939 resultados para Louis, Dauphin of France, 1729-1765
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Oceanic Anoxic Event 2 (OAE2), spanning the Cenomanian-Turonian boundary (CTB), represents one of the largest perturbations in the global carbon cycle in the last 100 Myr. The d13Ccarb, d13Corg, and d18O chemostratigraphy of a black shale-bearing CTB succession in the Vocontian Basin of France is described and correlated at high resolution to the European CTB reference section at Eastbourne, England, and to successions in Germany, the equatorial and midlatitude proto-North Atlantic, and the U.S. Western Interior Seaway (WIS). Delta13C (offset between d13Ccarb and d13Corg) is shown to be a good pCO2 proxy that is consistent with pCO2 records obtained using biomarker d13C data from Atlantic black shales and leaf stomata data from WIS sections. Boreal chalk d18O records show sea surface temperature (SST) changes that closely follow the Delta13C pCO2 proxy and confirm TEX86 results from deep ocean sites. Rising pCO2 and SST during the Late Cenomanian is attributed to volcanic degassing; pCO2 and SST maxima occurred at the onset of black shale deposition, followed by falling pCO2 and cooling due to carbon sequestration by marine organic productivity and preservation, and increased silicate weathering. A marked pCO2 minimum (~25% fall) occurred with a SST minimum (Plenus Cold Event) showing >4°C of cooling in ~40 kyr. Renewed increases in pCO2, SST, and d13C during latest Cenomanian black shale deposition suggest that a continuing volcanogenic CO2 flux overrode further drawdown effects. Maximum pCO2 and SST followed the end of OAE2, associated with a falling nutrient supply during the Early Turonian eustatic highstand.
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Within both aesthetic and history fields, civil engineering occupies a privileged place among arts whose manifestations are based on drawing. In this work, Leonardo’s creativity concerned with civil bridges proyects, have been studied. Leonardo designed ten bridges: eight of them intended for military porposes and only two were purely planned for civil functionaly - “Ponte sul corno d’oro”, infolio 66, manuscript L; and “Ponte a due piani”, represented in the Manuscript B at the Institute of France, infolio 23. There can be no doubt about Leonardo’s intentions when he started on designing these two bridges: his genious for creativy focused on providing both singulary and functionaly to the structures: they should be admired and utilized at the same time, a monument for civil society to be used.The work presented here attemps to make an scientist-historical trip along these Leonardo’s bridges, highlighting their technical, geometrical and aesthetic characteristics, as well as emphasizing Leonardo’s human, scientist and artistic nature.
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La competitividad del transporte de mercancías depende del estado y funcionamiento de las redes existentes y de sus infraestructuras, no del modo de transporte. En concreto, la rentabilidad o la reducción de los costes de producción del transporte marítimo se vería incrementado con el uso de buques de mayor capacidad y con el desarrollo de plataformas portuarias de distribución o puertos secos, ya que el 90% del comercio entre la Unión Europea y terceros países se realiza a través de sus puertos a un promedio de 3,2 billones de toneladas de mercancías manipuladas cada año y el 40% del tráfico intraeuropeo utiliza el transporte marítimo de corta distancia. A pesar de que los puertos europeos acogen anualmente a más de 400 millones de pasajeros, los grandes desarrollos se han producido en los puertos del norte de Europa (Róterdam, Amberes, Ámsterdam). Los países del Sur de Europa deben buscar nuevas fórmulas para ser más competitivos, ya sea mediante creación de nuevas infraestructuras o mediante refuerzo de las existentes, ofreciendo los costes de los puertos del Norte. El fomento del transporte marítimo y fluvial como alternativa al transporte por carretera, especialmente el transporte marítimo de corta distancia, ha sido impulsado por la Comisión Europea (CE) desde 2003 a través de programas de apoyo comunitario de aplicación directa a las Autopistas del Mar, a modo de ejemplo, cabría citar los programas Marco Polo I y II, los cuales contaron con una dotación presupuestaria total de 855 millones de euros para el período 2003 – 2013; en ese período de tiempo se establecieron objetivos de reducción de congestión vial y mejora del comportamiento medio ambiental del sistema de transporte de mercancías dentro de la comunidad y la potenciación de la intermodalidad. El concepto de Autopista del Mar surge en el Libro Blanco de Transportes de la Comisión Europea “La política europea de transportes de cara al 2010: La hora de la verdad” del 12 de diciembre de 2001, en el marco de una política