The Crowding-out Effect of Mandatory Labour Market Pension Schemes on Private Savings. Evidence from renters in Denmark. CEPS Working Document No. 389, February 2014

This paper aims to estimate the crowding-out effect of the Danish mandatory labour market pension reforms begun in 1993 on the level of total household savings for renters. The effect is identified via a large panel of individual administrative records utilising the differences in speed, timing and sectoral coverage of the implementation of the reform in the period 1997 to 2005. Little substitutability was found between current mandatory labour market pension savings and private voluntary savings. Each euro paid into mandatory labour market pension accounts results in a reduction in private savings of approximately 0 to 30 cents, depending on age. This low rate of substitution is only, to a minor extent, explained by liquidity constraints. The results point to mandatory pension savings having a large effect on total household savings. Thus, pension reforms that introduce mandatory savings have macroeconomic implications.

Mixed Public-Private Enterprises in Europe: Economic Theory and an Empirical Analysis of Italian Water Utilities. Bruges European Economic Research (BEER) Papers 4/July 2006

Mixed enterprises, which are entities jointly owned by the public and private sector, are spreading all over Europe in local utilities. Well aware that in the vast majority of cases the preference of local authorities towards such governance structure is determined by practical reasons rather than by the ambition to implement new regulatory designs (an alternative to the typical “external” regulation), our purpose is to confer some scientific value to this phenomenon which has not been sufficiently investigated in the economic literature. This paper aims at proposing an economic analysis of mixed enterprises, especially of the specific configuration in which the public partner acts as controller and the private one (or “industrial” partner) as service provider. We suggest that the public service concession to mixed enterprises could embody, under certain conditions, a noteworthy substitute to the traditional public provision and the concession to totally private enterprises, as it can push regulated operators to outperform and limit the risk of private opportunism. The starting point of the entire analysis is that ownership allows the (public) owner to gather more information about the actual management of the firm, according to property rights theory. Following this stream of research, we conclude that under certain conditions mixed enterprises could significantly reduce asymmetric information between regulators and regulated firms by implementing a sort of “internal” regulation. With more information, in effect, the public authority (as owner/controller of the regulated firm, but also as member of the regulatory agency) can stimulate the private operator to be more efficient and can monitor it more effectively with respect to the fulfilment of contractual obligations (i.e., public service obligations, quality standards, etc.). Moreover, concerning the latter function, the board of directors of the mixed enterprise can be the suitable place where public and private representatives (respectively, welfare and profit maximisers) can meet to solve all disputes arising from incomplete contracts, without recourse to third parties. Finally, taking into account that a disproportionate public intervention in the “private” administration (or an ineffective protection of the general interest) would imply too many drawbacks, we draw some policy implications that make an equitable debate on the board of the firm feasible. Some empirical evidence is taken from the Italian water sector.

Unfair Advantage: An Intriguing Example of Legal Transformation in the Swiss Private Law

This paper demonstrates a mixed approach to the theme of the instrumentality of law by both analysing the goal of a legal transformation and the techniques adapted to achieve it. The correct recognition of a certain practical necessity has lead the Swiss Federal Tribunal to an intriguing judgement “Fussballclub Lohn-Fall” of 1997. The legal remedies provided for cases of unfair advantage have been then creatively modified praeter legem. The adaptation was strongly influenced by foreign legal patterns. The Swiss Code of Obligations of 1911 provides a norm in art. 21 on unfair advantage (unconscionable contract), prescribing that if one party takes unjustified advantage over the weaknesses of another in order to receive an excessive benefit, such a contract is avoidable. Its wording has been shaped over a hundred years ago and still remains intact. However, over the course of the 20th century the necessity for a more efficient protection has arisen. The legal doctrine and jurisprudence were constantly pointing out the incompleteness of the remedies provided by art. 21 of the Code of Obligations. In the “Fussballclub Lohn-Fall” (BGE 123 III 292) the Swiss Federal Tribunal finally introduced the possibility to modify the contract. Its decision has been described as “a sign of the zeitgeist, spirit of the time”. It was the Swiss legal doctrine that has imposed the new measure under the influence of the German “quantitative Teilnichtigkeit” (quantitative partial nullity). The historical heritage of the Roman laesio enormis has also played its role.

Torn between state and market: Private policy implementation and conflicting institutional logics

Policy implementation by private actors constitutes a “missing link” for understanding the implications of private governance. This paper proposes and assesses an institutional logics framework that combines a top-down, policy design approach with a bottom-up, implementation perspective on discretion. We argue that the conflicting institutional logics of the state and the market, in combination with differing degrees of goal ambiguity, accountability and hybridity play a crucial role for output performance. These arguments are analyzed based on a secondary analysis of seven case studies of private and hybrid policy implementation in diverging contexts. We find that aligning private output performance with public interests is at least partly a question of policy design congruence: private implementing actors tend to perform deficiently when the conflicting logics of the state and the market combine with weak accountability mechanisms.

The private sector, the public sector, and donor assistance in economic development : an interpretive essay /

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