Microcredit Financing Organizations: Global Players Empowering Women and Alleviating Poverty Worldwide

World poverty is a global issue and a development issue. Poverty reduction and women's empowerment are deeply connected to regional stability and long lasting peace. Nations will continue to be plagued by poverty, and top-down government agency aid programs to date have been unsuccessful. Encouraging news resides in innovative microfinance initiatives that alleviate poverty and impact millions of impoverished people around the globe. Microfinance organizations provide small loans, primarily to women otherwise excluded from the formal banking sector, for entrepreneurial endeavors. Myriad social, educational, and health programs accompany microfinance loan services. It is a powerful poverty-fighting tool with socioeconomic benefits. Evidence suggests that while imperfect, microfinance goals and successes are inspiring given the paucity of realistic alternatives in today's global development arena.

Microfinance Providing Security and Poverty Alleviation to Nicaragua

Micro-finance has been highly successful in alleviating poverty in Bangladesh by providing low interest no-collateral financing to women, who are unable to qualify for credit on their own. In Latin America, especially in Nicaragua, microfinance delinquencies are high and the benefits are not as great as they are in other parts of the World. Women are oppressed and are unable to provide economic opportunities for themselves or their families. Oversaturation of the microfinance market, improper lending practices, poor regulation and political turmoil has prevented microfinance in Nicaragua from providing low interest loans to those who need them most.

IV. Promissory Notes, 1790-1793

This series consists of handwritten slips written by the borrower with the promise of repayment with interest to a specified lender. Some of the notes reflect loans made to the Butler by members of the community, and others are promissory notes to Adams signed by Harvard students.

Statement, 1791

Statement listing the "total due" for debts incurred between May 1790 and November 1791 on loans. "Thom. Adams note"--written on verso.

IV. Promissory Notes, 1790-1793

This series consists of handwritten slips written by the borrower with the promise of repayment with interest to a specified lender. Some of the notes reflect loans made to the Butler by members of the community, and others are promissory notes to Adams signed by Harvard students.

Justice of the peace docket books, 1769-1808

A collection of notebooks in which Hubbard recorded both legal and personal transactions in detail, including: writs, arrests, wills, boundary disputes, damages awarded in court cases over which he presided, various payments and expenses, etc. Also included are three notebooks kept by his nephew James Hubbard, who inherited Joshua Hubbard's farm; these primarily record the sale of cider and vinegar from his farm, costs of hired labor, and bank loans.

Mr. Marsh's catalogue, ca. 1764

A half-page handwritten list of books with the author's surname, title, and location in the old Harvard Library, signed "Mr. Marsh." The list includes the note, "Shuckford's Connection is charged to you." The document is undated but presumably was created following the Harvard Hall Fire of 1764 as part of the College's efforts to inventory volumes that were spared because they were checked out at the time of the fire. Many of the books are listed in a charging record for Thomas Marsh recorded in a Harvard library account book (UAIII 50.15.60, Volume 1, Box 95), including "Shuckford's connection" which was charged to Marsh on September 23, 1763.

[Receipt for certificates of funded debt], 1791 January 28

Printed Commissioner's Office receipt form acknowledging three certificates of funded debt received by Caleb Gannett from Nathaniel Appleton, Commissioner of Loans in the State of Massachusetts. The receipt, No. 712, is signed by Gannett and dated January 28, 1791.

[Receipt issued for interest on stock], 1792 February 2

Printed Commissioner's Office receipt form acknowledging the disbursement of money to Caleb Gannett from Nathaniel Appleton, Commissioner of Loans in the State of Massachusetts, for interest on stock in the funds of the United States. The receipt, No. 484, is signed by Gannett and dated February 2, 1792.

Can Europe recover without credit? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/03, 15 February 2013

• Data from 135 countries covering five decades suggests that creditless recoveries, in which the stock of real credit does not return to the pre-crisis level for three years after the GDP trough, are not rare and are characterised by remarkable real GDP growth rates: 4.7 percent per year in middle-income countries and 3.2 percent per year in high-income countries. • However, the implications of these historical episodes for the current European situation are limited, for two main reasons: • First, creditless recoveries are much less common in high-income countries, than in low-income countries which are financially undeveloped. European economies heavily depend on bank loans and research suggests that loan supply played a major role in the recent weak credit performance of Europe. There are reasons to believe that, despite various efforts, normal lending has not yet been restored.Limited loan supply could be disruptive for the European economic recovery andthere has been only a minor substitution of bank loans with debt securities. • Second, creditless recoveries were associated with significant real exchange rate depreciation, which has hardly occurred so far in most of Europe. This stylised fact suggests that it might be difficult to re-establish economic growth in the absence of sizeable real exchange rate depreciation, if credit growth does not return.

