Long-run substitutability between more and less educated workers: Evidence from U.S. States 1950-1990

We estimate the aggregate long-run elasticity of substitution between more and less educatedworkers (the slope of the demand curve for more relative to less educated workers) at theUS state level. Our data come from the (five)1950-1990 decennial censuses. Our empiricalapproach allows for state and time fixed effects and relies on time and state dependentchild labor and compulsory school attendance laws as instruments for (endogenous) changesin the relative supply of more educated workers. We find the aggregate long-run elasticity ofsubstitution between more and less educated workers to be around 1.5.

Capital, wages and growth: Theory and evidence

Returns to scale to capital and the strength of capital externalities play a key role for the empirical predictions and policy implications of different growth theories. We show that both can be identified with individual wage data and implement our approach at the city-level using US Census data on individuals in 173 cities for 1970, 1980, and 1990. Estimation takes into account fixed effects, endogeneity of capital accumulation, and measurement error. We find no evidence for human or physical capital externalities and decreasing aggregate returns to capital. Returns to scale to physical and human capital are around 80 percent. We also find strong complementarities between human capital and labor and substantial total employment externalities.

Schooling supply and the structure of production: Evidence from US States 1950-1990

We find that over the period 1950-1990, US states absorbed increases in the supplyof schooling due to tighter compulsory schooling and child labor laws mostly throughwithin-industry increases in the schooling intensity of production. Shifts in the industrycomposition towards more schooling-intensive industries played a less important role.To try and understand this finding theoretically, we consider a free trade model withtwo goods/industries, two skill types, and many regions that produce a fixed rangeof differentiated varieties of the same goods. We find that a calibrated version ofthe model can account for shifts in schooling supply being mostly absorbed throughwithin-industry increases in the schooling intensity of production even if the elasticityof substitution between varieties is substantially higher than estimates in the literature.

Fiscal policy, pricing frictions and monetary accommodation

We investigate the theoretical conditions for effectiveness of government consumptionexpenditure expansions using US, Euro area and UK data. Fiscal expansions taking placewhen monetary policy is accommodative lead to large output multipliers in normal times.The 2009-2010 packages need not produce significant output multipliers, may havemoderate debt effects, and only generate temporary inflation. Expenditure expansionsaccompanied by deficit/debt consolidations schemes may lead to short run output gains buttheir success depends on how monetary policy and expectations behave. Trade opennessand the cyclicality of the labor wedge explain cross-country differences in the magnitude ofthe multipliers.

The effects of structural reforms on productivity and profitability enhancing reallocation: Evidence from Colombia

Estimates for the U.S. suggest that at least in some sectors productivity enhancing reallocationis the dominant factor in accounting for producitivity growth. An open question, particularlyrelevant for developing countries, is whether reallocation is always productivity enhancing. Itmay be that imperfect competition or other barriers to competitive environments imply that thereallocation process is not fully e?cient in these countries. Using a unique plant-levellongitudinal dataset for Colombia for the period 1982-1998, we explore these issues byexamining the interaction between market allocation, and productivity and profitability.Moreover, given the important trade, labor and financial market reforms in Colombia during theearly 1990's, we explore whether and how the contribution of reallocation changed over theperiod of study. Our data permit measurement of plant-level quantities and prices. Takingadvantage of the rich structure of our price data, we propose a sequential mehodology to estimateproductivity and demand shocks at the plant level. First, we estimate total factor productivity(TFP) with plant-level physical output data, where we use downstream demand to instrumentinputs. We then turn to estimating demand shocks and mark-ups with plant-level price data, usingTFP to instrument for output in the inversedemand equation. We examine the evolution of thedistributions of TFP and demand shocks in response to the market reforms in the 1990's. We findthat market reforms are associated with rising overall productivity that is largely driven byreallocation away from low- and towards highproductivity businesses. In addition, we find thatthe allocation of activity across businesses is less driven by demand factors after reforms. Wefind that the increase in aggregate productivity post-reform is entirely accounted for by theimproved allocation of activity.

Entry regulation and intersectoral reallocation

We study how restrictions on firm entry affect intersectoral factor reallocation when openeconomies experience global economic shocks. In our theoretical framework, countries trade freelyin a range of differentiated sectors that are subject to country-specific and global shocks. Entryrestrictions are modeled as an upper bound on the introduction of new differentiated goods followingshocks. Prices and quantities adjust to clear international goods markets, and wages adjustto clear national labor markets. We show that in general equilibrium, countries with tighter entryrestrictions see less factor reallocation compared to the frictionless benchmark. In our empiricalwork, we compare sectoral employment reallocation across countries in the 1980s and 1990s withproxies for frictionless benchmark reallocation. Our results indicate that the gap between actualand frictionless reallocation is greater in countries where it takes longer to start a firm.

Interviews and adverse selection

Interviewing in professional labor markets is a costly process for firms. Moreover, poor screening can have a persistent negative impact on firms bottom lines and candidates careers. In a simple dynamic model where firms can pay a cost to interview applicants who have private information about their own ability, potentially large inefficiencies arise from information-based unemployment, where able workers are rejected by firms because of their lack of offers in previous interviews. This effect may make the market less efficient than random matching. We show that the first best can be achieved using either a mechanism with transfers or one without transfers.

