Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need toborrow from banks. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitiveequilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only borrow from banks. If an additional market is added to provide entrepreneurs withadditional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic of thisadditional market is that it must be non-exclusive, in the sense that entrepreneurs must be ableto simultaneously borrow from many different lenders operating in it. This makes it possible toattain efficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new market while separating them in themarket for bank loans.

Comparative genomics of chemosensory protein genes reveals rapid evolution and positive selection in ant-specific duplicates.

Gene duplications can have a major role in adaptation, and gene families underlying chemosensation are particularly interesting due to their essential role in chemical recognition of mates, predators and food resources. Social insects add yet another dimension to the study of chemosensory genomics, as the key components of their social life rely on chemical communication. Still, chemosensory gene families are little studied in social insects. Here we annotated chemosensory protein (CSP) genes from seven ant genomes and studied their evolution. The number of functional CSP genes ranges from 11 to 21 depending on species, and the estimated rates of gene birth and death indicate high turnover of genes. Ant CSP genes include seven conservative orthologous groups present in all the ants, and a group of genes that has expanded independently in different ant lineages. Interestingly, the expanded group of genes has a differing mode of evolution from the orthologous groups. The expanded group shows rapid evolution as indicated by a high dN/dS (nonsynonymous to synonymous changes) ratio, several sites under positive selection and many pseudogenes, whereas the genes in the seven orthologous groups evolve slowly under purifying selection and include only one pseudogene. These results show that adaptive changes have played a role in ant CSP evolution. The expanded group of ant-specific genes is phylogenetically close to a conservative orthologous group CSP7, which includes genes known to be involved in ant nestmate recognition, raising an interesting possibility that the expanded CSPs function in ant chemical communication.

Constant coefficient tests for random coefficient regression

Random coefficient regression models have been applied in differentfields and they constitute a unifying setup for many statisticalproblems. The nonparametric study of this model started with Beranand Hall (1992) and it has become a fruitful framework. In thispaper we propose and study statistics for testing a basic hypothesisconcerning this model: the constancy of coefficients. The asymptoticbehavior of the statistics is investigated and bootstrapapproximations are used in order to determine the critical values ofthe test statistics. A simulation study illustrates the performanceof the proposals.

In vitro prevention of the emergence of daptomycin resistance in Staphylococcus aureus and enterococci following combination with amoxicillin/clavulanic acid or ampicillin.

Daptomycin is bactericidal against meticillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), glycopeptide-intermediate-resistant S. aureus (GISA) and vancomycin-susceptible and -resistant enterococci. However, selection for daptomycin-resistant derivatives has occasionally been reported during therapy in humans. Here we evaluate whether selection for daptomycin-resistant S. aureus or enterococci could be prevented in vitro by combining daptomycin with amoxicillin/clavulanic acid, ampicillin, gentamicin or rifampicin. Six strains of S. aureus (four MRSA and two GISA) and four strains of enterococci (two Enterococcus faecalis and two Enterococcus faecium) were serially exposed in broth to two-fold stepwise increasing concentrations of daptomycin alone or in combination with a fixed concentration [0.25x minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC)] of either of the second agents. The daptomycin MIC was examined after each cycle. Exposure to daptomycin alone gradually selected for S. aureus and enterococci with an increased MIC. Gentamicin did not prevent the emergence of daptomycin-resistant bacteria. Rifampicin was also unable to prevent daptomycin resistance, although resistance was slightly delayed. In contrast, amoxicillin/clavulanic acid or ampicillin prevented or greatly delayed the selection of daptomycin-resistant mutants in S. aureus and enterococci, respectively. Addition of amoxicillin/clavulanic acid or ampicillin to daptomycin prevents, or greatly delays, daptomycin resistance in vitro. Future studies in animal models are needed to predict the utility of these combinations in humans.

Adverse selection, credit and efficiency: The case of the missing market

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment,entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects needto borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, thecompetitive equilibrium is typically inefficient.We show that this conventional wisdom rests on one implicit assumption: entrepreneurscan only access monitored lending. If a new set of markets is added to provide entrepreneurswith additional funds, efficiency can be attained in equilibrium. An important characteristic ofthese additional markets is that lending in them must be unmonitored, in the sense that it doesnot condition total borrowing or investment by entrepreneurs. This makes it possible to attainefficiency by pooling all entrepreneurs in the new markets while separating them in the marketsfor monitored loans.

Hiring and firing costs, adverse selection and long-term unemployment

In this paper, we present a matching model with adverse selection that explains why flows into and out of unemployment are much lower in Europe compared to North America, while employment-to-employment flows are similar in the two continents. In the model,firms use discretion in terms of whom to fire and, thus, low quality workers are more likely to be dismissed than high quality workers. Moreover, as hiring and firing costs increase, firms find it more costly to hire a bad worker and, thus, they prefer to hire out of the pool of employed job seekers rather than out of the pool of the unemployed, who are more likely to turn out to be 'lemons'. We use microdata for Spain and the U.S. and find that the ratio of the job finding probability of the unemployed to the job finding probability of employed job seekers was smaller in Spain than in the U.S. Furthermore, using U.S. data, we find that the discrimination of the unemployed increased over the 1980's in those states that raised firing costs by introducing exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine.