europea para fomento y desarrollo de sistemas de transportes sostenibles. Las Autopistas del Mar consisten en rutas marítimas de corta distancia entre dos puntos, de menor distancia que por vía terrestre, en las que a través del transporte intermodal mejoran significativamente los tiempos y costes de la cadena logística, contribuyen a la reducción de accidentes, ruidos y emisiones de CO2 a la atmósfera, permite que los conductores pierdan horas de trabajo al volante y evita el deterioro de las infraestructuras terrestres, con el consiguiente ahorro en mantenimiento. La viabilidad de una Autopista del Mar depende tanto de factores de ubicación geográficos, como de características propias del puerto, pasando por los diferentes requerimientos del mercado en cada momento (energéticos, medio ambientales y tecnológicos). Existe un elemento nuevo creado por la Comisión Europea: la red transeuropea de transportes (RTE-T). En el caso de España, con sus dos accesos por los Pirineos (La Junquera e Irún) como únicos pasos terrestres de comunicación con el continente y con importantes limitaciones ferroviarias debido a los tres anchos de vía distintos, le resta competitividad frente al conjunto europeo; por el contrario, España es el país europeo con más kilómetros de costa (con más de 8.000 km) y con un emplazamiento geográfico estratégico, lo que le convierte en una plataforma logística para todo el sur de Europa, por lo que las Autopistas del Mar tendrán un papel importante y casi obligado para el desarrollo de los grandes corredores marítimos que promueve Europa. De hecho, Gijón y Vigo lo han hecho muy bien con sus respectivas líneas definidas como Autopistas del Mar y que conectan con el puerto francés de Nantes-Saint Nazaire, ya que desde ahí los camiones pueden coger rutas hacia el Norte. Paralelamente, la Unión Europea ha iniciado los pasos para el impulso de la primera Autopista del Mar que conectará España con el mercado de Reino Unido, concretamente los Puertos de Bilbao y Tilbury. Además, España e Italia sellaron un acuerdo internacional para desarrollar Autopistas del Mar entre ambos países, comprometiéndose a impulsar una docena de rutas entre puertos del litoral mediterráneo español y el italiano. Actualmente, están en funcionando los trayectos como Barcelona-Génova, Valencia-Civitavecchia y Alicante- Nápoles, notablemente más cortos por mar que por carretera. Bruselas identificó cuatro grandes corredores marítimos que podrían concentrar una alta densidad de tráfico de buques, y en dos de ellos España ya tenía desde un principio un papel crucial. La Comisión diseñó el 14 de abril de 2004, a través del proyecto West-Mos, una red de tráfico marítimo que tiene como vías fundamentales la denominada Autopista del Báltico (que enlaza Europa central y occidental con los países bálticos), la Autopista de Europa suroriental (que une el Adriático con el Jónico y el Mediterráneo más oriental) y también la Autopista de Europa occidental y la Autopista de Europa suroccidental (que enlazan España con Reino Unido y la Francia atlántica y con la Francia mediterránea e Italia, respectivamente). Para poder establecer Autopistas del Mar entre la Península Ibérica y el Norte de Europa primará especialmente la retirada de camiones en la frontera pirenaica, donde el tráfico pesado tiene actualmente una intensidad media diaria de 8.000 unidades, actuando sobre los puntos de mayor congestión, como por ejemplo los Alpes, los Pirineos, el Canal de la Mancha, las carreteras fronterizas de Francia y Euskadi, y proponiendo el traslado de las mercancías en barcos o en trenes. Por su parte, para contar con los subsidios y apoyos europeos las rutas seleccionadas como Autopistas del Mar deben mantener una serie de criterios de calidad relacionados con la frecuencia, coste “plataforma logística a plataforma logística”, simplicidad en procedimientos administrativos y participación de varios países, entre otros. Los estudios consideran inicialmente viables los tramos marítimos superiores a 450 millas, con un volumen de unas 15.000 plataformas al año y que dispongan de eficientes comunicaciones desde el puerto a las redes transeuropeas de autopistas y ferrocarril. Otro objetivo de las Autopistas del Mar es desarrollar las capacidades portuarias de forma que se puedan conectar mejor las regiones periféricas a escala del continente europeo. En lo que a Puertos se refiere, las terminales en los muelles deben contar con una línea de atraque de 250 m., un calado superior a 8 m., una rampa “ro-ro” de doble calzada, grúas portainer, y garantizar operatividad para un mínimo de dos frecuencias de carga semanales. El 28 de marzo de 2011 se publicó el segundo Libro Blanco sobre el futuro del transporte en Europa “Hoja de ruta hacia un espacio único europeo de transporte: por una política de transportes competitiva y sostenible”, donde se definió el marco general de las acciones a