1 + 1 = 3? EU-US voting cohesion in the United Nations General Assembly. EU Diplomacy Paper 07/2012, September 2012

This paper investigates the factors that explain the voting cohesion of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU) on foreign policy issues in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). It is often argued that the EU and the US are simply too different to cooperate within international organizations and thus to vote the same way, for example, in the UNGA. However, there is still a lack of research on this point and, more importantly, previous studies have not analyzed which factors explain EU-US voting cohesion. In this paper, I try to fill this gap by studying voting cohesion from 1980 until 2011 on issues of both ‘high’ politics (security) and ‘low’ politics (human rights) not only as regards EU-US voting cohesion, but also concerning voting cohesion among EU member states. I test six hypotheses derived from International Relations theories, and I argue that EU-US voting cohesion is best explained by the topic of the issue voted upon, whether an issue is marked as ‘important’ by the US government, and by the type of resolution. On the EU level, the length of Union membership and transaction costs matter most.

The EU should tax in harmony. CEPS Commentary, 3 May 2012

Rather than expending unnecessary negative energy on the blunt and indiscriminate financial transaction tax (FTT), this commentary argues that the EU should give priority to its tax base harmonisation project. Progress on this front would advance several objectives at once: it would make an important step towards more economic union, it would promote the EU as a business location and it would succeed in appropriating tax income to the location where corporate activities are effectively exercised.

The Legacy of Austerity in the Eurozone. CEPS Commentary, 4 October 2013

The recent slight improvement in the GDP growth rates in the eurozone has led European policy-makers to proclaim victory and assert that the austerity programmes imposed within the eurozone are paying off. But is this really the case? In this Commentary Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji argue that the improvement in the eurozone business cycle is the result of the ECB’s announcement of its Outright Monetary Transaction (OMT) programme, and that austerity has left a legacy of unsustainable debt that will test the political resilience of the debtor countries.

La réforme Dodd-Frank des produits dérivés de gré à gré : vers un modèle mondial?

Suite à la crise financière de 2008 les pays du G20 se sont interrogés sur la transparence des marchés, la stabilité du système et une façon de réguler les risques posés par le nouvel environnement économique. Les produits dérivés de gré à gré ont été identifiés et des engagements ont été pris en faveur de nouvelles régulations des dérivés de gré à gré et la gestion des risques sous-jacents. Les régulateurs ont donc adopté chacun à leur tour un cadre législatif régulant les dérivés de gré à gré tout en déployant un effort international d'harmonisation et de reconnaissance des contreparties assujetties à des régimes équivalents. Les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières ont publié des projets de règlements. Nous nous interrogerons sur ce nouveau cadre réglementaire des dérivés de gré à gré élaboré par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières, prenant en considération les spécificités canadiennes et les acteurs actifs sur leur territoire. Notre étude traite de ces projets de règlements et de la difficulté d'encadrer les marchés des dérivés de gré à gré qui par définition ne comportent pas de plateformes de négociation ou de lieu géographique et de frontières mais se caractérisent surtout par le lien contractuel entre les parties et l'identification de ces parties. L'élaboration d'un nouveau cadre pour les dérivés de gré à gré qui régule les transactions transfrontières semble très délicat à traiter et les possibles conflits et chevauchements de lois seront inévitables. Confrontés à des définitions divergentes de contreparties locales, les parties à une opération seront condamnées à un risque de qualification en vertu des règlements nationaux sur les dérivés de gré à gré. Une concertation pourrait être renforcée et la détermination de l'autorité compétente ainsi que les concepts de contreparties locales, succursales ou filiales pourraient être harmonisés.

Multilateral Interchange Fees: Competition and regulation in light of recent legislative developments. ECRI Research Report No. 14, 31 January 2014

Two-sided payment card markets generate costs that have to be distributed among the participating actors. For this purpose, payment card networks set an interchange fee, which is the fee paid by the merchant’s bank to the cardholder’s bank per transaction. While in recent years many antitrust authorities all over the world - including the European Commission - have opened proceedings against card brands in order to verify whether agreements to collectively establish the level of interchange fees are anticompetitive, the Reserve Bank of Australia – as a regulator - has directly tried to address market failures by lowering the level of interchange fees and changing some network rules. The US has followed with new legislation on financial consumer protection, which also intervenes on interchange fees. This has opened a strong debate not only on legitimacy of interchange fees, but also on the appropriateness of different public tools to address such issues. Drawing from economic and legal theories and a comparative analysis of recent case law in the EU and other jurisdictions, this work investigates whether a regulation rather than a purely competition policy approach would be more appropriate in this field, considering in particular, at EU level, all of the competition and regulatory concerns that have arisen from the operation of SEPA with multilateral interchange fees. The paper concludes that a wider regulation approach could address some of the shortcomings of a purely antitrust approach, proving to be highly beneficial to the development of an efficient European single payments area.

