we follow is that of the recent literature on the political economy of international unions and the unification or break-up of nations (Bolton and Roland 1997, Alesina and Wacziarg 1999, Alesina et al. 2001, 2005a, to mention only the relevant). The general perspective is that unification provides returns to scale in the provision of public goods, but reduces each member state���s ability to determine its most favoured bundle of public goods. In the simple model presented in Chapter 2, support for membership of the union is increasing in the union���s average income and in the loss of efficiency stemming from being outside the union, and decreasing in a country���s average income, while increasing heterogeneity of preferences among countries points to a reduced scope of the union. Afterwards we empirically test the model with data on the EU; more precisely, we perform an econometric analysis employing a panel of member countries over time. The second part of Chapter 2 thus tries to answer the following question: does public opinion support for the EU really depend on economic factors? The findings are broadly consistent with our theoretical expectations: the conditions of the national economy, differences in income among member states and heterogeneity of preferences shape citizens��� attitude towards their country���s membership of the EU. Consequently, this analysis offers some interesting policy implications for the present debate about ratification of the European Constitution and, more generally, about how the EU could act in order to gain more support from the European public. Citizens in many member states are called to express their opinion in national referenda, which may well end up in rejection of the Constitution, as recently happened in France and the Netherlands, triggering a European-wide political crisis. These events show that nowadays understanding public attitude towards the EU is not only of academic interest, but has a strong relevance for policy-making too. Chapter 3 empirically investigates the link between European integration and regional autonomy in Italy. Over the last few decades, the double tendency towards supranationalism and regional autonomy, which has characterised some European States, has taken a very interesting form in this country, because Italy, besides being one of the founding members of the EU, also implemented a process of decentralisation during the 1970s, further strengthened by a constitutional reform in 2001. Moreover, the issue of the allocation of competences among the EU, the Member States and the regions is now especially topical. The process leading to the drafting of European Constitution (even if then it has not come into force) has attracted much attention from a constitutional political economy perspective both on a normative and positive point of view (Breuss and Eller 2004, Mueller 2005). The Italian parliament has recently passed a new thorough constitutional reform, still to be approved by citizens in a referendum, which includes, among other things, the so called ���devolution���, i.e. granting the regions exclusive competence in public health care, education and local police. Following and extending the methodology proposed in a recent influential article by Alesina et al. (2005b), which only concentrated on the EU activity (treaties, legislation, and European Court of Justice���s rulings), we develop a set of quantitative indicators measuring the intensity of the legislative activity of the Italian State, the EU and the Italian regions from 1973 to 2005 in a large number of policy categories. By doing so, we seek to answer the following broad questions. Are European and regional legislations substitutes for state laws? To what extent are the competences attributed by the European treaties or the Italian Constitution actually exerted in the various policy areas? Is their exertion consistent with the normative recommendations from the economic literature about their optimum allocation among different levels of government? The main results show that, first, there seems to be a certain substitutability between EU and national legislations (even if not a very strong one), but not between regional and national ones. Second, the EU concentrates its legislative activity mainly in international trade and agriculture, whilst social policy is where the regions and the State (which is also the main actor in foreign policy) are more active. Third, at least two levels of government (in some cases all of them) are significantly involved in the legislative activity in many sectors, even where the rationale for that is, at best, very questionable, indicating that they actually share a larger number of policy tasks than that suggested by the economic theory. It appears therefore that an excessive number of competences are actually shared among different levels of government. From an economic perspective, it may well be recommended that some competences be shared, but only when the balance between scale or spillover effects and heterogeneity of preferences suggests so. When, on the contrary, too many levels of government are involved in a certain policy area, the distinction between their different responsibilities easily becomes unnecessarily blurred. This may not only leads to a slower and inefficient policy-making process, but also risks to make it too complicate to understand for citizens, who, on the contrary, should be able to know who is really responsible for a certain policy when they vote in national,local or European elections or in referenda on national or European constitutional issues.

