The use of remotely sensed rainfall for managing drought risk: a case study of weather index insurance in Zambia

Remotely sensed rainfall is increasingly being used to manage climate-related risk in gauge sparse regions. Applications based on such data must make maximal use of the skill of the methodology in order to avoid doing harm by providing misleading information. This is especially challenging in regions, such as Africa, which lack gauge data for validation. In this study, we show how calibrated ensembles of equally likely rainfall can be used to infer uncertainty in remotely sensed rainfall estimates, and subsequently in assessment of drought. We illustrate the methodology through a case study of weather index insurance (WII) in Zambia. Unlike traditional insurance, which compensates proven agricultural losses, WII pays out in the event that a weather index is breached. As remotely sensed rainfall is used to extend WII schemes to large numbers of farmers, it is crucial to ensure that the indices being insured are skillful representations of local environmental conditions. In our study we drive a land surface model with rainfall ensembles, in order to demonstrate how aggregation of rainfall estimates in space and time results in a clearer link with soil moisture, and hence a truer representation of agricultural drought. Although our study focuses on agricultural insurance, the methodological principles for application design are widely applicable in Africa and elsewhere.

Government spending and unemployment : An empirical study on Sweden, 1994-2012

The aim of the study was to see if any relationship between government spending andunemployment could be empirically found. To test if government spending affectsunemployment, a statistical model was applied on data from Sweden. The data was quarterlydata from the year 1994 until 2012, unit-root test were conducted and the variables wheretransformed to its first-difference so ensure stationarity. This transformation changed thevariables to growth rates. This meant that the interpretation deviated a little from the originalgoal. Other studies reviewed indicate that when government spending increases and/or taxesdecreases output increases. Studies show that unemployment decreases when governmentspending/GDP ratio increases. Some studies also indicated that with an already largegovernment sector increasing the spending it could have negative effect on output. The modelwas a VAR-model with unemployment, output, interest rate, taxes and government spending.Also included in the model were a linear and three quarterly dummies. The model used 7lags. The result was not statistically significant for most lags but indicated that as governmentspending growth rate increases holding everything else constant unemployment growth rateincreases. The result for taxes was even less statistically significant and indicates norelationship with unemployment. Post-estimation test indicates that there were problems withnon-normality in the model. So the results should be interpreted with some scepticism.

Growth, migration and unemployment across Swedish municipalities

Fundamental questions in economics are why some regions are richer than others, why their economic growth rates vary, whether their growth tends to converge and the key factors that contribute to the variations. These questions have not yet been fully addressed, but changes in the local tax base are clearly influenced by the average income growth rate, net migration rate, and changes in unemployment rates. Thus, the main aim of this paper is to explore in depth the interactive effects of these factors (and local policy variables) in Swedish municipalities, by estimating a proposed three-equation system. Our main finding is that increases in local public expenditures and income taxes have negative effects on subsequent local income growth. In addition, our results support the conditional convergence hypothesis, i.e. that average income tends to grow more rapidly in relatively poor local jurisdictions than in initially “richer” jurisdictions, conditional on the other explanatory variables.

Changes in Maine's Unemployment Rate

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On the positive correlation between income inequality and unemployment

Several empirical studies in the literature have documented the existence of a positive correlation between income inequalitiy and unemployment. I provide a theoretical framework under which this correlation can be better understood. The analysis is based on a dynamic job search under uncertainty. I start by proving the uniqueness of a stationary distribution of wages in the economy. Drawing upon this distribution, I provide a general expression for the Gini coefficient of income inequality. The expression has the advantage of not requiring a particular specification of the distribution of wage offers. Next, I show how the Gini coefficient varies as a function of the parameters of the model, and how it can be expected to be positively correlated with the rate of unemployment. Two examples are offered. The first, of a technical nature, to show that the convergence of the measures implied by the underlying Markov process can fail in some cases. The second, to provide a quantitative assessment of the model and of the mechanism linking unemployment and inequality.

