999 resultados para security administration
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The arbuscular mycorrhizal symbiosis is formed between arbuscular mycorrhizal fungi (AMF) and plant roots. The fungi provide the plant with inorganic phosphate (P). The symbiosis can result in increased plant growth. Although most global food crops naturally form this symbiosis, very few studies have shown that their practical application can lead to large-scale increases in food production. Application of AMF to crops in the tropics is potentially effective for improving yields. However, a main problem of using AMF on a large-scale is producing cheap inoculum in a clean sterile carrier and sufficiently concentrated to cheaply transport. Recently, mass-produced in vitro inoculum of the model mycorrhizal fungus Rhizophagus irregularis became available, potentially making its use viable in tropical agriculture. One of the most globally important food plants in the tropics is cassava. We evaluated the effect of in vitro mass-produced R. irregularis inoculum on the yield of cassava crops at two locations in Colombia. A significant effect of R. irregularis inoculation on yield occurred at both sites. At one site, yield increases were observed irrespective of P fertilization. At the other site, inoculation with AMF and 50% of the normally applied P gave the highest yield. Despite that AMF inoculation resulted in greater food production, economic analyses revealed that AMF inoculation did not give greater return on investment than with conventional cultivation. However, the amount of AMF inoculum used was double the recommended dose and was calculated with European, not Colombian, inoculum prices. R. irregularis can also be manipulated genetically in vitro, leading to improved plant growth. We conclude that application of in vitro R. irregularis is currently a way of increasing cassava yields, that there is a strong potential for it to be economically profitable and that there is enormous potential to improve this efficiency further in the future.
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We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.
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166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.
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A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - December 2007
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A-1a - SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY INCOME PROGRAM - November 2007
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Many political economic theories use and emphasize the process of votingin their explanation of the growth of Social Security, governmentspending, and other public policies. But is there an empirical connectionbetween democracy and Social Security program size or design? Using somenew international data sets to produce both country-panel econometricestimates as well as case studies of South American and southern Europeancountries, we find that Social Security policy varies according toeconomic and demographic factors, but that very different politicalhistories can result in the same Social Security policy. We find littlepartial effect of democracy on the size of Social Security budgets, onhow those budgets are allocated, or how economic and demographic factorsaffect Social Security. If there is any observed difference, democraciesspend a little less of their GDP on Social Security, grow their budgetsa bit more slowly, and cap their payroll tax more often, than doeconomically and demographically similar nondemocracies. Democracies andnondemocracies are equally likely to have benefit formulas inducingretirement and, conditional on GDP per capita, equally likely to induceretirement with a retirement test vs. an earnings test.
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Why are Bismarckian social security systems associated with largerpublic pension expenditures, a smaller fraction of private pension andlower income in-equality than Beveridgean systems? These facts arepuzzling for political economy theories of social security whichpredict that Beveridgean systems, involving intra-generationalredistribution, should enjoy larger support among low-income people andthus be larger. This paper explains these features in a bidimensionalpolitical economy model. In an economy with three income groups,low-income support a large, redistributive system; middle-income favoran earning-related system, while high-income oppose any public system,since they have access to a superior saving technology, a privatesystem. We show that, if income inequality is large, the voting majorityof high-income and low-income supports a (small) Beveridgean system,and a large private pillar arises; the opposite occurs with lowinequality. Additionally, when the capital market provides higherreturns, a Beveridgean system is more likely to emerge.
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Puhe
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B-1 Medicaid Reports The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report name Report number Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown IAMM1800-R001 Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County IAMM1800-R002 Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service IAMM2200-R002 Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service IAMM2200-R003 ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County IAMM3800-R001 Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program IAMM4400-R001 Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program IAMM4400-R002 Elderly Waiver Summary by County IAMM4600-R002
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B-1 Medicaid Reports The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report Report name IAMM1800-R001 Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown IAMM1800-R002 Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County IAMM2200-R002 Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service IAMM2200-R003 Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service IAMM3800-R001 ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County IAMM4400-R001 Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program IAMM4400-R002 Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program IAMM4600-R002 Elderly Waiver Summary by County
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A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, April 2008
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A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, March 2008
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B-1 Medicaid Reports The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report name Report number IAMM1800-R001 Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown IAMM1800-R002 Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County IAMM2200-R002 Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service IAMM2200-R003 Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service IAMM3800-R001 ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County IAMM4400-R001 Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program IAMM4400-R002 Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program IAMM4600-R002 Elderly Waiver Summary by County
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B-1 Medicaid Reports -- The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report Report name IAMM1800-R001--Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown; IAMM1800-R002--Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County; IAMM2200-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM2200-R003--Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM3800-R001--ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County; IAMM4400-R001--Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program; IAMM4400-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program; IAMM4600-R002--Elderly Waiver Summary by County.
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B-1 Medicaid Reports -- The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report Report name IAMM1800-R001--Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown; IAMM1800-R002--Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County; IAMM2200-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM2200-R003--Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM3800-R001--ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County; IAMM4400-R001--Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program; IAMM4400-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program; IAMM4600-R002--Elderly Waiver Summary by County.