The Bayesian Foundations of solution concepts of games

We transform a non co-operati ve game into a -Bayesian decision problem for each player where the uncertainty faced by a player is the strategy choices of the other players, the pr iors of other players on the choice of other players, the priors over priors and so on.We provide a complete characterization between the extent of knowledge about the rationality of players and their ability to successfulIy eliminate strategies which are not best responses. This paper therefore provides the informational foundations of iteratively unàominated strategies and rationalizable strategic behavior (Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984». Moreover, sufficient condi tions are also found for Nash equilibrium behavior. We also provide Aumann's (1985) results on correlated equilibria .

A comment on "Rational learning lead to nash equilibrium" by professors Ehud Kalai and Ehud Lehrer

Kalai and Lebrer (93a, b) have recently show that for the case of infinitely repeated games, a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies ensures convergence to Nash equilibrium. In this paper, we show that for the case of repeated games with long (but finite) horizon, their condition does not imply approximate Nash equilibrium play. Recently Kalai and Lehrer (93a, b) proved that a coordination assumption on beliefs and optimal strategies, ensures that pIayers of an infinitely repeated game eventually pIay 'E-close" to an E-Nash equilibrium. Their coordination assumption requires that if players believes that certain set of outcomes have positive probability then it must be the case that this set of outcomes have, in fact, positive probability. This coordination assumption is called absolute continuity. For the case of finitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a quite innocuous assumption that just ensures that pIayers' can revise their priors by Bayes' Law. However, for the case of infinitely repeated games, the absolute continuity assumption is a stronger requirement because it also refers to events that can never be observed in finite time.

The finite-sample size of the BDS test for GARCH standardized residuals

This paper uses a multivariate response surface methodology to analyze the size distortion of the BDS test when applied to standardized residuals of rst-order GARCH processes. The results show that the asymptotic standard normal distribution is an unreliable approximation, even in large samples. On the other hand, a simple log-transformation of the squared standardized residuals seems to correct most of the size problems. Nonethe-less, the estimated response surfaces can provide not only a measure of the size distortion, but also more adequate critical values for the BDS test in small samples.

On the impossibility of prisoner's dilemmas in adversarial preference games

Why don't agents cooperate when they both stand to gain? This question ranks among the most fundamental in the social sciences. Explanations abound. Among the most compelling are various configurations of the prisonerís dilemma (PD), or public goods problem. Payoffs in PDís are specified in one of two ways: as primitive cardinal payoffs or as ordinal final utility. However, as final utility is objectively unobservable, only the primitive payoff games are ever observed. This paper explores mappings from primitive payoff to utility payoff games and demonstrates that though an observable game is a PD there are broad classes of utility functions for which there exists no associated utility PD. In particular we show that even small amounts of either altruism or jealousy may disrupt the mapping from primitive payoff to utility PD. We then examine some implications of these results ñ including the possibility of conflict inducing growth.

Existence of nash equilibrium in competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection

We show that for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games with adverse selection, the property of better-reply security is naturally satisfied - thus, resolving via a result due to Reny (1999) the issue of existence of Nash equilibrium for a large class of competitive nonlinear pricing games.

Flexible information acquisition and optimal Tobin tax in tractable dynamic global games

My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

On invariant Rings of Sylow subgroups of finite classical groups

In this thesis we study the invariant rings for the Sylow p-subgroups of the nite classical groups. We have successfully constructed presentations for the invariant rings for the Sylow p-subgroups of the unitary groups GU(3; Fq2) and GU(4; Fq2 ), the symplectic group Sp(4; Fq) and the orthogonal group O+(4; Fq) with q odd. In all cases, we obtained a minimal generating set which is also a SAGBI basis. Moreover, we computed the relations among the generators and showed that the invariant ring for these groups are a complete intersection. This shows that, even though the invariant rings of the Sylow p-subgroups of the general linear group are polynomial, the same is not true for Sylow p-subgroups of general classical groups. We also constructed the generators for the invariant elds for the Sylow p-subgroups of GU(n; Fq2 ), Sp(2n; Fq), O+(2n; Fq), O-(2n + 2; Fq) and O(2n + 1; Fq), for every n and q. This is an important step in order to obtain the generators and relations for the invariant rings of all these groups.

The use of software Mapavox for teaching graphics and games to blind and low vision students: a development through practices

Current policies on education to visually impaired point for a growing trend of including students with special educational needs in regular schools. However, most often this inclusion is not accompanied by an appropriate professional trained or infrastructure, which has been presented as a big problem for regular school teachers who have students with visual impairments in their classroom. Based on this situation, the Group of Extension in Tactile Cartography from UNESP - University of the State of São Paulo - Campus de Rio Claro - SP - Brazil has been developing educational material of geography and cartography to blind students at a special school. Among the materials developed in this study highlight the development of graphics and board games provided with sound capabilities through MAPAVOX, software developed in partnership with UFRJ - Federal University from Rio de Janeiro - RJ - Brazil. Through this software, sound capabilities can be inserted into built materials, giving them a multi-sensory character. In most cases the necessary conditions for building specific materials to students with visual impairments is expensive and beyond the reach of features from a regular school, so the survey sought to use easy access and low cost materials like Cork, leaf aluminum, material for fixing and others. The development of these materials was supported by preparation in laboratory and its subsequent test through practices involving blind students. The methodology used on the survey is based on qualitative research and non comparative analysis of the results. In other words, the material is built based on the special students perception and reality construction, not being mere adaptations of visual materials, but a construction focused on the reality of the visually impaired. The results proved were quite successful as the materials prepared were effective on mediating the learning process of students with disabilities. Geographical and cartographic concepts were seized by the students through the technology used, associated with the use of materials that took into account in its building process the perception of the students.

Stochastic stability for Markovian jump linear systems associated with a finite number of jump times

This paper deals with a stochastic stability concept for discrete-time Markovian jump linear systems. The random jump parameter is associated to changes between the system operation modes due to failures or repairs, which can be well described by an underlying finite-state Markov chain. In the model studied, a fixed number of failures or repairs is allowed, after which, the system is brought to a halt for maintenance or for replacement. The usual concepts of stochastic stability are related to pure infinite horizon problems, and are not appropriate in this scenario. A new stability concept is introduced, named stochastic tau-stability that is tailored to the present setting. Necessary and sufficient conditions to ensure the stochastic tau-stability are provided, and the almost sure stability concept associated with this class of processes is also addressed. The paper also develops equivalences among second order concepts that parallels the results for infinite horizon problems. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Excitations and finite-size properties of an integrable supersymmetric electronic model

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)

BOUND HYDROGENIC STATES IN A MAGNETIC FIELD: A FINITE-DIFFERENCE APPROACH

A finite-difference scheme is used to calculate bound electronic states of an electron in a hydrogen atom subject to a magnetic field. The numerical results are in good agreement with exact results, in the absence of the magnetic field, and with a two-parameters variational calculation, when the magnetic field is applied.

Assessment of a high-order finite difference upwind scheme for the simulation of convection-diffusion problems

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Modeling of interfaces in two-dimensional problems using solid finite elements with high aspect ratio

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico (CNPq)