Mutual recognition in goods and services: an economic perspective. Bruges European Economic Policy (BEEP) Briefing 2/2002

Mutual recognition is a remarkable innovation facilitating economic intercourse across borders. In the EU's internal goods market it has been helpful in tackling or avoiding the remaining obstacles, namely, regulatory barriers between Member States. However, there is a curious paradox. Despite the almost universal acclaim of the great merits of mutual recognition the principle has, in and by itself, contributed only modestly to the actual realisation of free movement in the single market. It is also surprising that economists have not or hardly underpinned their widespread appreciation for the principle by providing rigorous analysis which could substantiate the case for mutual recognition for policy makers. Business in Europe has shown a sense of disenc hantment with the principle because of the many costs and uncertainties in its application in actual practice. The purpose of the present paper is to provide the economic and strategic arguments for employing mutual recognition much more systematically in the single market for goods and services. The strategic and the "welfare" gains are analysed and adetailed exposition of the fairly high information , transaction and compliance costs is provided. The information costs derive from the fact that mutual recognition remains a distant abstraction for day-to-day business life. Understandably, verifying the "equivalence" of objectives of health and safety between Member States is perceived as difficult and uncertain. This sentiment is exacerbated by the complications of interpreting the equivalence of "effects". In actual practice, these abstractions are expected to override clear and specific national product or services rules, which local inspectors or traders may find problematic without guidance. The paper enumerates several other costs including, inter alia, the absence of sectoral rule books and the next-to-prohibitive costs of monitoring of the application of the principle. The basic problems in applying mutual recognition in the entire array of services are inspected, showing why the principle can only be used in a limited number of services markets and even there it may contribute only modestly to genuine free movement and competitive exposure. A special section is devoted to a range of practical illustrations of the difficulties business experiences when relying on mutual recognition. Finally, the corollary of mutual recognition - regulatory competition - is discussed in terms of a cost/benefits analysis compared to what is often said to be the alternative , that is "harmonisation" , in EU parlance the "new approach" to approximation. The conclusion is that the manifold benefits of mutual recognition for Europe are too great to allow the present ambiguities to continue. The Union needs much more pro-active approaches to reduce the costs of mutual recognition as well as permanent monitoring structures for its application to services (analogous to those already successfully functioning in goods markets). Above all, what is required is a "mutual recognition culture" so that the EU can better enjoy the fruits of its own regulatory ingenuity.

Sales Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 14, February 2012

All agricultural markets are subjected to institutional regulations that – in one way or another –affect the functioning of these markets, and this is no different for the agricultural land market in the EU. In this paper, we describe the existing regulations in the sales markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on three types of sales market regulations and institutions: quantity regulations, price regulations and transaction costs. The differences in the regulatory framework between land acquisition and ownership by domestic and foreign investors are analysed, as well as the taxes associated with land sales and ownership, zoning regulations and market imperfections.

Rental Market Regulations for Agricultural Land in EU Member States and Candidate Countries. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 15, February 2012

In this paper, we describe the regulations governing the rental markets for agricultural land in selected EU member states and candidate countries. The analysis focuses on various kinds of regulations and institutions connected with the land rental market, including price, tenancy duration, quantity and other regulations, as well as transaction costs. The diverse government regulations on price restrictions and tenancy duration are analysed, along with the social norms observed for rental payments and contracts. The paper also examines the type and registration of contracts, the contract enforcement rules, the regulations on the inheritability of contracts and the pre-emptive right of tenants to buy the land.

