Optimal contracting with private information on cost expectation and variability

We study the screening problem that arises in a framework where, initially, the agent is privately informed about both the expected production cost and the cost variability and, at a later stage, he learns privately the cost realization. The speci c set of relevant incentive constraints, and so the characteristics of the optimal mechanism, depend nely upon the curvature of the principal s marginal surplus function as well as the relative importance of the two initial information problems. Pooling of production levels is optimally induced with respect to the cost variability when the principal's knowledge imperfection about the latter is sufficiently less important than that about the expected cost.

Market Competition and Lower Tier Incentives

The relationship between competition and performance-related pay has been analyzed in single-principal-single-agent models. While this approach yields good predictions for managerial pay schemes, the predictions fail to apply for employees at lower tiers of a firm's hierarchy. In this paper, a principal-multi-agent model of incentive pay is developed which makes it possible to analyze the effect of changes in the competitiveness of markets on lower tier incentive payment schemes. The results explain why the payment schemes of agents located at low and mid tiers are less sensitive to changes in competition when aggregated firm data is used. Journal of Economic Literature classiffication numbers: D82, J21, L13, L22. Keywords: Cournot Competition, Contract Delegation, Moral Hazard, Entry, Market Size, Wage Cost.

The Spillover Effects of Monitoring: A Field Experiment.

We provide field experimental evidence of the effects of monitoring in a context where productivity is multi-dimensional and only one dimension is monitored and incentivised. We hire students to do a job for us. The job consists of identifying euro coins. We study the effects of monitoring and penalising mistakes on work quality, and evaluate spillovers on non- incentivised dimensions of productivity (punctuality and theft). We .nd that monitoring improves work quality only if incentives are large, but reduces punctuality substantially irrespectively of the size of incentives. Monitoring does not affect theft, with ten per cent of participants stealing overall. Our setting also allows us to disentangle between possible theoretical mechanisms driving the adverse effects of monitoring. Our .ndings are supportive of a reciprocity mechanism, whereby workers retaliate for being distrusted.

The Effects of Experience on Preference Uncertainty: Theory and Empirics for Public and Quasi-Public Environmental Goods

This paper develop and estimates a model of demand estimation for environmental public goods which allows for consumers to learn about their preferences through consumption experiences. We develop a theoretical model of Bayesian updating, perform comparative statics over the model, and show how the theoretical model can be consistently incorporated into a reduced form econometric model. We then estimate the model using data collected for two environmental goods. We find that the predictions of the theoretical exercise that additional experience makes consumers more certain over their preferences in both mean and variance are supported in each case.

Measuring intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain: a selection-bias-free approach

This paper analyses intergenerational earnings mobility in Spain correcting for different selection biases. We address the co-residence selection problem by combining information from two samples and using the two-sample two-stage least square estimator. We find a small decrease in elasticity when we move to younger cohorts. Furthermore, we find a higher correlation in the case of daughters than in the case of sons; however, when we consider the employment selection in the case of daughters, by adopting a Heckman-type correction method, the diference between sons and daughters disappears. By decomposing the sources of earnings elasticity across generations, we find that the correlation between child's and father's occupation is the most important component. Finally, quantile regressions estimates show that the influence of the father's earnings is greater when we move to the lower tail of the offspring's earnings distribution, especially in the case of daughters' earnings.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.

Decentralization and the Gains from Monitoring

This paper analyzes the delegation of contracting capacity in a moral hazard environment with sequential production in a project which involves a principal and two agents. The agent in charge of the …nal production can obtain soft information about the other agent's effort choice by investing in monitoring. I investigate the circumstances under which it is optimal for the principal to use a centralized organization in which she designs the contracts with both agents or to use a decentralized organization in which she contracts only one agent, and delegates the power to contract the other agent. It is shown that in this setting a decentralized organization can be superior to a centralized organization. This is because the principal is better off under monitoring and the incentives for an agent to invest in monitoring can be higher in a decentralized organization. The circumstances under which this is true are related to the monitoring costs and the importance of each agent for production. The results explain the recent application of the design-build method in public procurement. Journal of Economic Literature Classi…cation Numbers: D23, D82, L14, L22. Keywords: Decentralization of Contracting, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.