Competing engines of growth: Innovation and standardization

We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes theform of the introduction of new goods whose production requires skilled workers.Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these newgoods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlightsa number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth anda potential barrier to it. As a result, growth is an inverse U-shaped function ofthe standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growthand welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal protection of intellectual property rights affecting the cost of standardization vary withthe skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that, depending on how competition between innovatingand standardizing firms is modelled and on parameter values, a new type of multiplicity of equilibria may arise. Finally, we study the implications of our model forthe skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade tointellectual property rights protection.

Offshoring and directed technical change

To study the short-run and long-run implications on wage inequality, we introducedirected technical change into a Ricardian model of offshoring. A unique final good isproduced by combining a skilled and an unskilled product, each produced from a continuumof intermediates (tasks). Some of these tasks can be transferred from a skill-abundant Westto a skill-scarce East. Profit maximization determines both the extent of offshoring andtechnological progress. Offshoring induces skill-biased technical change because it increasesthe relative price of skill-intensive products and induces technical change favoring unskilledworkers because it expands the market size for technologies complementing unskilled labor.In the empirically more relevant case, starting from low levels, an increase in offshoringopportunities triggers a transition with falling real wages for unskilled workers in the West,skill-biased technical change and rising skill premia worldwide. However, when the extentof offshoring becomes sufficiently large, further increases in offshoring induce technicalchange now biased in favor of unskilled labor because offshoring closes the gap betweenunskilled wages in the West and the East, thus limiting the power of the price effectfueling skill-biased technical change. The unequalizing impact of offshoring is thus greatestat the beginning. Transitional dynamics reveal that offshoring and technical change aresubstitutes in the short run but complements in the long run. Finally, though offshoringimproves the welfare of workers in the East, it may benefit or harm unskilled workers inthe West depending on elasticities and the equilibrium growth rate.

Start-up costs and pecuniary externalities as barriers to economic development

We use a dynamic monopolistic competition model to show that an economythat inherits a small range of specialized inputs can be trapped into alower stage of development. The limited availability of specialized inputsforces the final goods producers to use a labor intensive technology, whichin turn implies a small inducement to introduce new intermediate inputs. Thestart--up costs, which make the intermediate inputs producers subject todynamic increasing returns, and pecuniary externalities that result from thefactor substitution in the final goods sector, play essential roles in themodel.

Compensating wage differentials and voluntary job changes: Evidence from West Germany

Does the labor market place wage premia on jobs that involve physical strain,job, insecurity or bad regulation of hours? This paper derives bounds on themonetary returns to these job disamenities in the West German labor market.We show that in a market with dispersion in both job characteristics andwages, the average wage change of workers who switch jobs voluntarily and optfor consuming more (less) disamenities,provides an upper (lower) bound on themarket return to the disamenity. Using longitudinal information from workersin the German Socio Economic Panel, we estimate an upper bound of 5% and alower bound of 3.5% for the market return to work strain in a job.

Human capital, the structure of production and growth

Do high levels of human capital foster economic growth by facilitating technology adoption? If so, countries with more human capital should have adopted more rapidly the skilled-labor augmenting technologies becoming available since the 1970 s. High human capital levels should therefore have translated into fast growth in more compared to less human-capital-intensive industries in the 1980 s. Theories of international specialization point to human capital accumulation as another important determinant of growth in human-capital-intensive industries. Using data for a large sample of countries, we find significant positive effects of human capital levels and human capital accumulation on output and employment growth in human-capital-intensive industries.

Social security, retirement, and the single-mindedness of the electorate

We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important featuresof social security programs around the world: (1) they redistributeincome from young to old and (2) they induce retirement. We construct avoting model that includes a political campaign or debate prior to theelection. The model incorporates single-mindedness of the groups that donot work: while the workers divide their political capital between their age concerns and occupational concerns , the retired concentrate alltheir political capital to support their age group. In our model, theelderly end up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young)and distortionary labor income taxes induce the retirement of the elderly.In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that work morewill tend to have more political power. The opposite is true fornon-occupational groups (such as the elderly). We provide some evidencethat supports these additional predictions.

Employee referrals and efficiency wages

Many workers believe that personal contacts are crucial for obtainingjobs in high-wage sectors. On the other hand, firms in high-wage sectorsreport using employee referrals because they help provide screening andmonitoring of new employees. This paper develops a matching model thatcan explain the link between inter-industry wage differentials and useof employee referrals. Referrals lower monitoring costs because high-effortreferees can exert peer pressure on co-workers, allowing firms to pay lowerefficiency wages. On the other hand, informal search provides fewer job andapplicant contacts than formal methods (e.g., newspaper ads). In equilibrium,the matching process generates segmentation in the labor market becauseof heterogeneity in the size of referral networks. Referrals match good high-paying jobs to well-connected workers, while formal methods matchless attractive jobs to less-connected workers. Industry-level data show apositive correlation between industry wage premia and use of employeereferrals. Moreover, evidence using the NLSY shows similar positive andsignificant OLS and fixed-effects estimates of the returns to employeereferrals, but insignificant effects once sector of employment is controlledfor. This evidence suggests referred workers earn higher wages not becauseof higher unobserved ability or better matches but rather because theyare hired in high-wage sectors.

The ins and outs of unemployment: An analysis conditional on technology shocks

We analyze how unemployment, job finding and job separation rates reactto neutral and investment-specific technology shocks. Neutral shocks increaseunemployment and explain a substantial portion of it volatility; investment-specificshocks expand employment and hours worked and contribute to hoursworked volatility. Movements in the job separation rates are responsible for theimpact response of unemployment while job finding rates for movements alongits adjustment path. The evidence warns against using models with exogenousseparation rates and challenges the conventional way of modelling technologyshocks in search and sticky price models.