emprender en los próximos diez años en el ámbito de las infraestructuras de transporte, la legislación del mercado interior, la reducción de la dependencia del carbono, la tecnología para la gestión del tráfico y los vehículos limpios, así como la estandarización de los distintos mercados. Entre los principales desafíos se encuentran la eliminación de los cuellos de botella y obstáculos diversos de nuestra red europea de transporte, minimizar la dependencia del petróleo, reducir las emisiones de GEI en un 60% para 2050 con respecto a los niveles de 1990 y la inversión en nuevas tecnologías e infraestructuras que reduzcan estas emisiones de transporte en la UE. La conexión entre la UE y el norte de África provoca elevados niveles de congestión en los puntos más críticos del trayecto: frontera hispano-francesa, corredor del Mediterráneo y el paso del estrecho. A esto se le añade el hecho de que el sector del transporte por carretera está sujeto a una creciente competencia de mercado motivada por la eliminación de las barreras europeas, mayores exigencias de los cargadores, mayores restricciones a los conductores y aumento del precio del gasóleo. Por otro lado, el mercado potencial de pasajeros tiene una clara diferenciación en tipos de flujos: los flujos en el período extraordinario de la Operación Paso del Estrecho (OPE), enfocado principalmente a marroquíes que vuelven a su país de vacaciones; y los flujos en el período ordinario, enfocado a la movilidad global de la población. Por tanto, lo que se pretende conseguir con este estudio es analizar la situación actual del tráfico de mercancías y pasajeros con origen o destino la península ibérica y sus causas, así como la investigación de las ventajas de la creación de una conexión marítima (Autopista del Mar) con el Norte de África, basándose en los condicionantes técnicos, administrativos, económicos, políticos, sociales y medio ambientales. The competitiveness of freight transport depends on the condition and operation of existing networks and infrastructure, not the mode of transport. In particular, profitability could be increased or production costs of maritime transport could be reduced by using vessels with greater capacity and developing port distribution platforms or dry ports, seeing as 90% of trade between the European Union and third countries happens through its ports. On average 3,2 billion tonnes of freight are handled annualy and 40% of intra-European traffic uses Short Sea Shipping. In spite of European ports annually hosting more than 400 million passengers, there have been major developments in the northern European ports (Rotterdam, Antwerp, Amsterdam). Southern European countries need to find new ways to be more competitive, either by building new infrastructure or by strengthening existing infrastructure, offering costs northern ports. The use of maritime and river transport as an alternative to road transport, especially Short Sea Shipping, has been driven by the European Commission (EC) from 2003 through community support programs for the Motorways of the Sea. These programs include, for example, the Marco Polo I and II programs, which had a total budget of 855 million euros for the period 2003-2013. During this time objectives were set for reducing road congestion, improving the environmental performance of the freight transport system within the community and enhancing intermodal transport. The “Motorway of the Sea” concept arises in the European Commission’s Transport White Paper "European transport policy for 2010: time to decide" on 12 December 2001, as part of a European policy for the development and promotion of sustainable transport systems. A Motorway of the Sea is defined as a short sea route between two points, covering less distance than by road, which provides a significant improvement in intermodal transport times and to the cost supply chain. It contributes to reducing accidents, noise and CO2 emissions, allows drivers to shorten their driving time and prevents the deterioration of land infrastructure thereby saving on maintenance costs. The viability of a Motorway of the Sea depends as much on geographical location factors as on characteristics of the port, taking into account the different market requirements at all times (energy, environmental and technological). There is a new element created by the European Commission: the trans-European transport network (TEN-T). In the case of Spain, with its two access points in the Pyrenees (La Junquera and Irun) as the only land crossings connected to the mainland and major railway limitations due to the three different gauges, it appears less competitive compared to Europe as a whole. However, Spain is the European country with the most kilometers of coastline (over 8,000 km) and a strategic geographical location, which makes it a logistics platform for the all of Southern Europe. This is why the Motorways