Epidemiological risk sratification of malaria in the Américas

During the last years, malaria had a significant increase in Latin America, emerging again as one critical health problem in the Region of the Americas. More than 1.04 million new cases were reported in 1990. This resurgence of malaria needed a comprehensive strategy for its prevention and control. National malaria control programs recognized the epidemiological stratification of malaria as a valuable method to assist them in the recognition of local variations and factors that specifically contribute to the level and intensity of transmission in critical malarious areas. Also it serves as a useful instrument for the selection of needed malaria prevention and control activities. The principal feature of this approach is to provide a dynamic and ongoing process for assessing in the epidemiological importance of different risk factors (socio-economic, ecological, organizatuion of health services) in malaria transmission. health interventions are based on this assesment and are aimed directly at the reduction or elimination of the identified risk factors operating at the local level. Intersectorial co-participation and the integration of malaria programs in local health services are also important aspects of this public health approach.

Decreasing population selection rates of resistance mutation K65R over time in HIV-1 patients receiving combination therapy including tenofovir.

OBJECTIVES: The use of tenofovir is highly associated with the emergence of mutation K65R, which confers broad resistance to nucleoside/nucleotide analogue reverse transcriptase inhibitors (NRTIs), especially when tenofovir is combined with other NRTIs also selecting for K65R. Although recent HIV-1 treatment guidelines discouraging these combinations resulted in reduced K65R selection with tenofovir, updated information on the impact of currently recommended regimens on the population selection rate of K65R is presently lacking. METHODS: In this study, we evaluated changes over time in the selection rate of resistance mutation K65R in a large population of 2736 HIV-1-infected patients failing combination antiretroviral treatment between 2002 and 2010. RESULTS: The K65R resistance mutation was detected in 144 patients, a prevalence of 5.3%. A large majority of observed K65R cases were explained by the use of tenofovir, reflecting its wide use in clinical practice. However, changing patterns over time in NRTIs accompanying tenofovir resulted in a persistent decreasing probability of K65R selection by tenofovir-based therapy. The currently recommended NRTI combination tenofovir/emtricitabine was associated with a low probability of K65R emergence. For any given dual NRTI combination including tenofovir, higher selection rates of K65R were consistently observed with a non-nucleoside reverse transcriptase inhibitor than with a protease inhibitor as the third agent. DISCUSSION: Our finding of a stable time trend of K65R despite elevated use of tenofovir illustrates increased potency of current HIV-1 therapy including tenofovir.

The Division problem with voluntary participation

The division problem consists of allocating a given amount of an homogeneous and perfectly divisible good among a group of agents with single-peaked preferences on the set of their potential shares. A rule proposes a vector of shares for each division problem. The literature has implicitly assumed that agents will find acceptable any share they are assigned to. In this paper we consider the division problem when agents' participation is voluntary. Each agent has an idiosyncratic interval of acceptable shares where his preferences are single-peaked. A rule has to propose to each agent either to not participate or an acceptable share because otherwise he would opt out and this would require to reassign some of the remaining agents' shares. We study a subclass of efficient and consistent rules and characterize extensions of the uniform rule that deal explicitly with agents' voluntary participation.

Protein recovery, separation and purification: selection of optimal techniques using an expert system

The paper discusses the utilization of new techniques ot select processes for protein recovery, separation and purification. It describesa rational approach that uses fundamental databases of proteins molecules to simplify the complex problem of choosing high resolution separation methods for multi component mixtures. It examines the role of modern computer techniques to help solving these questions.

On the maintenance of sex-chromosome polymorphism by sex-antagonistic selection

Complex sex-determination systems are a priori unstable and require specific selective forces for their maintenance. Analytical derivations have suggested that sex-antagonistic selection may play such a role, but this assumed absence of recombination between the sex-determining and sex-antagonistic genes. Using individual-based simulations, and focusing on the sex chromosome and coloration polymorphisms of platy fishes as a case study, we show that the conditions for polymorphism maintenance induce female-biases in primary sex ratios, so that sex-ratio selection makes the system collapse towards male- or female heterogamety as soon as recombinant genotypes appear. However, a polymorphism can still be maintained under scenarios comprising strong sexual selection against dull males, mild natural selection against bright females, and low recombination rates. Though such conditions are plausibly met in natural populations of fishes harbouring such polymorphisms, quantitative empirical evaluations are required to properly test whether sex-antagonistic selection is a causal agent, or if other selective processes are required (such as local mate competition favouring female biased sex ratios).

