On the number of limit cycles bifurcating from a non-global degenerated center

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Should fiscal authorities cooperate in a monetary union with public deficit targets?

In this paper we analyse the setting of optimal policies in a monetary union with one monetary authority and various fiscal authorities that have a public deficit target. We will show that fiscal cooperation among the fiscal authorities, in the presence of positive supply shocks, ends up producing higher public deficits than in a non-cooperative regime. JEL No. E61, E63, F33, H0. Keywords: monetary union, fiscal policy coordination.

Creating and using a non-dedicated HPC cluster with ParallelKnoppix

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows econometricians with average knowledge of computers to create and begin using a high performance computing cluster for parallel computing in very little time. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, and clusters of up to 200 nodes are supported. When the cluster is shut down, all machines are in their original state, so their temporary use in the cluster does not interfere with their normal uses. An example shows how a Monte Carlo study of a bootstrap test procedure may be done in parallel. Using a cluster of 20 nodes, the example runs approximately 20 times faster than it does on a single computer.

ParallelKnoppix - Rapid deployment of a linux cluster for MPI parallel processing using non-dedicated computers

This note describes ParallelKnoppix, a bootable CD that allows creation of a Linux cluster in very little time. An experienced user can create a cluster ready to execute MPI programs in less than 10 minutes. The computers used may be heterogeneous machines, of the IA-32 architecture. When the cluster is shut down, all machines except one are in their original state, and the last can be returned to its original state by deleting a directory. The system thus provides a means of using non-dedicated computers to create a cluster. An example session is documented.

Coalition formation in a contest game with three heterogeneous players

We analyze the incentives for cooperation of three players differing in their efficiency of effort in a contest game. We concentrate on the non-cooperative bargaining foundation of coalition formation, and therefore, we adopt a two-stage model. In the first stage, individuals form coalitions following a bargaining protocol similar to the one proposed by Gul (1989). Afterwards, coalitions play the contest game of Esteban and Ray (1999) within the resulting coalition structure of the first stage. We find that the grand coalition forms whenever the distribution of the bargaining power in the coalition formation game is equal to the distribution of the relative efficiency of effort. Finally, we use the case of equal bargaining power for all individuals to show that other types of coalition structures may be observed as well.

How universal is behavior? A four country comparison of spite, cooperation and errors in voluntary contribution mechanisms

This paper studies behavior in experiments with a linear voluntary contributions mechanism for public goods conducted in Japan, the Netherlands, Spain and the USA. The same experimental design was used in the four countries. Our 'contribution function' design allows us to obtain a view of subjects' behavior from two complementary points of view. If yields information about situations where, in purely pecuniary terms, it is a dominant strategy to contribute all the endowment and about situations where it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing. Our results show, first, that differences in behavior across countries are minor. We find that when people play "the same game" they behave similarly. Second, for all four countries our data are inconsistent with the explanation that subjects contribute only out of confusion. A common cooperative motivation is needed to explain the date.

On the stability of cooperation structures

Qin [J. Eco. Th., 1996] recently showed that in a game of endogenous formation of cooperation structure, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, then the full cooperation structure is stable. In this note, we characterize the class of games that ensure the stability of the full cooperation structure, and show that this class is much larger than that of superadditive TU-games.

Firm strategies in R&D: cooperation and participation in R&D programs

This paper presents empirical evidence on firms’ decisions to cooperate in R&D and the extent to which government sponsored R&D programs increase cooperation. Using a sample of firms from the Spanish innovation survey we jointly estimate the determinants of firm participation in R&D programs and of choice of cooperation partners. We find that (i) firms participating in national and European programs have different profiles, suggesting program complementarity; (ii) private-private and publicprivate cooperation are associated on average with firms with different characteristics, and (iii) national R&D programs seem to have a positive effect on all types of cooperation, but especially on public-private partnerships.