Institutional Factors Affecting Agricultural Land Markets. Factor Markets Working Paper No. 16, February 2012

This paper analyses the main institutional factors affecting the rental and sales markets for agricultural land. Particular attention is paid to the effects of the common agricultural policy on land markets, and more specifically the underlying mechanism through which agricultural subsidies are capitalised into land values and farmland rents. This paper also provides a broad overview of the empirical studies that estimate the impact of agricultural support policies on land rents and land prices. Various other fundamental factors that affect agricultural land markets are discussed, such as land market institutions and regulations, transaction costs, credit market constraints and levels of profitability, the legal means of contract enforcement and land use alternatives.

Influence of Agricultural Support on Sale Prices of French Farmland: A comparison of different subsidies, accounting for the role of environmental and land regulations. Factor Markets Working Document No. 51, June 2013

This paper investigates the determinants of agricultural land price in several regions in France over the period 1994-2011, using individual plot transaction data, with a particular emphasis on agricultural subsidies and nitrate zoning regulations. It found a positive but relatively small capitalisation effect of the total subsidies per hectare. The data revealed that agricultural subsidies capitalised, at least to some extent, but the magnitude of such a capitalisation depends on the region considered, on the type of subsidy considered, and on the location of the plot in a nitrate surplus zone or not. Only land set-aside premiums significantly capitalise into land price, while single farm payments have a significant positive capitalisation impact only for plots located in a nitrate-surplus zone.

Farm/Household-Level Simulation: Results of Testing Policy and Other Scenarios. Factor Markets Working Document No. 54, June 2013

Among the different production factors, land is the one that most often limits farm development and one of the most studied. The connection between policy and other context variables and land markets is at the core of the policy debate, including the present reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. The proposal of the latter has been published in October 2011 and in Italy it will include the switch of the payment regime from an historical to a regional basis. The authors’ objective is to simulate the impact of the proposed policy reform on the land market, particularly on land values and propensity to transaction. They combine insights and data from a farm household investment model revised and extended in order to simulate the demand curve for land in different policy scenarios and a survey of farmers stated intention carried out in the province of Bologna (Italy) in 2012. Based on these results, the authors calibrate a mathematical programming model of land market exchanges for the province of Bologna and use this model form simulation. The results of the model largely corroborate the results from the survey and both hint at a relevant reaction of the land demand and supply to the shift from the historical to the regionalised payments. As effect, the regionalisation would result in increased rental prices and in a tendency to the re-allocation of land.

The Impact of the SFP System on Italian Farmland Prices and Tenure Contracts. Factor Markets Working Document No. 65, August 2013

EDITED VERSION TO BE PUBLISHED SOON. The aim of this paper is to contribute to the estimation of the potential effects of the CAP reform on propensity to transaction, particularly comparing the effect of different new instruments/policy settings with the current policy (CAP health check) used as a baseline. The work is focused on three of new policy instruments within the post 2013 CAP reform proposal: regionalization, greening and capping. The first and second are analysed in more detail. The analysis will be based on a survey of farmers in the Province of Bologna, Emilia Romagna, Italy. The questionnaire focuses on mechanism of access to land and related incentives towards different land use/economic behaviour. The survey includes information about respondent characteristics (farm, farmer, household and payments received) and stated intention about potential changes in land operated under alternative agricultural policy scenarios (particularly the post-2013 reform proposals).

Growth for Europe – Is the Juncker Plan the answer? EPC Discussion Paper, 20 March 2015

