Memoranda booklet (soft cover) compliments of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, St. Catharines Branch

Memoranda booklet (soft cover) compliments of the Canadian Bank of Commerce, St. Catharines Branch. Only one page has writing on it. It appears to be a shopping list, n.d.

Indenture of assignment of mortgage between Executors of the Zimmerman Estate and the Bank of Upper Canada

Indenture of assignment of mortgage between Executors of the Zimmerman Estate and the Bank of Upper Canada regarding Lot no. 4 in block O in the Town of Elgin – instrument no. 6360, May 14, 1858.

Receipt from Lucien Howe, M.D., Buffalo, New York for ear examination

Receipt from Lucien Howe, M.D., Buffalo, New York for ear examination, Sept. 24, 1887.

Letter to William Dickson of Galt from the cashier of the Bank of Upper Canada

Letter to William Dickson of Galt from the cashier of the Bank of Upper Canada, Toronto, Ontario. This letter informs Mr. Dickson that he has received a bonus on his shares of the Old Stock on the Bank of Upper Canada due to an act that was passed by legislature (3 pages, printed), Jan. 6, 1855.

Statement of Debentures lodged in the Bank of Upper Canada for Safe Keeping and for Collection the Interest

Statement of Debentures lodged in the Bank of Upper Canada for Safe Keeping and for Collection the Interest on them every 6 months, on the 8th of February and the 8th of August every year (handwritten), 1848, 1850.

Statement of Debentures lodged in the Bank of Upper Canada for Safe Keeping and for Collection the Interest

Statement of Debentures lodged in the Bank of Upper Canada for Safe Keeping and for Collection the Interest on them every 6 months, on the 8th of February and the 8th of August every year (handwritten). [This is a more detailed copy of the above item], 1848, 1850.

Examination of Mr. Thomas Douglass of Brantford

Examination of Mr. Thomas Douglass of Brantford (1 double-sided page, handwritten). The pages are stained and contain some holes. This affects the text slightly, 1830.

Examination of Henry Nelles (2 double-sided pages, handwritten)

Examination of Henry Nelles (2 double-sided pages, handwritten). The pages are stained and contain some holes. This affects some of the text. [These are copies of the answers from the previous document], 1830.

Examination of W. George Richardson, clerk to William Richardson, Brantford, Post Master

Examination of W. George Richardson, clerk to William Richardson, Brantford, Post Master (2 pages, handwritten). This is stained and contains small holes. The text is not affected, 1830.

Examination of W. Henry Griffen of Grimsby

Examination of W. Henry Griffen of Grimsby (3 pages, handwritten). These pages are stained and slightly torn. This affects a small portion of the text, 1830.

Examination of W. Joseph Smith, clerk of Grimsby

Examination of W. Joseph Smith, clerk of Grimsby (2 pages, handwritten). The pages are stained and torn. This affects the text slightly, 1830.

Examination of Mr. Thomas Bingh

Examination of Mr. Thomas Bingh (1 ½ pages, handwritten), 1830.

Credibility and Signaling in Disinflation- a Cross Country Examination

This paper develops a model of money demand where the opportunity cost of holding money is subject to regime changes. The regimes are fully characterized by the mean and variance of inflation and are assumed to be the result of alternative government policies. Agents are unable to directly observe whether government actions are indeed consistent with the inflation rate targeted as part of a stabilization program but can construct probability inferences on the basis of available observations of inflation and money growth. Government announcements are assumed to provide agents with additional, possibly truthful information regarding the regime. This specification is estimated and tested using data from the Israeli and Argentine high inflation periods. Results indicate the successful stabilization program implemented in Israel in July 1985 was more credible than either the earlier Israeli attempt in November 1984 or the Argentine programs. Government’s signaling might substantially simplify the inference problem and increase the speed of learning on the part of the agents. However, under certain conditions, it might increase the volatility of inflation. After the introduction of an inflation stabilization plan, the welfare gains from a temporary increase in real balances might be high enough to induce agents to raise their real balances in the short-term, even if they are uncertain about the nature of government policy and the eventual outcome of the stabilization attempt. Statistically, the model restrictions cannot be rejected at the 1% significance level.

The Inflation Bias When the Central Bank Targets, the Natural Rate of Unemployment

This paper studies the proposition that an inflation bias can arise in a setup where a central banker with asymmetric preferences targets the natural unemployment rate. Preferences are asymmetric in the sense that positive unemployment deviations from the natural rate are weighted more (or less) severely than negative deviations in the central banker's loss function. The bias is proportional to the conditional variance of unemployment. The time-series predictions of the model are evaluated using data from G7 countries. Econometric estimates support the prediction that the conditional variance of unemployment and the rate of inflation are positively related.