962 resultados para Infraestrutura (Economia) - Brasil


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The reduction of standard weekly working hours from the curreilt leveI of 44 hours to 40 hours has recently been proposed by the main central unions as a way to create jobs and reduce unemployment in Brazil. The idea, known as work-sharing, is that the reduction in average hours per worker allows the same tasks to be performed bymore employees. However, the notion ofwork-sharing has been challenged by the theoretical and the empirical literature. Theory says that, in general, a reduction in the duration ofthe workweek tends to decrease employment. Work-sharing is even less likely in the case of no wage restraint, when monthly wages are not proportionally reduced. Recent cautious econometric evidence also conflict with the notion of work -sharing (Hunt, 1999, and Crépon and Kramarz, 2000). The objective ofthis paper is to study the effects ofthe workweek length reduction from 48 to 44 hours, prescribed by the 1988 Constitutional change, on the Brazilian labor market. We find that: i) the reduction of standard working hours was followed by a significant decrease in actual working hours: 60,7% ofthe employees that worked between 45 and 48 weekly hours in 1988 (the affected group) and that remained employed in 1989 switched to a 40-44 hours workweek; ii) belonging to the affected group in 1988 had no statistical effect on the probability ofbecoming unemployed, exiting the labor market, or switching to an informal job in 1989; iii) the reduction in working hours implied a 8,8% increase in hourly real wages with respect to those that remained employed at 40-44 hours a week. In sum, the reduction of standard working hours in 1988 reduced actual working hours, did not affect the probability ofa typical worker to lose hisjob in 1989, and implied a relative increase in hourly real wages.

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A teoria da Nova Economia Institucional atribuiu papel de destaque às instituições, classificando-as como as “regras do jogo” nas sociedades. Uma das vertentes desta literatura foca-se em analisar a relação entre o grau de enforcement ou exigibilidade das decisões proferidas pelo Poder Judiciário e seu impacto no desenvolvimento econômico das nações, em especial, dos países em desenvolvimento. No Brasil, este debate ganha relevância no final da década de 1990 a partir de determinadas pesquisas de cunho social realizadas com magistrados, demonstrando que estes tenderiam a sacrificar a previsibilidade judicial em favor da justiça social. Nesse contexto, certos economistas brasileiros lançam a hipótese da existência de um viés anticredor por parte do Poder Judiciário brasileiro, cuja tendência é a de favorecer a parte devedora, fato que resulta na manutenção das altas taxas de juros no país, bem como na inexistência de um mercado de crédito de longo prazo. Diante deste debate, foi selecionado segmento específico – a atividade de factoring – para se desenvolver pesquisa empírica qualitativa substantiva a fim de se (i) investigar o grau de enforcement das decisões contratuais e (ii) testar a existência ou não de um viés anticredor por parte dos Tribunais de Justiça de São Paulo e do Rio Grande do Sul.

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One of the main socioeconomic problems observed in most developing countries is the high income inequality. In Brazil, such issue is particularly relevant, since it possesses one of the worst income distributions in the world. This paper aims at studying the impact of health status on income distribution in Brazil. The methodology is a counterfactual analysis. The database used is that of PNAD 2003. The major contribution of the present study is to detect the impact of health status on income distribution in Brazil. This effect is more significant among the elderly than the others age groups.