of the Sea will have an important role, and an almost necessary one to develop major maritime corridors that Europe supports. In fact, Gijon and Vigo have done very well with their respective sea lanes defined as Motorways of the Sea and which connect with the French port of Nantes-Saint Nazaire, as from there trucks can use nort-heading routes. In parallel, the European Union has taken the first steps to boost the first Motorway of the Sea linking Spain to the UK market, specifically the ports of Bilbao and Tilbury. Furthermore, Spain and Italy sealed an international agreement to develop Motorways of the Sea between both countries, pledging to develop a dozen routes between ports on the Spanish and Italian Mediterranean coasts. Currently, there are sea lanes already in use such as Barcelona-Genova, Valencia-Civitavecchia and Alicante-Naples, these are significantly shorter routes by sea than by road. Brussels identified four major maritime corridors that could hold heavy concentrate shipping traffic, and Spain had a crucial role in two of these from the beginning. On 14 April 2004 the Commission planned through the West-Mos project, a network of maritime traffic which includes the essential sea passages the so-called Baltic Motorway (linking Central and Western Europe with the Baltic countries), the southeast Europe Motorway (linking the Adriatic to the Ionian and eastern Mediterranean Sea), the Western Europe Motorway and southwestern Europe Motorway (that links Spain with Britain and the Atlantic coast of France and with the French Mediterranean coast and Italy, respectively). In order to establish Motorways of the Sea between the Iberian Peninsula and Northern Europe especially, it is necessary to remove trucks from the Pyrenean border, where sees heavy traffic (on average 8000 trucks per day) and addressing the points of greatest congestion, such as the Alps, the Pyrenees, the English Channel, the border roads of France and Euskadi, and proposing the transfer of freight on ships or trains. For its part, in order to receive subsidies and support from the European Commission, the routes selected as Motorways of the Sea should maintain a series of quality criteria related to frequency, costs "from logistics platform to logistics platform," simplicity in administrative procedures and participation of several countries, among others. To begin with, studies consider viable a maritime stretch of at least 450 miles with a volume of about 15,000 platforms per year and that have efficient connections from port to trans-European motorways and rail networks. Another objective of the Motorways of the Sea is to develop port capacity so that they can better connect peripheral regions across the European continent. Referring ports, the terminals at the docks must have a berthing line of 250 m., a draft greater than 8 m, a dual carriageway "ro-ro" ramp, portainer cranes, and ensure operability for a minimum of two loads per week. On 28 March 2011 the second White Paper about the future of transport in Europe "Roadmap to a Single European Transport Area – Towards a competitive and resource efficient transport system" was published. In this Paper the general framework of actions to be undertaken in the next ten years in the field of transport infrastructure was defined, including internal market legislation, reduction of carbon dependency, traffic management technology and clean vehicles, as well as the standardization of different markets. The main challenges are how to eliminate bottlenecks and various obstacles in our European transport network, minimize dependence on oil, reduce GHG emissions by 60% by 2050 compared to 1990 levels and encourage investment in new technologies and infrastructure that reduce EU transport emissions. The connection between the EU and North Africa causes high levels of congestion on the most critical points of the journey: the Spanish-French border, the Mediterranean corridor and Gibraltar Strait. In addition to this, the road transport sector is subject to increased market competition motivated by the elimination of European barriers, greater demands of shippers, greater restrictions on drivers and an increase in the price of diesel. On the other hand, the potential passenger market has a clear differentiation in type of flows: flows in the special period of the Crossing the Straits Operation (CSO), mainly focused on Moroccans who return home on vacation; and flows in the regular session, focused on the global mobile population. Therefore, what I want to achieve with this study is present an analysis of the current situation of freight and passengers to or from the Iberian Peninsula and their causes, as well as present research on the advantages of creating a maritime connection (Motorways of the Sea) with North Africa, based on the technical, administrative, economic, political, social and environmental conditions.