Bank bonus compromise bodes ill for the Single Supervisory Mechanism. CEPS Commentary, 8 March 2013

The European Parliament has probably won a Pyrrhic victory with its position on bank bonuses, argues CEPS CEO Karel Lannoo in this new Commentary. In return, EU member states got what they wanted with the new Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV): no binding leverage ratio; mortgage risk weightings and capital add-ons to be determined by member states; and no obligatory consolidated capital position for bank-insurance companies. In other words, Banking Union will start out with capital rules that are more like Emmental cheese than a single rulebook. This is a huge encumbrance for a well-functioning Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), and makes a single resolution mechanism impossible.

A Copernican Turn for Banking Union. CEPS Policy Brief No. 290, 14 May 2013

Despite apparent consensus that the creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress is painfully slow. The Single Supervisory Mechanism may not be ready before the middle of next year, the Single Resolution Mechanism may require a laborious change of the EU Treaty and common deposit insurance has been postponed into the indefinite future. Any real progress has been prevented by the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of past bad loans. In this Policy Brief, Thomas Mayer suggests that a radically new approach is needed if there is any prospect of moving beyond this impasse to reach full Banking Union. Instead of trying to move from common bank supervision over to resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he argues that policy-makers should go backwards and start with deposit insurance, move from there to resolution, and end with supervision.

Banking system soundness is the key to more SME financing. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2013/10, July 2013

The SME access-to-finance problem is not universal in the European Union and there are reasons for the fall in credit aggregates and higher SME lending rates in southern Europe. Possible market failures, high unemployment and externalities justify making greater and easier access to finance for SMEs a top priority. Previous European initiatives were able to support only a tiny fraction of Europe’s SMEs; merely stepping-up these programmes is unlikely to result in a breakthrough. Without repairing bank balance sheets and resuming economic growth, initiatives to help SMEs get access to finance will have limited success. The European Central Bank can foster bank recapitalisation by performing in the toughest possible way the asset quality review before it takes over the single supervisory role. Of the possible initiatives for fostering SME access to finance, a properly designed scheme for targeted central bank lending seems to be the best complement to the banking clean-up, but other options, such as increased European Investment Bank lending and the promotion of securitisation of SME loans, should also be explored.

A Copernican turn in Banking Union urgently needed. CEPS Policy Brief No. 297, July 2013 [is another Brief with no. 297]

Despite broad agreement among central bankers, policy-makers and economists that creation of a ‘Banking Union’ is essential for the survival of the euro, progress in building this union has been painfully slow. This is largely due to the protracted fights over which government will be the payer of last resort when banks fail because of bad loans made in the past. Taking a cue from Copernicus, Thomas Mayer suggests in this new CEPS Policy Brief that the impasse may be broken by turning the whole process on its head. So, instead of trying to move from common bank supervision, over to bank resolution and then on to deposit insurance, he proposes reversing the process by starting with deposit insurance, moving from there to resolution and ending with supervision.

The distribution of debt across euro area countries : The role of individual characteristics, institutions and credit conditions. National Bank of Belgium Working Paper No. 252, December 2013

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, we present an up-to-date assessment of the differences across euro area countries in the distributions of various measures of debt conditional on household characteristics. We consider three different outcomes: the probability of holding debt, the amount of debt held and, in the case of secured debt, the interest rate paid on the main mortgage. Second, we examine the role of legal and economic institutions in accounting for these differences. We use data from the first wave of a new survey of household finances, the Household Finance and Consumption Survey, to achieve these aims. We find that the patterns of secured and unsecured debt outcomes vary markedly across countries. Among all the institutions considered, the length of asset repossession periods best accounts for the features of the distribution of secured debt. In countries with longer repossession periods, the fraction of people who borrow is smaller, the youngest group of households borrow lower amounts (conditional on borrowing), and the mortgage interest rates paid by low-income households are higher. Regulatory loan-to-value ratios, the taxation of mortgages and the prevalence of interest-only or fixed-rate mortgages deliver less robust results.