How the European Union does not work: national bargaining success in the Council of Ministers

We know surprisingly little about whether the content of European Union legislation reflects the preferences of some Member States more than others. The few studies that have examined national bargaining success rates for EU legislation have conceptual and methodological weaknesses. To redress these problems I use a salience-weighted measure to gauge the relative success of Member States in translating their national preferences into legislation, and test two plausible, competing hypotheses about how the EU works: that no state consistently achieves more of what it really wants than any other, and that large Member States tend to beat small ones. Neither hypothesis receives empirical support. Not only do states differ far more significantly in their respective levels of bargaining success than previously recognised, but some of the smaller states are the ones that do especially well. The paper‟s main contribution -- demonstrating that the EU does not work as most people think it does -- sets the stage for new research questions, both positive and normative. In the last section I make a tentative start answering two of the most important: which factors explain the surprising empirical results, and whether differential national bargaining success might undermine the legitimacy of the integration process.

The Council of Ministers of the European Union After the Lisbon Treaty

The Treaty of Lisbon has brought remarkable changes and innovations to the European Union. As far as the Council of Ministers of the European Union (“the Council” hereinafter) is concerned, there are two significant innovations: double qualified majority voting and new rotating Presidency scheme, which are considered to make the working of the Council more efficiently, stably and consistently. With the modification relating to other key institutions, the Commission and the European Parliament, and with certain procedures being re-codified, the power of the Council varies accordingly, where the inter-institutional balance counts for more research. As the Council is one of the co-legislatures of the Union, the legislative function of it would be probably influenced, positively or negatively, by the internal innovations and the inter-institutional re-balance. Has the legislative function of the Council been reinforced or not? How could the Council better reach its functional goal designed by the Treaties’ drafter? How to evaluate the Council’s evolution after Lisbon Treaty in the light of European integration? This thesis is attempting to find the answers by analyzing two main internal innovations and inter-institutional re-balance thereinafter.

Risk assessment for the design of a risk-based surveillance programme for fish farms in Switzerland (in accordance with Council Directive 2006/88/EC of the European Union).

Swiss aquaculture farms were assessed according to their risk of acquiring or spreading viral haemorrhagic septicaemia (VHS) and infectious haematopoietic necrosis (IHN). Risk factors for the introduction and spread of VHS and IHN were defined and assessed using published data and expert opinions. Among the 357 aquaculture farms identified in Switzerland, 49.3% were categorised as high risk, 49.0% as medium risk and 1.7% as low risk. According to the new Directive 2006/88/EC for aquaculture of the European Union, the frequency of farm inspections must be derived from their risk levels. A sensitivity analysis showed that water supply and fish movements were highly influential on the output of the risk assessment regarding the introduction of VHS and IHN. Fish movements were also highly influential on the risk assessment output regarding the spread of these diseases.