Towards a measure of income inequality freed from the volatility caused by variations in the rate of unemployment

By mixing together inequalities based on cyclical variables, such as unemployment, and on structural variables, such as education, usual measurements of income inequality add objects of a di§erent economic nature. Since jobs are not acquired or lost as fast as education or skills, this aggreagation leads to a loss of relavant economic information. Here I propose a di§erent procedure for the calculation of inequality. The procedure uses economic theory to construct an inequality measure of a long-run character, the calculation of which can be performed, though, with just one set of cross-sectional observations. Technically, the procedure is based on the uniqueness of the invariant distribution of wage o§ers in a job-search model. Workers should be pre-grouped by the distribution of wage o§ers they see, and only between-group inequalities should be considered. This construction incorporates the fact that the average wages of all workers in the same group tend to be equalized by the continuous turnover in the job market.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Determinants for political risk insurance of direct investments in emerging markets

Esta dissertação analisa os principais determinantes para investidores contratarem seguro de proteção de riscos políticos (PRI) para seus investimentos diretos, assim com o racional de sair de um PRI não renovando suas políticas. Esta dissertação contribui para a literatura existente sobre PRI, investigando os principais motivadores para PRI, tais como, riscos políticos, riscos econômicos, capacidade do patrocinador, instrumento utilizado para realizar o investimento (horizonte do investimento) determina combinações de PRI utilizando um modelo binário de resposta não linear. Um banco de dados único da Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) no período de 1990 até 2010, contendo informações sobre 693 investimentos incluindo sua cobertura para: seguro de risco de conversibilidade, seguro para risco de expropriação, riscos de guerras e distúrbios civis e riscos de quebra de contrato. Entretanto, percebemos que 47% destes seguros não permanecem ativos até o prazo originalmente contratado. Adicionalmente, instituições financeiras como garantidoras utilizam proporcionalmente mais dívida do que capital como instrumento de investimento e são largamente seguradas dentro da União Européia (EU). Por outro lado, investidores nos BRICs tendem a cobrir primariamente seus investimentos em infraestrutura. Resultados empíricos incluem que um aumento nos riscos de quebra de contrato e guerra civil estão totalmente correlacionados com a renovação de contratos de seguro, assim como um aumento da percepção de risco do pais que está recebendo o investimento.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derive

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.

Do insurance defrauders want to be punished?

We analyze a Principal-Agent model of an insurer who faces an adverse selection problem. He is unable to observe if his client has a high risk or a low risk of having an accident. At the underwriting of the contract, the insurer requests the client to declare his risk. After that, the former can costly audit the truthfulness of this announcement. If the audit confirms a false declaration, the insurer is legally allowed to punish the defrauder. We characterize the efRcient contracts when this punishment is bounded from above by a legal restriction. Then, we do some comparative statics on the efRcient contracts and on the agent's utility. The most important result of this paper concerns the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment. We prove that there exists a uni que value of this legal limit that maximizes the expected utility of a high risk type. Facing this particular value of the legal limit to a defrauder's punishment, the insurer will effectively audit a low risk reporto We also show that this particular value increases with the probability of facing a high risk policyholder. Therefore, when this probability is sufRciently high, the nullity of the contract is not enough. From the point of view of a potential defrauder, the law should allow harder sanctions. This is an striking result because the nullity of the contract is a common sanction for this kind of fraud in the USA and in some European countries.

Project portfolio management: an analysis from the insurance industry IT area

This paper aims to bring more information related to the critical question "how IT areas of insurance companies are defining and delivering their strategic initiatives Portfolios?" and make conclusions based on the collected data. To reach these interpretations, it is composed of a theoretical investigation on the theme, a strategy delineation for the research methodology and a conclusion presentation based on the findings. In this last part, this study concluded that explored organization does not applied a sufficient number of best practices answering the critical question as "the company is not mature on this subject".

Microinsurance: income risk, social security and the demand for private onsurance by low-income families

Insurance provision against uncertainties is present in several dimensions of peoples´s lives, such as the provisions related to, inter alia, unemployment, diseases, accidents, robbery and death. Microinsurance improves the ability of low-income individuals to cope with these risks. Brazil has a fairly developed financial system but still not geared towards the poor, especially in what concerns the insurance industry. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The evaluation of the microinsurance effects on well-being, and the demand for different types of microinsurance require an analysis of the dynamics of the individual income process and an assessment of substitutes and complementary institutions that condition their respective financial behavior. The Brazilian government provides a relatively developed social security system considering other countries of similar income level which crowds-out the demand for insurance and savings. On the other hand, this same public infrastructure may help to foster microfinance products supply. The objective of this paper is to analyze the demand for different types of private insurance by the low-income population using microdata from a National Expenditure Survey (POF/IBGE). The final objective is to help to understand the trade-offs faced for the development of an emerging industry of microinsurance in Brazil.