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This brief handwritten document certifies that the guardianship of Richard Nichols of Reading, Massachusetts, was granted to yeoman Thomas Hartshorn of Reading according to the records of the Probate Court in Framingham, Massachusetts. The document is attested by James Winthrop in his capacity as register of probate for Middlesex County.
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Notebook of unlined pages holding a handwritten copy of Tutor Flynt's "Catechism" copied by Harvard student Hull Abbot (1702-1774, Harvard AB 1720). The volume lists questions and accompanying answers on various academic subjects.
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Notebook of unlined pages with paper marbled cover holding a handwritten copy of Tutor Flynt's "Catechism" likely copied by Harvard student John Wolcott in 1719. The volume lists questions and accompanying answers on various academic subjects. On the last page, the inscription "John Wolcott [the name is crossed over] his geography, 1719" indicates Wolcott (1702-1747), a member of the Harvard class of 1721, copied the book.
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Three letters written from Paris and Bordeaux. Tudor again writes of his approval of Bonaparte, and offers observations on the weather, crops, and culture of France.
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Handwritten copy of a brief letter in French presumably to Francois Arago congratulating him on his appointment in the French Provisional Government following the 1848 Revolution and the formation of the French Second Republic. Both Arago and Sales were from the Pyrénées-Orientales region of France.
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This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: Map of the republic of Switzerland : describing its twenty-two cantons, including those of Le Valais, Geneva and Neuchâtel, added by the Act of Congress, 1815, compiled from the surveys of Weiss, Kellar &c. ; J. Walker, sculpt. It was published by Jas. Wyld ... 5 Charing Cross in 1825. Scale [ca. 1:440,000]. Covers also portions of France, Germany, Liechtenstein, Austria, and Italy. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the Europe Lambert Conformal Conic coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, major roads, territorial boundaries, and more. Relief shown by hachures. Includes population table and altitudes.This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.
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This layer is a georeferenced raster image of the historic paper map entitled: A complete representation of the coast of England, together with the interior, divided into counties and military districts : also the coast of France and Holland from the Texel to Brest ... to which is annexed eighteen plans of the ports of the enemy, the principal depôts of the flotilla intended for the invasion of England, by John Luffman, Geogr. It was published by J. Luffman in 1804. Scale [ca. 1:2,500,000]. The image inside the map neatline is georeferenced to the surface of the earth and fit to the 'British National Grid' coordinate system. All map collar and inset information is also available as part of the raster image, including any inset maps, profiles, statistical tables, directories, text, illustrations, index maps, legends, or other information associated with the principal map. This map shows features such as drainage, cities and other human settlements, administrative and military district boundaries, shoreline features including distances between selected ports, and more. Includes insets of foreign military installations and index to the military districts. This layer is part of a selection of digitally scanned and georeferenced historic maps from the Harvard Map Collection. These maps typically portray both natural and manmade features. The selection represents a range of originators, ground condition dates, scales, and map purposes.
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How has the integration of trade policy and negotiating authority in Europe affected the external bargaining capabilities of the European Community (EC)? This paper analyzes the bargaining constraints and opportunities for the EC created by the obligation to negotiate as a single entity. The nature of demands in external~ the voting rules at the EC level, and the amount of autonomy exercised by EC negotiators contribute to explaining, this paper argues, whether the EC gains some external bargaining clout from its internal divisions and whether the final international agreement reflects the position of the median or the extreme countries in the Community. The Uruguay Round agricultural negotiations illustrate the consequences of the EC's institutional structure on its external bargaining capabilities. Negotiations between the EC and the U.S. were deadlocked for six years because the wide gap among the positions of the member states at the start of the Uruguay Round had prevented the EC from making sufficient concessions. The combination of a weakened unanimity rule and greater autonomy seized by Commission negotiators after the May 1992 reform of the Common Agricultural Policy made possible the conclusion of an EC-U.S. agricultural agreement. Although the majority of member states supported the Blair House agreement, the reinstating of the veto power in the EC and the tighter member states' control over the Commission eventually resulted in a renegotiation of the U.S.-EC agreement tilted in favor of France, the most recalcitrant country.
