GTP bound to chloroplast thylakoid membranes is required for light-induced, multienzyme degradation of the photosystem II D1 protein

Even though light is the driving force in photosynthesis, it also can be harmful to plants. The water-splitting photosystem II is the main target for this light stress, leading to inactivation of photosynthetic electron transport and photooxidative damage to its reaction center. The plant survives through an intricate repair mechanism involving proteolytic degradation and replacement of the photodamaged reaction center D1 protein. Based on experiments with isolated chloroplast thylakoid membranes and photosystem II core complexes, we report several aspects concerning the rapid turnover of the D1 protein. (i) The primary cleavage step is a GTP-dependent process, leading to accumulation of a 23-kDa N-terminal fragment. (ii) Proteolysis of the D1 protein is inhibited below basal levels by nonhydrolyzable GTP analogues and apyrase treatment, indicating the existence of endogenous GTP tightly bound to the thylakoid membrane. This possibility was corroborated by binding studies. (iii) The proteolysis of the 23-kDa primary degradation fragment (but not of the D1 protein) is an ATP- and zinc-dependent process. (iv) D1 protein degradation is a multienzyme event involving a strategic (primary) protease and a cleaning-up (secondary) protease. (v) The chloroplast FtsH protease is likely to be involved in the secondary degradation steps. Apart from its significance for understanding the repair of photoinhibition, the discovery of tightly bound GTP should have general implications for other regulatory reactions and signal transduction pathways associated with the photosynthetic membrane.

Urocortin II: A member of the corticotropin-releasing factor (CRF) neuropeptide family that is selectively bound by type 2 CRF receptors

Here we describe the cloning and initial characterization of a previously unidentified CRF-related neuropeptide, urocortin II (Ucn II). Searches of the public human genome database identified a region with significant sequence homology to the CRF neuropeptide family. By using homologous primers deduced from the human sequence, a mouse cDNA was isolated from whole brain poly(A)+ RNA that encodes a predicted 38-aa peptide, structurally related to the other known mammalian family members, CRF and Ucn. Ucn II binds selectively to the type 2 CRF receptor (CRF-R2), with no appreciable activity on CRF-R1. Transcripts encoding Ucn II are expressed in discrete regions of the rodent central nervous system, including stress-related cell groups in the hypothalamus (paraventricular and arcuate nuclei) and brainstem (locus coeruleus). Central administration of 1–10 μg of peptide elicits activational responses (Fos induction) preferentially within a core circuitry subserving autonomic and neuroendocrine regulation, but whose overall pattern does not broadly mimic the CRF-R2 distribution. Behaviorally, central Ucn II attenuates nighttime feeding, with a time course distinct from that seen in response to CRF. In contrast to CRF, however, central Ucn II failed to increase gross motor activity. These findings identify Ucn II as a new member of the CRF family of neuropeptides, which is expressed centrally and binds selectively to CRF-R2. Initial functional studies are consistent with Ucn II involvement in central autonomic and appetitive control, but not in generalized behavioral activation.

Dual HLA class I and class II restricted recognition of alloreactive T lymphocytes mediated by a single T cell receptor complex

The alloreactive human T cell clone MBM15 was found to exhibit dual specificity recognizing both an antigen in the context of the HLA class I A2 molecule and an antigen in the context of the HLA class II DR1. We demonstrated that the dual reactivity that was mediated via a single clonal T cell population depended on specific peptide binding. For complete recognition of the HLA-A2-restricted specificity the interaction of CD8 with HLA class I is essential. Interestingly, interaction of the CD8 molecule with HLA class I contributed to the HLA-DR1-restricted specificity. T cell clone MBM15 expressed two in-frame T cell receptor (TCR) Vα transcripts (Vα1 and Vα2) and one TCR Vβ transcript (Vβ13). To elucidate whether two TCR complexes were responsible for the dual recognition or one complex, cytotoxic T cells were transduced with retroviral vectors encoding the different TCR chains. Only T cells transduced with the TCR Vα1Vβ13 combination specifically recognized both the HLA-A2+ and HLA-DR1+ target cells, whereas the Vα2Vβ13 combination did not result in a TCR on the cell surface. Thus a single TCRαβ complex can have dual specificity, recognizing both a peptide in the context of HLA class I as well as a peptide in the context of HLA class II. Transactivation of T cells by an unrelated antigen in the context of HLA class II may evoke an HLA class I-specific T cell response. We propose that this finding may have major implications for immunotherapeutic interventions and insight into the development of autoimmune diseases.

