Growth, selection and appropriate contracts

We study a dynamic model where growth requires both long-term investmentand the selection of talented managers. When ability is not ex-ante observable and contracts are incomplete, managerial selection imposes a cost, as managers facing the risk ofbeing replaced choose a sub-optimally low level of long-term investment. This generates atrade-off between selection and investment that has implications for the choice of contractualrelationships and institutions. Our analysis shows that rigid long-term contracts sacrificingmanagerial selection may prevail at early stages of economic development and when heterogeneity in ability is low. As the economy grows, however, knowledge accumulation increasesthe return to talent and makes it optimal to adopt flexible contractual relationships, wheremanagerial selection is implemented even at the cost of lower investment. Measures of investor protection aimed at limiting the bargaining power of managers improve selection undershort-term contract. Given that knowledge accumulation raises the value of selection, theoptimal level of investor protection increases with development.

Implantación de una plataforma corporativa de business intelligence

La Universidad UPROMA ha identificado una línea de actuación inicial caracterizada por la implantación de una plataforma de reporting y análisis de la información corporativa.

Audit report of the financial statements of the governmental activities, the business type activities, the aggregate discretely presented component units, each major fund and the aggregate remaining fund information of the State of Iowa as of and for the year ended June 30, 2014

Audit report of the financial statements of the governmental activities, the business type activities, the aggregate discretely presented component units, each major fund and the aggregate remaining fund information of the State of Iowa as of and for the year ended June 30, 2014

The law of impersonal transactions

Most economic interactions happen in a context of sequential exchangein which innocent third parties suffer information asymmetry with respect toprevious "originative" contracts. The law reduces transaction costs byprotecting these third parties but preserves some element of consent byproperty rightholders to avoid damaging property enforcement?e.g., it isthey, as principals, who authorize agents in originative contracts. Judicialverifiability of these originative contracts is obtained either as an automaticbyproduct of transactions or, when these would have remained private, byrequiring them to be made public. Protecting third parties produces a legalcommodity which is easy to trade impersonally, improving the allocationand specialization of resources. Historical delay in generalizing this legalcommoditization paradigm is attributed to path dependency?the law firstdeveloped for personal trade?and an unbalance in vested interests, asluddite legal professionals face weak public bureaucracies.

Leverage and beliefs: Personal experience and risk taking in margin lending

What determines risk-bearing capacity and the amount of leverage in financial markets? Thispaper uses unique micro-data on collateralized lending contracts during a period of financialdistress to address this question. An investor syndicate speculating in English stocks wentbankrupt in 1772. Using hand-collected information from Dutch notarial archives, we examinechanges in lenders' behavior following exposure to potential (but not actual) losses. Before thedistress episode, financiers that lent to the ill-fated syndicate were indistinguishable from therest. Afterwards, they behaved differently: they lent with much higher haircuts. Only lendersexposed to the failed syndicate altered their behavior. The differential change is remarkable sincethe distress was public knowledge, and because none of the lenders suffered actual losses ? allfinanciers were repaid in full. Interest rates were also unaffected; the market balanced solelythrough changes in collateral requirements. Our findings are consistent with a heterogeneousbeliefs-interpretation of leverage. They also suggest that individual experience can modify thelevel of leverage in a market quickly.

Centre de negocis : Barcelona Business World

Anàlisi, disseny i implementació de dues aplicacions (una plana web i una intranet), ambdues relacionades amb un centre de negocis anomenat Barcelona Business World.

Analysis of the present (and impact) of women in business organizations in contemporany Spanish democracy. The impact of Spanish law of equality reviewed

Since its approval, in 2007, the Spanish Law of Equality (LO 3/2007) has been the target of many scholars on gender issues. Those analyses (and those previous to the first observable results of the Spanish Law of Equality), have largely prioritized political representative institutions and political parties as the main arenas to assess the impact of the new regulation. Nevertheless, to make a comprehensive analysis of the increase and impact of the presence of women in contemporary democracies one cannot exclude the existence of many other crucial actors in our pluralist systems, such as business organizations.In this line, in order to widen the knowledge on the presence of women in Spanish contemporary democracy, as well as to further assess the impact of Spanish Law of Equality on the presence of women in economic and political life, our paper will look at the gender bias of the executive committees in the Spanish Chambers of Commerce and business associations during the period 20010-2012. By placing those actors at the front sight, we aim to contribute with new empirical insights to the current debate on this topic.