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FOREWORD. When one looks at the present state of the CSDP, one cannot help but look on with disenchantment at the energy that appears to have abandoned both institutions and Member States. Commentators increasingly take for granted that nothing much should be expected from this field of EU policy. The reasons for this state of mind are well known: the recent economic and financial strains, which have impacted all EU action since 2008, means that most of the Member States will struggle to keep their defence budgets at their present level in the future, and we may even see reductions. Furthermore, and to put it mildly, most of the recent CSDP operations have also experienced a lack of enthusiasm. Adding to this overall trend, the EU is far from presenting a common vision of what security and defence should really mean. Many of the Member States do not want to be involved in all of today’s international turmoils, and they rarely share the strategic culture which inspires those Member States who see themselves as having special responsibilities in dealing with these crises. In the end it may be that Member States diverge fundamentally on the simple question of whether it is relevant for the EU to engage in most of the ‘hot’ crises Europe faces; many prefer to see Europe as a soft power, mostly dedicated to intervening on less dramatic fronts and more inclined to mend than to fight. For whatever reason given, it remains that if there is a lack of common understanding on what CSDP should really be about, it should not come as a surprise if this policy is presently in stalemate. As an additional blow, the Ukrainian crisis, which dragged on for the whole of last year, could only add to the downward spiral the EU has been experiencing, with a new Russia aggressively confronting Europe in a manner not too distant from the Cold War days. This attitude has triggered the natural reaction among EU Member States to seek reassurances from NATO about their own national security. Coupled with the return of France a few years ago into the integrated military command, NATO’s renewed relevance has sent a strong message to Europe about the military organisation’s credibility with regard to collective defence. Surprisingly, this overall trend was gathering momentum at the same time as other more positive developments. The European Council of December 2013 dedicated its main session to CSDP: it underlined Europe’s role as a ‘security provider’ while adopting a very ambitious road map for Europe in all possible dimensions of the security sector. Hence the impression of a genuine boost to all EU institutions, which have been invited to join efforts and give CSDP a reinvigorated efficiency. In the same way, the increasing instability in Europe’s neighbourhood has also called for more EU operations: most recently in Iraq, Libya, Northern Nigeria or South Sudan. Pressure for further EU engagement has been one of the most constant features of the discussions taking place around these crises. Moreover, a growing number of EU partners in Asia, Latin America or Eastern Europe have shown a renewed eagerness to join CSDP missions in what sounds like a vote of confidence for EU capacities. What kind of conclusion should be drawn from this contradictory situation? Probably that the EU has much more potential than it can sometimes figure out itself, if only it would be ready to adapt to the new global realities. But, more than anything else, an enhanced CSDP needs from all Member States strong political will and a clear vision of what they want this policy to be. Without this indispensable ingredient CSDP may continue to run its course, as it does today. It may even grow in efficiency but it will keep lacking the one resource that would definitely help it overcome all the present shortcomings that have prevented Europe from finding its true role and mission through the CSDP. Member States remain central to EU security and defence policy. This is why this collection of essays is so valuable for assessing in no uncertain way the long road that lies ahead for any progress to be made. Pierre VIMONT Senior Associate at Carnegie Europe Former Executive Secretary-General of the European External Action Service
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The eurozone crisis triggered a whole new series of innovations in EU economic governance in order to make the Union more resilient for the next economic downswing. But one of the more persistent issues are the socio-economic divergences between member states, identified by the Five Presidents’ Report as a major problem in the functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Debates took place in recent years about automatic stabilisers, and more specifically about the possibility of introducing an unemployment insurance within the EMU. While the need for some form of fiscal risk-sharing has become a dominant view in expert circles, there has been much less progress among the main political parties and stakeholders. In this study, Regula Hess and László Andor analyse the political feasibility of the adoption of an automatic fiscal stabiliser (AFS) for the eurozone by evaluating actors’ positions towards three distinctive proposals: 1) cyclical shock insurance, 2) reinsurance, 3) a European basic unemployment insurance; they included an empirical case study of France and Germany as the most relevant players within the intergovernmental bargaining constellation. Although the authors realise the current political context makes the adoption of an AFS improbable, Hess and Andor encourage stakeholders to further pursue the discussion, as windows of opportunities can open at any time, and even give some suggestions on what the parameters of the most feasible proposal might be.
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Includes index.
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Mode of access: Internet.