A common major histocompatibility complex class II allele HLA-DQB1* 0301 is present in clinical variants of pemphigoid.

Bullous pemphigoid (BP) is an autoimmune subepidermal blistering disease seen primarily in elderly persons. It is characterized clinically by the development of tense bullae and by the presence of an antibasement membrane antibody. In BP, the antigens involved in the autoimmunity are epidermal basement membrane peptides BPAg1 and BPAg2. We have compared high resolution typing of major histocompatibility complex class II loci (HLA-DRB1, DQB1) in 21 patients with BP, 17 with ocular cicatricial pemphigoid (OCP), and 22 with oral pemphigoid (OP) to a panel of 218 haplotypes of normal individuals. We found that the three diseases (BP, OCP, and OP) have significant association with DQB1*0301 (P = 0.005, P < 0.0001, and P = 0.001, respectively). The frequencies of alleles DQB1*0302, 0303, and 06, which share a specific amino acid sequence from position 71 to 77 (Thr-Arg-Ala-Glu-Leu-Val-Thr) were also increased (P = 0.01). We suggest that an identical major histocompatibility complex class II allele (DQB1*0301) is a common marker for enhanced susceptibility and that the same amino acid residues in positions 71-77 (DQB1*0301, -0302, -0305, -0602, -0603 alleles) are found in patients with BP, OCP and OP. Our findings propose that the autoimmune response in the three different clinical variants of pemphigoid, involves the recognition by T cells of a class II region of DQB1, bound to a peptide from the basement membrane of conjunctiva, oral mucosa, and skin.

Russia's Clandestine War against the United States: The Resurrection of the KGB and Russian Organized Crime Post 9/11

As American leadership has narrowly focused on fighting global terror in Iraq and Afghanistan, the modern version of the KGB, now known as the FSB, has been conducting continuous clandestine warfare operations against the United States. These warfare operations include strategic economic and political partnerships with anti-American entities worldwide and direct embedding of double agents in the US intelligence community. This paper investigates the role of Russia's cultural history leading to the merger of the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) and Russian Organized Crime (ROC). This paper concludes that the FSB is the most pervasive security threat to the United States and that employing Russian native and heritage speakers of Russian in the US intelligence community compromises US national security.

Solenogastres from the eastern coast of North America / by Harold Heath.

v.45:no.2 (1918)

"A Catalogue of books given to Harvard College Library," undated

Lists books donated by a Dr. Chauncy, Mr. Pemberton, Joseph Green, William W. Kitwell(?), Mr. Sec[retar]y Oliver, William Greenleaf, Moses Gill, Mr. Bradstreet, Dr. Isaac Foster, Brigadier General Royall, Nicholas Sever, M.(?) Condy, Mr. Dolbear, Rev. Mr. Harris, Mr. Browne, Stephen Greenleaf, Thomas Cushing, Mr. Orne, Mr. Agar, Mr. Marion, Mr. Fleet, Mr. Davies, Mr. Barrett, Dr. Grant, and possibly others. Entries include author, title, volume number, and occasionally format.

Russia goes on the offensive ahead of the Eastern Partnership summit in Vilnius. OSW Commentary No. 115, 30.09.2013

In recent weeks, Russia has stepped up its efforts to prevent a group of former Soviet republics from tightening their relations with the European Union. The intensification of these efforts comes ahead of the upcoming Eastern Partnership summit, scheduled to take place in Vilnius on 28-29 November. It is expected that during the summit Kiev will sign the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) initialled in March 2012, including an agreement for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA). Meanwhile, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia are expected to initial similar documents, effectively accepting their terms and conditions, and paving the way for their official signing in the near future. Moscow has always viewed the relations between the EU and the post-Soviet states as a threat to its own influence in the region. Consequently, any attempts to tighten these relations have been actively opposed by Russia. The EU’s Eastern Partnership programme, launched in 2009, has posed a particular challenge to Moscow’s policies in the region.. Russia responded by rolling out a Eurasian integration project, which began in 2010 with the establishment of the Customs Union of Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, and is expected to culminate in the establishment of the Eurasian Economic Union by 2015. Moscow’s overarching objective has been to persuade the countries in the region, especially Ukraine, to adopt an unambiguously pro-Russian geopolitical stance and to join the integration project proposed by the Kremlin. The Russian government hopes that this would permanently place these states in Moscow’s sphere of influence and at the same time prevent them from developing closer relations with Brussels. Russia has regularly taken actions aimed at showcasing the benefits of integration with the Customs Union (particularly, by promising preferential pricing of Russian energy resources) and at the same time it has adopted measures highlighting the pitfalls of retaining a pro-European orientation (mainly by imposing occasional trade sanctions). The upcoming summit in Vilnius, during which Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia could lock themselves on to a pro-European course, has spurred Moscow to intensify its efforts to torpedo a successful outcome of the Vilnius meeting, with a view to slowing down or even blocking the possibility of closer cooperation between the EU and the former Soviet republics.

