Financial governance: the Brazilian experience on prudential regulation and its impacts on the effects of the 2008 financial crisis

The Brazilian economy was severely hit by the 2008 crisis. In the beginning of the crisis, the vast majorities of the economic agents and authorities thought that Brazil could face some sort of decoupling since some macroeconomic fundamentals were very good. What we saw, however, was that the Brazilian economy was not decoupled, and expectations faced a huge deterioration soon after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 15th. Two aspects regarding the impact of crisis in Brazil, however, deserve a great deal of attention: (a) although deep, the impact did not last for a long time. Actually, the GDP growth experienced a good recovery in the second quarter of 2009, showing that the health of the Brazilian economy was good; (b) the Brazilian banking system performed very well during the crisis, although we cannot say the system was not in danger in the worst time of the crisis. In spite of the confidence crisis faced by the banking system 1, it showed a great deal of resilience. In this aspect, we argue that the restructure faced by the banking system in the aftermath of the Real Plan, as well as the development of a solid supervision regulation helped a lot the system to avoid the systemic crisis that was an open possibility to the Brazilian banking system in the end of 2008. These notes, thus, discusse why the Brazilian banking system performed pretty well in the 2008 financial crisis and how the Brazilian banking (and prudential) regulation can be taken as responsible for this good performance. More specifically, the paper back to the middle of the 1990s, when the Real Plan was implemented, in order to understand the role played by the restructuring of the Brazilian financial system in helping to pave the way to the great resilience experienced by the Brazilian banking system during the 2008 crisis. More specifically, the prudential regulation that was implemented in Brazil in the aftermath of the Real Plan seems to play a decisive role in the resilience of the system nowadays.

Europe’s financial crisis: the Euro’s flawed design and the consequences of lack of a government banker

This paper argues the euro zone requires a government banker that manages the bond market and helps finance country budget deficits. The euro solved Europe’s problem of exchange rate speculation by creating a unified currency managed by a single central bank, but in doing so it replaced the exchange rate speculation problem with bond market speculation. Remedying this requires a central bank that acts as government banker and maintains bond interest rates at sustainable levels. Because the euro is a monetary union, this must be done in a way that both avoids favoring individual countries and avoids creating incentives for irresponsible country fiscal policy that leads to “bail-outs”. The paper argues this can be accomplished via a European Public Finance Authority (EPFA) that issues public debt which the European Central Bank (ECB) is allowed to trade. The debate over the euro’s financial architecture has significant political implications. The current neoliberal inspired architecture, which imposes a complete separation between the central bank and public finances, puts governments under continuous financial pressures. That will make it difficult to maintain the European social democratic welfare state. This gives a political reason for reforming the euro and creating an EPFA that supplements the economic case for reform.

The 1999 Brazilian financial crisis: how to create a financial crisis by trying to avoid one

This paper attempts to understand the Brazilian financial crisis mainly from an ‘endogenous-failure’ perspective. It argues that the general mechanisms that led to this financial crisis were in essence endogenous to the workings of an economy facing a sudden liberalisation, a surge in capital inflows, ineffective regulation and weak governance. This paper will also argue that within this general framework, there is a very specific ‘Minskyian’ feature to the Brazilian crisis, which made it different from other financial crises both in Latin America and in East Asia: how a particularly radical monetary policy led to a major financial fragility in the financial sector and State finances, and to an unmanageable Ponzi finance in the accounts of the Federal Government.

A note on financial regulation and the brazilian response to the 2008‐09 financial crisis

Brazil was frequently criticized for its interventionist and heavy financial regulation up until the 2008‐09 world financial crisis.  According to the neo‐liberal or pro‐market view that predominated in academic and financial circles during the early 2000s, economic development came together with financial deepening, which in its turn could only be achieved through financial liberalization and deregulation. The currency crises of the 1990s notwithstanding, by the mid‐2000s Brazil’s segmented financial market and its restrictive reserve and capital requirements were seen as a symbol of inefficiency and backwardness by most financial specialists.  To the luck of the Brazilian population, most of the advices of such specialists were ignored by the Brazilian authorities, so that, when the 2008 financial crisis hit the world economy, Brazil still had powerful and efficient instruments to deal with the problem.  The objective of this note is to present the mains aspects of the Brazilian financial regulation and how they helped the economy to deal with the consequences of 2008‐09 financial meltdown.

