Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

Reliure de : M. Annaei Lucani pharsalia, sive de bello civili Caesaris et Pompeii lib. X. Ex emendatione V.C. Hug : Grotii.

[La guerre civile (latin). 1626]

The novel ss469415590 variant predicts virological response to therapy in patients with chronic hepatitis C virus type 1 infection.

BACKGROUND: A novel dinucleotide variant TT/∆G (ss469415590) has been associated with hepatitis C virus clearance. AIM: To assess the role of the ss469415590 variant, compared with the known IL28B polymorphisms (rs8099917, rs12979860 and rs12980275) for predicting virological response to therapy in chronic hepatitis C, and its association with the CXCL10 chemokine serum levels - a surrogate marker of interferon-stimulated genes activation. METHODS: Multivariate analysis of factors predicting rapid and sustained virological response in 280 consecutive, treatment-naïve, nondiabetic, Caucasian patients with chronic hepatitis C treated with peginterferon alpha and ribavirin. RESULTS: In hepatitis C virus genotype 1, the OR (95% CI) for rapid and sustained virological response for the wild-type ss469415590 TT was 9.88 (1.99-48.99) and 7.25 (1.91-27.51), respectively, similar to those found for rs12979860 CC [9.55 (1.93-47.37) and 6.30 (1.71-23.13)] and for rs12980275 AA [9.62 (1.94-47.77] and 7.83 (2.02-30.34)], but higher than for rs8099917 TT [4.8 (1.73-13.33) and 4.75 (2.05-10.98)]. In hepatitis C virus genotype 1, mean (SD) CXCL10 levels in patients with the TT/TT, TT/∆G and ∆G/∆G variants were, respectively, 355.1 (240.6), 434.4 (247.4) and 569.9 (333.3) (P = 0.04). In patients with genotypes 2 and 3 no significant association was found for TT/∆G with viral response. The predictive value of ss469415590 was stronger in patients with advanced fibrosis. CONCLUSIONS: The novel IL28B variants at marker ss469415590 predict response to IFN alpha in chronic hepatitis C patients, especially in those with advanced fibrosis. Their determination may be superior to that of known IL28B variants for patient management using IFN-based regimens.

[Illustrations des Fables] / C. Monnet, dess. ; Aug. de Saint-Aubin, H.L. Schmitz, grav. ; Boisard, aut. du texte

Comprend : [Fig. p. titre du Tome 1 : poète.] Ausidius Forti Miscebat Mella Falerno. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 1. Livre I. Pl. de la Fable XX : La pêche.] Tout réussit à la bergère. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 1. Livre II. Pl. de la Fable IV : Le loup et le dogue.] Et meurent comme toi, brigand impitoyable, / Tous ceux qui comme toi, meurtriers dans le coeur, / Dans le bonheur public ont trouvé leur malheur. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 1. Livre II. Pl. de la Fable XX : Le cheval, le boeuf, le mouton et l'âne.] Voilà comme l'on fait fortune! [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 1. Livre III. Pl. de la Fable V : Xénocrate et le moineau.] Il est foible, innocent... je lui dois mon secours. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 1. Livre IV. Pl. de la Fable XXV : L'Histoire.] On fit l'Histoire après sa mort. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Cul de lampe p. 215 : Minerve et la muse de la musique.] [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Fig. de titre du Tome 2 : poète et chérubin.] Ausidius Forti Miscebat Mella Falerno. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 2. Livre V. Pl. de la Fable I : le vieillard et l'idole.] Ne songe pas au bien qu'il ne pourra nous faire, Songe à celui qu'il nous a fait. [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 2. Livre VI. Pl. de la Fable XX : Le jeune renard.] Je n'ai vu que l'appast, il avait vu le piège! [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 2. Livre VII. Pl. de la Fable XX : Les deux voleurs.] Toi des remords! Toi des scrupules! [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Tome 2. Livre VIII. Pl. de la Fable XX : Phidias et la statue de Jupiter.] Non pas moi! [cote : microfilms R 122333-334] ; [Cul de lampe p. 301 : Minerve et un chérubin.] [cote : microfilms R 122333-334]