Il Pluralismo tra Democrazia ed Autoritarismo: Il Caso Russo

The research explores the mechanisms in the formation and consolidation of a new regime which combines democratic and authoritarian features; it has emerged as result of democratization processes affecting different world areas in recent years. The study analyses a case of great international significance, post-communist Russia: here internal factors strongly prevail in front of the external variables of democratic imitation and contagion, thus showing to what extent Russia differs from other political contexts. The study intends to examine the strategies used by this regime to solve internal conflicts and become stable in spite of the democratizing pressures coming from outside. Indeed, the literature about political transformations has shown the problems in analyzing these polities together with the need to examine their peculiarities more in depth. In this perspective, the first section focuses on the dynamics of State-building in Russia as a fundamental process in tracing the specific characteristics of the current regime: particularly, it is suggested that the State dimension comes out as crucial in determining the level of political and social pluralism accepted in post-Soviet Russia. This argument is worked out in the second section, which analyses the main mechanisms used by the incumbents to limit and control pluralism within the two arenas of political competition and civil society, from where the major threats to the status quo are supposed to come. The main hypothesis is that the leadership interventions in these spheres during the last ten years have shaped a regime which can be characterized as a new type of authoritarianism: with respect to traditional authoritarian forms a certain degree of political contestation is accepted, visible in the presence of a multiparty system, semi-competitive elections and of the several representatives of civil society. Yet, this diversity is curbed basically in two different ways: from one hand the incumbents provide support to political and social actors who sponsor government politics (see the party of power and pro-Kremlin movements). From the other they use some non coercive forms of control and restriction (in legislation, in political elections) against those actors who promote values and priorities opposed to the official ones.

W��hlen im r��umlichen Kontext : eine empirische Untersuchung zum Einfluss der sozialen Komposition des Wahlkreises auf die individuelle Wahlentscheidung bei der Bundestagswahl 2009

Die meisten Studien der empirischen Wahlforschung f��hren das W��hlverhalten bei deutschen Bundestagswahlen gem���� den bew��hrten Erkl��rungsans��tzen (Columbia School, Cleavage-Theorie, Michigan School, ���) auf Faktoren der Individualebene zur��ck. Nur wenige analysieren dar��ber hinaus den Einfluss r��umlicher Kontextmerkmale. Diese Beitr��ge gelangen zudem zu widerspr��chlichen Befunden, z.B. dar��ber, welcher Anteil der Gesamtvarianz ��berhaupt durch Kontextfaktoren erkl��rt werden kann. Daher will die vorliegende Arbeit kl��ren, inwiefern die soziale Komposition des r��umlichen Kontexts ��ber individuelle Merkmale der W��hler hinaus ihre individuelle Wahlentscheidung bei der Bundestagswahl 2009 beeinflusst hat. Dazu wird zun��chst ein r��umliches Mehrebenen-Modell des individuellen Wahlverhaltens entwickelt, das den Einfluss von Kontextmerkmalen u.a. auf soziale Interaktionsmechanismen innerhalb der Kontexteinheiten zur��ckf��hrt. Zudem werden die zentralen individuellen Erkl��rungsfaktoren der oben genannten Theorien (Parteiidentifikation, Kandidaten-, Sachfragen-Orientierung, soziale Gruppenzugeh��rigkeit) in das Modell integriert. Auf Grundlage von Daten der German Longitudinal Election Study werden anschlie��end logistische Mehrebenen-Modelle f��r die alten und erstmals auch f��r die neuen Bundesl��nder und Deutschland gesch��tzt. Erstmals werden zudem Wahlkreise als relevante Kontexteinheiten untersucht. Es zeigt sich, dass ein kleiner Teil der Varianz der individuellen Wahlentscheidung allein auf Merkmale des Wahlkreises zur��ckgef��hrt werden kann. Es treten sowohl direkte Kontexteffekte als auch Mehrebenen-Interaktionseffekte auf, die sich jedoch in ihrer Wirkung zwischen den Regionen und auch zwischen den Parteien erheblich unterscheiden.