Delays in stabilization or in reforms? The debt crisis

Empirical analyses attributing the 1980s' debt crisis to inconsistent stabilization policies rest on an inappropriate long-run approach. Revising this long-run approach yields opposite results: terms of trade shocks and foreign indebtedness explain this crisis, regardless of domestic stabilization policies. This prompts us to consider a new hypothesis, of delays in trade-policy reforms, with a model in which terms-of-trade variation (under shocks) is endogenous to export structure and efficiency of resource allocation. Evidence from the structural equations model shows that allocation distortions negatively affect changes in terms of trade, which then explain this crisis. A political economy extension demonstrates that income inequality and regional trade policy determine the distortions, which in turn leads to this crisis.

A family of crisis in a dissipative Fermi accelerator model

The Fermi accelerator model is studied in the framework of inelastic collisions. The dynamics of this problem is obtained by use of a two-dimensional nonlinear area-contracting map. We consider that the collisions of the particle with both periodically time varying and fixed walls are inelastic. We have shown that the dissipation destroys the mixed phase space structure of the nondissipative case and in special, we have obtained and characterized in this problem a family of two damping coefficients for which a boundary crisis occurs. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Boundary crisis and suppression of Fermi acceleration in a dissipative two-dimensional non-integrable time-dependent billiard

Some dynamical properties for a dissipative time-dependent oval-shaped billiard are studied. The system is described in terms of a four-dimensional nonlinear mapping. Dissipation is introduced via inelastic collisions of the particle with the boundary, thus implying that the particle has a fractional loss of energy upon collision. The dissipation causes profound modifications in the dynamics of the particle as well as in the phase space of the non-dissipative system. In particular, inelastic collisions can be assumed as an efficient mechanism to suppress Fermi acceleration of the particle. The dissipation also creates attractors in the system, including chaotic. We show that a slightly modification of the intensity of the damping coefficient yields a drastic and sudden destruction of the chaotic attractor, thus leading the system to experience a boundary crisis. We have characterized such a boundary crisis via a collision of the chaotic attractor with its own basin of attraction and confirmed that inelastic collisions do indeed suppress Fermi acceleration in two-dimensional time-dependent billiards. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Boundary crisis and transient in a dissipative relativistic standard map

Some dynamical properties for a problem concerning the acceleration of particles in a wave packet are studied. The model is described in terms of a two-dimensional nonlinear map obtained from a Hamiltonian which describes the motion of a relativistic standard map. The phase space is mixed in the sense that there are regular and chaotic regions coexisting. When dissipation is introduced, the property of area preservation is broken and attractors emerge. We have shown that a tiny increase of the dissipation causes a change in the phase space. A chaotic attractor as well as its basin of attraction are destroyed thereby leading the system to experience a boundary crisis. We have characterized such a boundary crisis via a collision of the chaotic attractor with the stable manifold of a saddle fixed point. Once the chaotic attractor is destroyed, a chaotic transient described by a power law with exponent 1 is observed. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Dynamical properties of a particle in a wave packet: Scaling invariance and boundary crisis

Some dynamical properties present in a problem concerning the acceleration of particles in a wave packet are studied. The dynamics of the model is described in terms of a two-dimensional area preserving map. We show that the phase space is mixed in the sense that there are regular and chaotic regions coexisting. We use a connection with the standard map in order to find the position of the first invariant spanning curve which borders the chaotic sea. We find that the position of the first invariant spanning curve increases as a power of the control parameter with the exponent 2/3. The standard deviation of the kinetic energy of an ensemble of initial conditions obeys a power law as a function of time, and saturates after some crossover. Scaling formalism is used in order to characterise the chaotic region close to the transition from integrability to nonintegrability and a relationship between the power law exponents is derived. The formalism can be applied in many different systems with mixed phase space. Then, dissipation is introduced into the model and therefore the property of area preservation is broken, and consequently attractors are observed. We show that after a small change of the dissipation, the chaotic attractor as well as its basin of attraction are destroyed, thus leading the system to experience a boundary crisis. The transient after the crisis follows a power law with exponent -2. (C) 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Energy gain induced by boundary crisis

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

The debt crisis: a re-appraisal

The 1980s' debt crisis is a landmark in developing economies' growth and stabilization. According to the most quoted empirical articles, external shocks and vicissitudes gave rise to crisis just because of delays in stabilization policies, engendered by internal conflicts and institutional immaturity. I review some of these papers, and find out some problems - in the measurement of shocks and foreign indebtedness, namely - whose corrections lead to opposite results: external shocks and foreign indebtedness explain that crisis regardless of domestic policies. At the same time, the strong correlation of income distribution to terms of trade changes and foreign indebtedness suggest that inequality may have contributed differently to that crisis: either through an economic channel, or through a political channel based on delays in reforms.