Executive Summary. The euro area is still suffering from low growth and high unemployment. For the recovery to become a reality, there needs to be a balance between fiscal discipline, supply side improvements and actions aimed at stimulating demand and growth. Increasing investment, both private and public, are important components in overcoming the recession. This becomes especially clear when comparing investment dynamics during the crisis with pre-crisis levels. Total investment is still much lower than before the crisis and public investment is well below its pre-crisis peak as well. In late November 2014, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker submitted a long-awaited proposal for a European Investment Plan that aims to stimulate private investment. Apart from the creation of the new European Fund for Strategic Investment (EFSI), through which private investors will receive public guarantees, the investment plan also aims to provide project assistance and improve the Single Market by removing sector-specific or other financial barriers to investment. While generally perceived as a first positive step towards increasing private investment, some commentators have expressed reservations about the plan. These include, among others, the lack of fresh money for the initial contributions to EFSI. Since a substantial amount of these contributions is reshuffled from other places in the European budget, the question was raised whether EFSI can fund additional projects or just replicates investment projects that would have happened without the plan. Other criticism relates to the high estimate of the expected leverage ratio of 1:15, and to the risk that the plan will only have a limited impact on stressed economies. The Juncker Plan addresses private investment, but so far there really is no clear strategy to stimulate productive public investment on the European and national level. Countries with fiscal space are reluctant to engage in higher spending, while those willing and in need of it the most are restricted by the rules. Member States and the Commission should therefore discuss options for further improving the euro area's economic governance. In addition to urging countries with fiscal space to increase investing in national public goods, investment could be treated with budget flexibility. One could, for instance, upgrade the importance of public investment in the European Semester. Additional deficit granted for public investment purposes could be attached to certain Country-Specific Recommendations. Another solution would be to allow some form of budget flexibility, such as the formulation of a new Golden Rule for productive public investment becoming part of the Stability and Growth Pact's application. Besides relying on a larger amount of flexibility in the rules, the Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) could be another solution to fund investment in European public goods. It will also be necessary to overcome the mistrust among Member States that is preventing further action. The political bargain of stronger conditionality, such as through contractual arrangements, could improve the situation. Increased trust will also be an important condition for tackling long-reaching economic governance reforms such as the creation of a Fiscal Capacity, which could take the form of a macroeconomic shock insurance. Such a Fiscal Capacity could make a real difference in providing the necessary funding to maintain productive public investment, even in times of deep recessions. The proposals presented do not attempt to be conclusive, but shall rather be an input for a wider debate on how to increase growth and employment in Europe. The paper draws heavily on the discussion of a Workshop on Growth and Investment, which the European Policy Centre (EPC) hosted on 10 December 2014 under Chatham-House Rule, with a group of economists and representatives from the European institutions.

The German Constitutional Court’s decision about the European Central Bank’s OMT [Outright Monetary Transactions] mechanism: A masterpiece of judicial arrogance. European Policy Briefs No. 30, April 2014

The German Constitutional Court (BVG) recently referred different questions to the European Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. They concern the legality of the European Central Bank’s Outright Monetary Transaction mechanism created in 2012. Simultaneously, the German Court has threatened to disrupt the implementation of OTM in Germany if its very restrictive analysis is not validated by the European Court of Justice. This raises fundamental questions about the future efficiency of the ECB’s monetary policy, the damage to the independence of the ECB, the balance of power between judges and political organs in charge of economic policy, in Germany and in Europe, and finally the relationship between the BVG and other national or European courts.

La réforme Dodd-Frank des produits dérivés de gré à gré : vers un modèle mondial?

Suite à la crise financière de 2008 les pays du G20 se sont interrogés sur la transparence des marchés, la stabilité du système et une façon de réguler les risques posés par le nouvel environnement économique. Les produits dérivés de gré à gré ont été identifiés et des engagements ont été pris en faveur de nouvelles régulations des dérivés de gré à gré et la gestion des risques sous-jacents. Les régulateurs ont donc adopté chacun à leur tour un cadre législatif régulant les dérivés de gré à gré tout en déployant un effort international d'harmonisation et de reconnaissance des contreparties assujetties à des régimes équivalents. Les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières ont publié des projets de règlements. Nous nous interrogerons sur ce nouveau cadre réglementaire des dérivés de gré à gré élaboré par les autorités canadiennes en valeurs mobilières, prenant en considération les spécificités canadiennes et les acteurs actifs sur leur territoire. Notre étude traite de ces projets de règlements et de la difficulté d'encadrer les marchés des dérivés de gré à gré qui par définition ne comportent pas de plateformes de négociation ou de lieu géographique et de frontières mais se caractérisent surtout par le lien contractuel entre les parties et l'identification de ces parties. L'élaboration d'un nouveau cadre pour les dérivés de gré à gré qui régule les transactions transfrontières semble très délicat à traiter et les possibles conflits et chevauchements de lois seront inévitables. Confrontés à des définitions divergentes de contreparties locales, les parties à une opération seront condamnées à un risque de qualification en vertu des règlements nationaux sur les dérivés de gré à gré. Une concertation pourrait être renforcée et la détermination de l'autorité compétente ainsi que les concepts de contreparties locales, succursales ou filiales pourraient être harmonisés.