Wahlbeteiligung bei Europawahlen : eine empirische Studie zu Deutschland und Polen

In der Arbeit wird die Wahlbeteiligung bei Europawahlen analysiert. Es geht um die Beantwortung der Frage, ob die individuelle Wahlteilnahme in alten und neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten bzw. alten und jungen Demokratien auf die gleichen Erkl��rungsgr����en zur��ckgeht oder ob m��glicherweise Unterschiede zwischen beiden L��ndergruppen bestehen. rnAls Bezugspunkt dient die Europawahl, die im Juni 2009 stattfand: Bei dieser Wahl f��llt nicht nur die generell niedrige Beteiligung auf, sondern auch erhebliche Niveauunterschiede zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten. Um diesen Befund erkl��ren zu k��nnen, wird zun��chst ein theoretisches Erkl��rungsmodell entwickelt, das sich auf die folgenden f��nf Dimensionen bezieht: politisches System der EU, europ��ische politische Gemeinschaft, W��hlermobilisierung w��hrend des Europawahlkampfes, Gewohnheitswahl und Einsch��tzung der staatlichen sowie der eigenen wirtschaftlichen Lage. Als Erkl��rungsgr����e werden in den f��nf Bereichen jeweils unterschiedlich stark ausgepr��gte De���zite in den beiden L��ndergruppen angenommen. rnExemplarisch werden Deutschland und Polen untersucht. Die empirischen Analysen basieren auf dem umfangreichen Datensatz der European Election Study 2009 (ESS), hier werden die Daten der Voter Study verwendet. Nicht alle Hypothesen lassen sich im Rahmen der Arbeit best��tigten, nur ein Teil der unabh��ngigen Variablen hat auch im multivariaten Modell noch einen Ein���uss auf die Europawahlbeteiligung. rnF��r Deutschland zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass Wahlnorm und W��hlermobilisierung einen gr����eren Effekt auf die Stimmabgabe aus��ben als die Nutzenseite (Effektivit��t) der Wahlen. Im zweiten Modell, das f��r die polnischen Befragten berechnet wurde, erweisen sich nur zwei der unabh��ngigen Variablen als signi���kant, d.h. nur die Einsch��tzung der Effektivit��t der Wahl und die internalisierte Wahlnorm haben einen Ein���uss auf die Wahlteilnahme. Von der Effektivit��tseinstufung geht eine gr����ere Erkl��rungskraft aus als von der Wahlnorm; in diesem Modell ��berwiegt folglich die Nutzenseite der Europawahl. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass die unterschiedlichen Beteiligungsraten in den beiden Staaten durch unterschiedlich stark ausgepr��gte De���zite in den Bereichen des politischen Systems und der Wahlnorm zustande kommen. Die De���zite sind in Polen st��rker ausgepr��gt und k��nnen so die niedrigere Wahlbeteiligung erkl��ren. Dar��ber hinaus kann res��miert werden, dass die Nutzenseite der Europawahl in Polen einen st��rkeren Ein���uss auf die Beteiligung aus��bt als in Deutschland.

Autorit��re Regime, Parlamente und die Wahrung von Menschenrechten : eine empirische Untersuchung

Der bei weitem ��berwiegende Teil der autorit��ren Regime weltweit verf��gt mittlerweile ��ber formal-demokratische Institutionen, wie Parlamente und Wahlen. Die Einf��hrung solcher Institutionen soll unter anderem eine Entwicklung in Richtung Demokratie andeuten oder vort��uschen und so den internationalen und innenpolitischen Druck auf die jeweilige Regierung vermindern. Diese Arbeit besch��ftigt sich mit der Frage, ob von diesen formal-demokratischen Institutionen eine Wirkung auf das Regierungshandeln ausgeht und die Menschenrechtslage im Land durch sie verbessert wird. Zun��chst werden autorit��re Regime unter Verwendung des minimalistischen Ansatzes von Cheibub et al. definiert. Anschlie��end werden aus den bisherigen Erkenntnissen der Forschung zur Rolle von formal-demokratischen Institutionen in autorit��ren Regimen Hypothesen zum Zusammenhang zwischen diesen Institutionen und repressivem Regierungsverhalten abgeleitet, die mit Hilfe einer empirische Analyse von Zeitreihen-Querschnittsdaten aus s��mtlichen autorit��ren Regime zwischen 1979 und 2004 getestet werden. Die Ergebnisse zeigen unter anderem, dass mit steigender Kompetitivit��t der Parlamentswahlen die Wahrscheinlichkeit drastischster Menschenrechtsverletzungen sinkt. Zudem finden sich Anzeichen daf��r, dass es zu weniger Menschenrechtsverletzungen kommt, je geringer die Zersplitterung der Oppositionsparteien ist, w��hrend mit einer Zunahme der formalen Kompetenzen der Parlamente das Repressionsniveau steigt.

