Buried clay pot irrigation for efficient and controlled water delivery

This study presents water flow (WF) into soil from several pitchers buried in the soil up to their neck and filled with water,under natural atmospheric conditions for a period of two years. Variation in daily WF into soil indicated a direct correlation with moisture deficit (MD) in atmosphere. WF increases linearly with MD for non rainy days. WF without hydraulic head through all pots varied in the order air>soil>water. Base line flow in water with respect to air was < 5%. WF for pots with hydraulic head was also in the order air>soil>water, but with significant increase in WF. Hydraulic conductivity Ks was in the order air>soil>water.Ks in water was independent of MD, whereas for air and soil, Ks increased with MD. Thus total WF is partially under hydraulic head and partly due to pull effect through capillary pores on pot wall either due to MD in air or prevailing soil water tension in soil.

The Shapley value for airport and irrigation games

In this paper cost sharing problems are considered. We focus on problems given by rooted trees, we call these problems cost-tree problems, and on the induced transferable utility cooperative games, called irrigation games. A formal notion of irrigation games is introduced, and the characterization of the class of these games is provided. The well-known class of airport games Littlechild and Thompson (1977) is a subclass of irrigation games. The Shapley value Shapley (1953) is probably the most popular solution concept for transferable utility cooperative games. Dubey (1982) and Moulin and Shenker (1992) show respectively, that Shapley's Shapley (1953) and Young (1985)'s axiomatizations of the Shapley value are valid on the class of airport games. In this paper we show that Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results can be proved by applying Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s proofs, that is those results are direct consequences of Shapley (1953)'s and Young (1985)'s results. Furthermore, we extend Dubey (1982)'s and Moulin and Shenker (1992)'s results to the class of irrigation games, that is we provide two characterizations of the Shapley value for cost sharing problems given by rooted trees. We also note that for irrigation games the Shapley value is always stable, that is it is always in the core Gillies (1959).

Irrigation regime affected SOC content rather than plow layer thickness of rice paddies : A county level survey from a river basin in lower Yangtze valley, China

Acknowledgements This work was funded by Natural Science Foundation of China under grant numbers of 41071337 and 40830528 and jointly by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions, China.

1961 Bessie Bean

1961-1962 Miss Lincoln