Agent based simulation to optimise emergency departments

Nowadays, many of the health care systems are large and complex environments and quite dynamic, specifically Emergency Departments, EDs. It is opened and working 24 hours per day throughout the year with limited resources, whereas it is overcrowded. Thus, is mandatory to simulate EDs to improve qualitatively and quantitatively their performance. This improvement can be achieved modelling and simulating EDs using Agent-Based Model, ABM and optimising many different staff scenarios. This work optimises the staff configuration of an ED. In order to do optimisation, objective functions to minimise or maximise have to be set. One of those objective functions is to find the best or optimum staff configuration that minimise patient waiting time. The staff configuration comprises: doctors, triage nurses, and admissions, the amount and sort of them. Staff configuration is a combinatorial problem, that can take a lot of time to be solved. HPC is used to run the experiments, and encouraging results were obtained. However, even with the basic ED used in this work the search space is very large, thus, when the problem size increases, it is going to need more resources of processing in order to obtain results in an acceptable time.

Estudi de la configuració magnètica de l'experiment LTP (LISA Technology Package)

La Teoria de la Relativitat General preveu que quan un objecte massiu és sotmès a una certa acceleració en certes condicions ha d’emetre ones gravitacionals. Es tracta d’un tipus d’on altament energètica però que interacciona amb la matèria de manera molt feble i el seu punt d’emissió és força llunyà. Per la qual cosa la seva detecció és una tasca extraordinàriament complicada. Conseqüentment, la detecció d’aquestes ones es creu molt més factible utilitzant instruments situats a l’espai. Amb aquest objectiu, neis la missió LISA (Laser Interferometer Space Antenna). Es tracta aquesta d’una missió conjunta entre la NASA i l’ESA amb llançament previst per 2020-2025. Per reduir els riscs que comporta una primera utilització de tecnologia no testejada, unit a l’alt cost econòmic de la missió LISA. Aquesta missió contindrà instruments molt avançats: el LTP (LISA Technoplogy Package), desenvolupat per la Unió Europea, que provarà la tecnologia de LISA i el Drag Free flying system, que s’encarregarà de provar una sèrie de propulsors (thrusters) utilitzats per al control d’actitud i posició de satèl•lit amb precisió de nanòmetres. Particularment, el LTP, està composat per dues masses de prova separades per 35 centímetres, i d’un interferòmetre làser que mesura la variació de la distància relativa entre elles. D’aquesta manera, el LTP mesurarà les prestacions dels equips i les possibles interferències que afecten a la mesura. Entre les fonts de soroll es troben, entre d’altres, el vent i pressió de radiació solar, les càrregues electrostàtiques, el gradient tèrmic, les fluctuacions de voltatge o les forces internes. Una de les possibles causes de soroll és aquella que serà l’objecte d’estudi en aquest projecte de tesi doctoral: la presència dintre del LTP de camps magnètics, que exerceixen una força sobre les masses de prova, la seva estimació i el seu control, prenent en compte les caracterírstiques magnètiques de l’experiment i la dinàmica del satèl•lit.

Monitorització d'alt nivell per a el computing de l'experiment ATLAS (LHC)

Aquest projecte descriu la fusió de les necessitats diaries de monitorització del experiment ATLAS des del punt de vista del cloud. La idea principal es desenvolupar un conjunt de col·lectors que recullin informació de la distribució i processat de les dades i dels test de wlcg (Service Availability Monitoring), emmagatzemant-la en BBDD específiques per tal de mostrar els resultats en una sola pàgina HLM (High Level Monitoring). Un cop aconseguit, l’aplicació ha de permetre investigar més enllà via interacció amb el front-end, el qual estarà alimentat per les estadístiques emmagatzemades a la BBDD.