Party Size and Constituency Representation: Evidence from the 19th-Century U.S. House of Representatives

Research on congressional parties assumes, but has not directly shown, that party size affects individual members' calculations. Drawing on a key case from the nineteenth-century House the secession-driven Republican hegemony of 1861 this article explores the hypothesis that party voting not only declines but also becomes more strongly linked to constituency factors as relative party size increases. The analysis reveals that the jump in party size coincides with (1) a decrease in party voting among individual continuing members, (2) a strengthening association between some constituency factors and party voting, and (3) patterns of decline in individual party voting that are explained in part by constituency measures.

A Sociological Study of the Political Subsystem in Yugoslavia

In this critical analysis of sociological studies of the political subsystem in Yugoslavia since the fall of communism Mr. Ilic examined the work of the majority of leading researchers of politics in the country between 1990 and 1996. Where the question of continuity was important, he also looked at previous research by the writers in question. His aim was to demonstrate the overall extent of existing research and at the same time to identify its limits and the social conditions which defined it. Particular areas examined included the problems of defining basic concepts and selecting the theoretically most relevant indicators; the sources of data including the types of authentic materials exploited; problems of research work (contacts, field control, etc.); problems of analysisl and finally the problems arising from different relations with the people who commission the research. In the first stage of the research, looking at methods of defining key terms, special attention was paid to the analysis of the most frequently used terms such as democracy, totalitarianism, the political left and right, and populism. Numerous weaknesses were noted in the analytic application of these terms. In studies of the possibilities of creating a democratic political system in Serbia and its possible forms (democracy of the majority or consensual democracy), the profound social division of Serbian society was neglected. The left-right distinction tends to be identified with the government-opposition relation, in the way of practical politics. The idea of populism was used to pass responsibility for the policy of war from the manipulator to the manipulated, while the concept of totalitarianism is used in a rather old-fashioned way, with echoes of the cold war. In general, the terminology used in the majority of recent research on the political subsystem in Yugoslavia is characterised by a special ideological style and by practical political material, rather than by developed theoretical effort. The second section of analysis considered the wider theoretical background of the research and focused on studies of the processes of transformation and transition in Yugoslav society, particularly the work of Mladen Lazic and Silvano Bolcic, who he sees as representing the most important and influential contemporary Yugoslav sociologists. Here Mr. Ilic showed that the meaning of empirical data is closely connected with the stratification schemes towards which they are oriented, so that the same data can have different meanings in shown through different schemes. He went on to show the observed theoretical frames in the context of wider ideological understanding of the authors' ideas and research. Here the emphasis was on the formalistic character of such notions as command economy and command work which were used in analysing the functioning and the collapse of communist society, although Mr. Ilic passed favourable judgement on the Lazic's critique of political over-determination in its various attempts to explain the disintegration of the communist political (sub)system. The next stage of the analysis was devoted to the problem of empirical identification of the observed phenomena. Here again the notions of the political left and right were of key importance. He sees two specific problems in using these notion in talking about Yugoslavia, the first being that the process of transition in the FR Yugoslavia has hardly begun. The communist government has in effect remained in power continuously since 1945, despite the introduction of a multi-party system in 1990. The process of privatisation of public property was interrupted at a very early stage and the results of this are evident on the structural level in the continuous weakening of the social status of the middle class and on the political level because the social structure and dominant form of property direct the majority of votes towards to communists in power. This has been combined with strong chauvinist confusion associated with the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, and these ideas were incorporated by all the relevant Yugoslav political parties, making it more difficult to differentiate between them empirically. In this context he quotes the situation of the stream of political scientists who emerged in the Faculty of Political Science in Belgrade. During the time of the one-party regime, this faculty functioned as ideological support for official communist policy and its teachers were unable to develop views which differed from the official line, but rather treated all contrasting ideas in the same way, neglecting their differences. Following the introduction of a multi-party system, these authors changed their idea of a public enemy, but still retained an undifferentiated and theoretically undeveloped approach to the issue of the identification of political ideas. The fourth section of the work looked at problems of explanation in studying the political subsystem and the attempts at an adequate causal explanation of the triumph of Slobodan Milosevic's communists at four subsequent elections was identified as the key methodological problem. The main problem Mr. Ilic isolated here was the neglect of structural factors in explaining the voters' choice. He then went on to look at the way empirical evidence is collected and studied, pointing out many mistakes in planning and determining the samples used in surveys as well as in the scientifically incorrect use of results. He found these weaknesses particularly noticeable in the works of representatives of the so-called nationalistic orientation in Yugoslav sociology of politics, and he pointed out the practical political abuses which these methodological weaknesses made possible. He also identified similar types of mistakes in research by Serbian political parties made on the basis of party documentation and using methods of content analysis. He found various none-sided applications of survey data and looked at attempts to apply other sources of data (statistics, official party documents, various research results). Mr. Ilic concluded that there are two main sets of characteristics in modern Yugoslav sociological studies of political subsystems. There are a considerable number of surveys with ambitious aspirations to explain political phenomena, but at the same time there is a clear lack of a developed sociological theory of political (sub)systems. He feels that, in the absence of such theory, most researcher are over-ready to accept the theoretical solutions found for interpretation of political phenomena in other countries. He sees a need for a stronger methodological bases for future research, either 1) in complementary usage of different sources and ways of collecting data, or 2) in including more of a historical dimension in different attempts to explain the political subsystem in Yugoslavia.