On the Source and Rewriting of 1 Corinthians 2.9 in Christian, Jewish and Islamic Traditions (1 Clem 34.8; GosJud 47.10-13; a ḥadīth qudsī)

The article reopens the file of sources, parallels and rewritings of 1 Cor 2.9, a saying that Paul attributes to some written source, when others sources put it into Jesus' mouth (e.g. GosThom 17). A state of research highlights that the hypothesis of an oral source is generally preferred but an accurate study of 1 Clem 34.8, a parallel too often neglected, supports the presence of a written source that existed before 1 Cor 2.9. GosJud 47.10-13 will help to understand the attribution of the saying to Jesus. The last important part of this article studies its parallel in Islamic traditions, a ḥadīth qudsī.

Uniform-price assignment markets

Uniform-price assignment games are introduced as those assignment markets with the core reduced to a segment. In these games, for all active agents, competitive prices are uniform although products may be non-homogeneous. A characterization in terms of the assignment matrix is given. The only assignment markets where all submarkets are uniform are the Bohm-Bawerk horse markets. We prove that for uniform-price assignment games the kernel, or set of symmetrically-pairwise bargained allocations, either coincides with the core or reduces to the nucleolus

The extreme core allocations of the assignment game

Although assignment games are hardly ever convex, in this paper a characterization of their set or extreme points of the core is provided, which is also valid for the class of convex games. For each ordering in the player set, a payoff vector is defined where each player receives his marginal contribution to a certain reduced game played by his predecessors. We prove that the whole set of reduced marginal worth vectors, which for convex games coincide with the usual marginal worth vectors, is the set of extreme points of the core of the assignment game

All assignment games with the same core have the same nucleolus

There exist coalitional games with transferable utility which have the same core but different nucleoli. We show that this cannot happen in the case of assignment games. Whenever two assignment games have the same core, their nucleoli also coincide. To show this, we prove that the nucleolus of an assignment game coincides with that of its buyer-seller exact representative

On the dimension of the core of the assignment game

The set of optimal matchings in the assignment matrix allows to define a reflexive and symmetric binary relation on each side of the market, the equal-partner binary relation. The number of equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the equal-partner binary relation determines the dimension of the core of the assignment game. This result provides an easy procedure to determine the dimension of the core directly from the entries of the assignment matrix and shows that the dimension of the core is not as much determined by the number of optimal matchings as by their relative position in the assignment matrix.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

The Lorenz-maximal core allocations and the kernel in some classes of assignment games

En aquest treball demostrem que en la classe de jocs d'assignació amb diagonal dominant (Solymosi i Raghavan, 2001), el repartiment de Thompson (que coincideix amb el valor tau) és l'únic punt del core que és maximal respecte de la relació de dominància de Lorenz, i a més coincideix amb la solucié de Dutta i Ray (1989), també coneguda com solució igualitària. En segon lloc, mitjançant una condició més forta que la de diagonal dominant, introduïm una nova classe de jocs d'assignació on cada agent obté amb la seva parella òptima almenys el doble que amb qualsevol altra parella. Per aquests jocs d'assignació amb diagonal 2-dominant, el repartiment de Thompson és l'únic punt del kernel, i per tant el nucleolo.

Monge assignment games

Un juego de asignación se define por una matriz A; donde cada fila representa un comprador y cada columna un vendedor. Si el comprador i se empareja a un vendedor j; el mercado produce aij unidades de utilidad. Estudiamos los juegos de asignación de Monge, es decir, aquellos juegos bilaterales de asignación en los cuales la matriz satisface la propiedad de Monge. Estas matrices pueden caracterizarse por el hecho de que en cualquier submatriz 2x2 un emparejamiento óptimo está situado en la diagonal principal. Para mercados cuadrados, describimos sus núcleos utilizando sólo la parte central tridiagonal de elementos de la matriz. Obtenemos una fórmula cerrada para el reparto óptimo de los compradores dentro del núcleo y para el reparto óptimo de los vendedores dentro del núcleo. Analizamos también los mercados no cuadrados reduciéndolos a matrices cuadradas apropiadas.