Crimean Tatars after Russia's annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. OSW Commentary No. 141, 30.06.2014

After Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Crimean Tatars face the necessity of working out a modus vivendi to cope with the difficult situation which now confronts them. On the one hand, the desire to remain in their homeland, which they regained after exile in Soviet times, is an imperative encouraging them to accept the status quo, while on the other, the fear of Russia and the strong relations of Crimean Tatar elites with Kyiv would favour opposing the present state of affairs. Another fact pointing in favour of an agreement with Moscow is that Kyiv has not attempted to defend Crimea and has not been active in demanding its return to Ukraine, which has undermined Kyiv’s authority in the eyes of the Tatars. Therefore, the leaders of the Mejlis of Crimean Tatars (the national self-government) act carefully, trying to avoid actions which could be seen as provocative and thus liable to incite retribution. It could be expected that this course of action will continue, although it faces ever greater difficulties in the context of the Russian authorities’ adoption of a strongly anti-Tatar policy, which is likely to evoke more radical attitudes among the Crimean Tatars.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

Russia's best ally: The situation of the Russian oil sector and forecast for its future. OSW Study 39/2012

Oil is a strategic raw material for Russia and one of fundamental significance for the functioning of the state and its future. Taxes on oil production and exports are the most important source of state budget revenues which guarantee Russia maintains its political and economic stability. Russia is building its international position on the basis of its vast raw material and energy potential. While a great number of various publications have been devoted to Russian gas and Gazprom, surprisingly little research has been done into the present condition and possible future developments of the Russian oil sector, despite the fact that oil has and will have a much greater impact than gas on the functioning and the future of Russia. The main objective of this text is to describe the present situation of the Russian oil sector, its problems and the challenges it is posing, as well as the government’s policy towards this key branch of the Russian economy. This will be an introduction to an attempt to answer to the questions about the possible future production and the export levels of Russian oil, also broken down into the European and Asian directions.

Is there reason to hope for Minsk II? CEPS Commentary, 16 February 2015

In his comparison of the agreement concluded in the Belarus capital by the leaders of Russia, France, Ukraine and Germany on February 12th with the one reached on 5 September 2014, Michael Emerson asks what will be different this time? He observes first that there are additional provisions which may be significant and secondly, the strategic political and economic context is categorically different.

NATO’s presence in the Baltic states – reassurance of allies or deterrence for Russia? OSW COMMENTARY Number 169, 29.04.2015 2015-04-29

In late March and early April, the US Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) held an exercise in Estonia, during which US F-16s destroyed ground targets in an Estonian firing range. Around the same time the Americans held a drill with the Swedish and Finnish Air Forces over the Baltic Sea. The United States has been playing a leading role in the process of strengthening NATO’s presence in the Baltic states. As far as the Western European allies are concerned, Germany will follow in the footsteps of Denmark and the United Kingdom, both of which made significant military contributions to the strengthening of the allied presence in 2014, and will deploy the largest number of troops in 2015. Non-aligned Sweden and Finland, key for the performance of NATO operations in the Baltic states, have been emphasising their military and political readiness to co-operate with NATO in the event of potential crises or conflicts. Comparing NATO ‘s military presence in the Baltic states before and after the outbreak of the Russian intervention in Ukraine, it is clear that NATO has stepped up its engagement considerably. However, its scope is still relatively small, given the much larger military potential and mobilisation capacity of Russia. Moreover, the message sent by NATO’s actions may be diminished by the political, military and financial constraints faced by the allies and Sweden and Finland. It seems that the greatest risk to the military security of the Baltic states currently appears to be the possibility that Russia could wrongly assess the reliability of NATO’s security guarantees.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.