The Presidential Institution in Bulgaria, Albania and Romani: An Attempt at Comparison"

Bulgaria, Albania and Romania are all parliamentary republics with a president as head of state. Although the Albanian president is elected by Parliament, he is arguably the strongest of the three, both in terms of the powers allowed by the provisional constitution and of Mr. Berisha's political practice. The constitutional reform underway in the country will however change the status quo. In Bulgaria and Romania the presidents are elected directly by popular vote, but their powers are relatively small as compared to the democratic legitimisation implied by direct elections. Actual presidential powers should however be assessed with caution as some of them are set by law or interpretations of constitutional texts, rather than by the constitutions themselves. There is also variation in the degree to which the presidents in office have exploited their constitutional powers or taken their role as non-aligned political brokers seriously. Mr. Berisha, in particular, was in control of party politics throughout his presidency and was one of the most polarising influences on public opinion. The excessive political polarisation in all three countries has however its own logic and power. Thus Mr. Zhelev invariably supported the emergence of a political centre in Bulgaria, but this did not succeed and the policy was as damaging to his political career as the fight with would-be centrists was to Berisha's. Political practice in all three countries seems to need a presidential figure. This adds flexibility to a situation governed by hostile and mutually suspicious parties, stuck parliaments and weak or inexperienced governments. The presidents also command considerable influence on public opinion. Public opinion in Bulgaria, for example, largely supports the idea of greater power for the president, in contrast with the opinions of constitutionalists and other law-makers in the country. Under the legacy of the past, the people have a love-hate relationship with such paternalist figures. Presidents personalise politics in the public mind, but they can also become scapegoats for political failures.