Improved estimation of the covariance matrix of stock returns with an application to portofolio selection

This paper proposes to estimate the covariance matrix of stock returnsby an optimally weighted average of two existing estimators: the samplecovariance matrix and single-index covariance matrix. This method isgenerally known as shrinkage, and it is standard in decision theory andin empirical Bayesian statistics. Our shrinkage estimator can be seenas a way to account for extra-market covariance without having to specifyan arbitrary multi-factor structure. For NYSE and AMEX stock returns from1972 to 1995, it can be used to select portfolios with significantly lowerout-of-sample variance than a set of existing estimators, includingmulti-factor models.

Selection of artificial hosts for oviposition by wild Anastrepha obliqua (Macquart) (Diptera, Tephritidae): influence of adult food and effect of experience

Several factors influence the selection of oviposition substrates by insects. The aim of the present work was to find answers to the following questions related to the oviposition behavior of Anastrepha obliqua. Can carbohydrates (glucose or sucrose) present in the adult diet have influence on the female preference for an oviposition substrate with similar composition? Can the previous experience with a host containing one of mentioned carbohydrates interfere in further selection of oviposition substrates? The results showed that the kind of carbohydrate present in the adult diet did not affect the female preference for an artificial oviposition substrate, neither when it was presented by itself nor in combination with brewer's yeast. The effect of experience in the oviposition behavior was observed when there was a previous contact with artificial oviposition substrates containing yeast and sucrose. The data are discussed in terms of the behavioral plasticity presented by this species in relation to feeding and oviposition behaviors.

Dynamic adverse selection and debt

This paper argues that the strategic use of debt favours the revelationof information in dynamic adverse selection problems. Our argument is basedon the idea that debt is a credible commitment to end long term relationships.Consequently, debt encourages a privately informed party to disclose itsinformation at early stages of a relationship. We illustrate our pointwith the financing decision of a monopolist selling a good to a buyerwhose valuation is private information. A high level of (renegotiable)debt, by increasing the scope for liquidation, may induce the highvaluation buyer to buy early at a high price and thus increase themonopolist's expected payoff. By affecting the buyer's strategy, it mayreduce the probability of excessive liquidation. We investigate theconsequences of good durability and we examine the way debt mayalleviate the ratchet effect.

Social preferences: Some simple tests and a new model

Departures from pure self interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences". We conduct experiments on simple two-person and three-person games with binary choices that test these theories more directly than the array of games conventionally considered. Our experiments show strong support for the prevalence of "quasi-maximin" preferences: People sacrifice to increase the payoffs for all recipients, but especially for the lowest-payoff recipients. People are also motivated by reciprocity: While people are reluctant to sacrifice to reciprocate good or bad behavior beyond what they would sacrifice for neutral parties, they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice. Some participants are averse to getting different payoffs than others, but based on our experiments and reinterpretation of previous experiments we argue that behavior that has been presented as "difference aversion" in recent papers is actually a combination of reciprocal and quasi-maximin motivations. We formulate a model in which each player is willing to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation only to those players also believed to be pursuing the quasi-maximin allocation, and may sacrifice to punish unfair players.

Long-run selection and the work ethic

That individuals contribute in social dilemma interactions even when contributing is costly is a well-established observation in the experimental literature. Since a contributor is always strictly worse off than a non-contributor the question is raised if an intrinsic motivation to contribute can survive in an evolutionary setting. Using recent results on deterministic approximation of stochastic evolutionary dynamics we give conditions for equilibria with a positive number of contributors to be selected in the long run.

Exact tests for correlation and for the slope in simple linear regressions without making assumptions

We present an exact test for whether two random variables that have known bounds on their support are negatively correlated. The alternative hypothesis is that they are not negatively correlated. No assumptions are made on the underlying distributions. We show by example that the Spearman rank correlation test as the competing exact test of correlation in nonparametric settings rests on an additional assumption on the data generating process without which it is not valid as a test for correlation.We then show how to test for the significance of the slope in a linear regression analysis that invovles a single independent variable and where outcomes of the dependent variable belong to a known bounded set.

Equilibrium selection through incomplete information in coordination games: An experimental study

We perform an experiment on a pure coordination game with uncertaintyabout the payoffs. Our game is closely related to models that have beenused in many macroeconomic and financial applications to solve problemsof equilibrium indeterminacy. In our experiment each subject receives anoisy signal about the true payoffs. This game has a unique strategyprofile that survives the iterative deletion of strictly dominatedstrategies (thus a unique Nash equilibrium). The equilibrium outcomecoincides, on average, with the risk-dominant equilibrium outcome ofthe underlying coordination game. The behavior of the subjects convergesto the theoretical prediction after enough experience has been gained. The data (and the comments) suggest that subjects do not apply through"a priori" reasoning the iterated deletion of dominated strategies.Instead, they adapt to the responses of other players. Thus, the lengthof the learning phase clearly varies for the different signals. We alsotest behavior in a game without uncertainty as a benchmark case. The gamewith uncertainty is inspired by the "global" games of Carlsson and VanDamme (1993).

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.

Tests pharmacogénétiques: bientôt avant chaque prescription [Pharmacogenetic testing: soon before every prescription?]

Genetic polymorphisms have currently been described in more than 200 systems affecting pharmacological responses (cytochromes P450, conjugation enzymes, transporters, receptors, effectors of response, protection mechanisms, determinants of immunity). Pharmacogenetic testing, i.e. the profiling of individual patients for such variations, is about to become largely available. Recent progress in the pharmacogenetics of tamoxifen, oral anticoagulants and anti-HIV agents is reviewed to discuss critically their potential impact on prescription and contribution/limits for improving rational and safe use of pharmaceuticals. Prospective controlled trials are required to evaluate large-scale pharmacogenetic testing in therapeutics. Ethical, social and psychological issues deserve particular attention.