The New Electoral Geography of Central Europe

Zarycki studied the political map of Central Europe today on the basis of results of recent parliamentary and/or presidential elections in the Czech Republic, Hungary, L8ithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine. He identified first the structure of regional political cleavages, then the spatial patterns emerging in different countries. He also considered the significance and eventual regional differentiation of various possible influences on these patterns, including urbanisation, historical heritage, ethnic factors, population movements, economic differentiation, the effects of the transformation, demographic factors, education and religion. Virtually all the countries showed a cleavage between more traditional, anti (or non-) communist regions and secular areas with higher post-communist support. Except in Ukraine and the Czech Republic, the post-communist party is dominated by the direct heirs of the former communist parties transformed into moderate left parties. The second major class of cleavages was typical of the Visegrad countries, i.e. the conflict between liberal, mostly metropolitan, regions and a different periphery, usually with a strong populist or anti-liberal appeal. This usually depends on the existence of a sizeable well-educated class, usually pro-market and pro-Western, and on the resolution of the conflict between post and anti-Communists. The third type of cleavage is based on ethnic factors and is clearest in Lithuania and Slovakia, where there are large ethnic minorities. Of factors influencing political behaviour, the two major ones identified were the historical heritage and urbanisation.

Handbook of Swiss Politics

Approaching Switzerland as a ���laboratory��� for democracy, this Handbook contributes to a refined understanding of the res publica. Over the years, the Handbook of Swiss Politics has established itself as a classic work. This new and extended second edition of the Handbook comprises 32 chapters, all by leading Swiss political scientists. The contributors write about fundamentals, institutions, interest groups, political parties, new social movements, the cantons and municipalities, elections, popular votes, policy processes and public policies. They address several important issues in the current international debates, such as the internationalization of domestic politics, multi-level governance, and the role of metropolitan agglomerations. Nine new chapters enrich this second, completely updated version. The section on public policies has been significantly extended, and covers a dozen of policy domains. Grounded on the latest scientific knowledge, this volume also serves as an indispensable reference for a non-academic audience of decision-makers, diplomats, senior officials and journalists.

The Acropolitan - v. 3, no. 5

In this issue...School of Mines Year Book, Junior Promenade, Clark Park, Archie McPhail, Anderson Carlisle Banquet, Butte, Montana, East Butte Copper Mining Company

The Acropolitan - v. 4, no. 1

In this issue...Executive Committee Elections, Dancing Club, Maiden Rock Surveying Field Trip, Mines Mixer, Badger Mine, geology, Butte, Montana

The Technocrat - v. 35, no. 2

In this issue...2014 Elections, native fish restoration, Ryan Zinke, John Lewis, Academic Center for Excellence, climate change, interpersonal communication, student opinion

Firing Up the Crucible with Senator Lee Metcalf & Governor Forrest Anderson -- Judge Gordon Bennett in ���The Crucible of Change���

During the lead-up to Montana second progressive era, Lee Metcalf and Forrest Anderson, along with others, kept the progressive flame lit in Montana. Metcalf���s political history is replete with close electoral wins because of his commitment to progressive ideals when the times were not always politically favorable for that. As State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice, Congressman and eventually as US Senator, Lee won races by as little as 55 votes because he stuck to his guns as a progressive. In Forrest Anderson���s career as a County Attorney, State Legislator, MT Supreme Court Justice and 12 years as MT Attorney General he was respected as a pragmatic practitioner of politics. But during that entire career leading up to his election as Governor, Forrest Anderson was also a stalwart supporter of the progressive agenda exemplified by FDR and the New Deal, which brought folks out of the Great Depression that was brought on by the bad policies of the GOP and big business. As MT���s second progressive period began in 1965, the first important election was Senator Metcalf���s successful re-election battle in 1966 with the sitting MT Governor, Tim Babcock. And the progressive express was really ignited by the election of Forrest Anderson as Governor in 1968 after 16 years of Republican Governors in MT. Gordon Bennett played a rather unique role, being a confidant of Metcalf and Anderson, both who respected his wide and varied experience, his intellect, and his roots in progressivism beginning with his formative years in the Red Corner of NE Montana. Working with Senator Metcalf and his team, including Brit Englund, Vic Reinemer, Peggy McLaughlin, Betty Davis and Jack Condon among others, Bennett helped shape the progressive message both in Washington DC and MT. Progressive labor and farm organizations, part of the progressive coalition, benefitted from Bennett���s advice and counsel and aided the Senator in his career including the huge challenge of having a sitting popular governor run against him for the Senate in 1966. Metcalf���s noted intern program produced a cadre of progressive leaders in Montana over the years. Most notably, Ron Richards transitioned from Metcalf Intern to Executive Secretary of the Montana Democratic Party (MDP) and assisted, along with Bennett, in the 1966 Metcalf-Babcock race in a big way. As Executive Secretary Richards was critical to the success of the MDP as a platform for Forrest Anderson���s general election run and win in 1968. After Forrest���s gubernatorial election, Richards became Executive Assistant (now called Chief of Staff) for Governor Anderson and also for Governor Thomas Judge. The Metcalf progressive strain, exemplified by many including Richards and Bennett, permeated Democratic politics during the second progressive era. So, too, did the coalition that supported Metcalf and his policies. The progressivism of the period of ���In the Crucible of Change��� was fired up by Lee Metcalf, Forrest Anderson and their supporters and coalitions, and Gordon Bennett was in the center of all of that, helping fire up the crucible, setting the stage for many policy advancements in both Washington DC and Montana. Gordon Bennett���s important role in the 1966 re-election of Senator Lee Metcalf and the 1968 election of Governor Forrest Anderson, as well as his wide experience in government and politics of that time allows him to provide us with an insider���s personal perspective of those races and other events at the beginning of the period of progressive change being documented ���In the Crucible of Change,��� as well as his personal insights into the larger political/policy picture of Montana. Gordon Bennett, a major and formative player ���In the Crucible of Change,��� was born in the far northeast town of Scobey, MT in 1922. He attended school in Scobey through the eighth grade and graduated from Helena High School. After attending Carroll College for two years, he received his BA in economics from Carleton College in Northfield, MN. During a brief stint on the east coast, his daily reading of the New York Times (���best newspaper in the world at that time ��� and now���) inspired him to pursue a career in journalism. He received his MA in Journalism from the University of Missouri and entered the field. As a reporter for the Great Falls Tribune under the ownership and management of the Warden Family, he observed and competed with the rigid control of Montana���s press by the Anaconda Company (the Great Falls Tribune was the only large newspaper in Montana NOT owned by ACM). Following his intellectual curiosity and his philosophical bend, he attended a number of Farm-Labor Institutes which he credits with motivating him to pursue solutions to economic and social woes through the law. In 1956, at the age of 34, he received his Juris Doctorate degree from the Georgetown University Law Center in Washington, DC. Bennett���s varied career included eighteen years as a farmer, four years in the US Army during WWII (1942-46), two years as Assistant MT Attorney General (1957-59) with Forrest Anderson, three years in private practice in Glasgow (1959-61), two years as Associate Solicitor in the Department of Interior in Washington, DC (1961-62), and private law practice in Helena from 1962 to 1969. While in Helena he was an unsuccessful candidate for the Montana Supreme Court (1962) and cemented his previous relationships with Attorney General Forrest Anderson and US Senator Lee Metcalf. Bennett modestly refuses to accept the title of Campaign Manager for either Lee Metcalf (1966 re-election over the challenger, MT Republican Governor Tim Babcock) or Forrest Anderson (his 1968 election as Governor), saying that ���they ran their campaigns ��� we were only there to help.��� But he has been generally recognized as having filled that critical role in both of those critical elections. After Governor Anderson���s election in 1968, Bennett was appointed Director of the MT Unemployment Compensation Commission, a position from where he could be a close advisor and confidant of the new Governor. In 1971, Governor Anderson appointed him Judge in the most important jurisdiction in Montana, the 1st Judicial District in Helena, a position he held for seventeen years (1971-88). Upon stepping down from his judgeship, for twenty years (1988-2008) he was a law instructor, mediator and arbitrator. He currently resides in Helena with his wife, Norma Tirrell, former newspaper reporter and researcher/writer. Bennett has two adult children and four grandchildren.