The evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to widespread government intervention and import-substitution industrialization, there has been a general perception that Latin America has always been less productive than the leading economies. In this paper, however, we show that until the mid-seventies Latin America had high productivity levels relative to the US and other regions. Moreover, total factor productivity in Latin America increased relative to the US during this period, declining only in the subsequent years.

Differences in doing business in Brazil and norway: evidence from norwegian expatriates

With more and more business being done between Brazil and Norway we are seeing an increasing number of expatriates from Norway moving to Brazil!to work. Most!are!related!to!the!oil!and!gas!industries.!With!the!two!cultures,! countries!and!backgrounds!being!so!different!what!are!some!of!the!issues!and! challenges!that!arise? Using!existing!literature!as!well!as!faceRtoRface!interviews!of!Norwegian! expatriates!working!in!Rio!de!Janeiro!this!thesis!tries!to!compare!the!two! countries!and!at!the!same!time!explore!some!of!these!potential!issues.!The! research!focuses!on!differences!in!trust,!negotiation!style,!planning,!organization,! conflict!as!well!as!general!cultural!challenges. Analysis!of!the!responses!shows!that!for!some!issues!there!are!no!clear!problems! or!challenges!but!for!others!there!are.!Specifically!the!treatment!of!time!and!the! general!timeliness!in!Brazilian!society!seems!to!be!a!challenge!for!Norwegian! expatriates.!Secondly!and!equally!as!challenging!is!the!hierarchical!way!of! organizing!businesses!in!Brazil!compared!to!the!flatter!structure!found!in! Norwegian!businesses.!With!the!hierarchy!comes!also!bureaucracy,!another! factor!that!the!subjects!in!this!thesis!found!to!be!difficult!to!deal!with. The!thesis!is!divided!into!6!chapters!starting!with!“introduction”,!followed!by! chapter!2!“Literature!review”.!Chapter!3!is!“Research!Methodology”!followed!by! chapter!4!“Data!presentation”.!Finally!the!results!are!discussed!in!chapter!5! “Analysis!and!discussion” and!concluded!in!chapter!6.

Trade in intermediate goods and total factor productivity

We develop and calibrate a model where differences in factor endowments lead countries to trade intermediate goods, and gains from trade reflect in total factor productivity. We perform several output and growth decompositions, to assess the impact that barriers to trade, as well as changes in terms of trade, have on measured TFP. We find that for very poor economies gains from trade are large, in some cases representing a doubling of GDP. Also, that an improvement in the terms of trade - by allowing the use of a better mix of intermediate inputs in the production process - translates into productivity growth.

The evolution of TFP in Latin America: high productivity when distortions were high?

Due to widespread government intervention and import-substitution industrialization, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper, however, we show that until the late seventies Latin America had high total factor productivity (TFP) levels relative to the US and other regions. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. Results are robust to the use of diferent methodologies and data sources.

New evidence on trade liberalization and productivity growth

Although the subject of a large number of studies, the debate on the links between trade reform and productivity growth is still unresolved and most studies at the micro level have not been able to establish a relationship between the two phenomena. Brazil provides a natural experiment to study this issue that is seldom available: it was one of the closest economies in the world until 1988, when trade reform was launched, and intra-industry data are available on an annual basis before, during and after liberalization. Using a panel of industry sectors this paper tests and measures the impact of trade reform on productivity growth. Results confirm the association between the former and the latter and show that the magnitude of the impact of tariff reduction on the growth rates of TFP and output per worker was substantial. Our data reveal large and widespread productivity improvement, so that the estimations in this paper are an indication that liberalization had an important effect on industrial performance in the country. Cross-sectional differences in protection are also investigated.

The evolution of international output differences (1960-2000): From factors to productivity

This article presents a group of exercises of level and growth decomposition of output per worker using cross-country data from 1960 to 2000. It is shown that at least until 1975 factors of production (capital and education) were the main source of output dispersion across economies and that productivity variance was considerably smaller than in late years. Only after this date the prominence of productivity started to show up in the data, as the majority of the literature has found. The growth decomposition exercises showed that the reversal of relative importance of productivity vis-a-vis factors is explained by the very good (bad) performance of productivity of fast (slow) growing economies. Although growth in the period, on average, is mostly due to factors accumulation, its variance is explained by productivity.

On the long run effects of barriers to trade

We study the macroeconomic effects of international trade policy by integrating a Hecksher-Ohlin trade model into an optimal-growth framework. The model predicts that a more open economy will have higher factor productivity. Furthermore, there is a "selective development trap," an additional steady state with low income, to which countries may or may not converge, depending on policy. Income at the development trap falls as trade barriers increase. Hence, cross-country differences in barriers to trade may help explain the dispersion of per-capita income observed across countries. The effects are quantified and we show that protectionism can explain a relevant fraction of TFP and long-run income differentials across countries.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial diference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

On the evolution of TFP in Latin America

Due to several policy distortions, including import-substitution industrialization, widespread government intervention and both domestic and international competitive barriers, there has been a general presumption that Latin America has been much less productive than the leading economies in the last decades. In this paper we show, however, that until the late seventies Latin American countries had high productivity levels relative to the United States. It is only after the late seventies that we observe a fast decrease of relative TFP in Latin America. We also show that the inclusion of human capital in the production function makes a crucial difference in the TFP calculations for Latin America.

The evolution of international output differences (1960-2000) : from factor to productivity

This article presents a group of exercises of leveI and growth decomposition of output per worker using cross-collntry data from 1960 to :2000. It is shown that at least llntil 197.5 factors of production (capital anel education) ",ere the main source of output dispersion across ecoIlomies and that productivity variance was considerably srnaller than in late years. Qnly after this date the prominence of productivity started to sho\\' up in the data. as the majority of the litcrature has found. The gro\\'th decomposition exercises showecl that t he reversal of relative irnportance of proeluctivity vis-a-\'is factors is explainecl by the very good (bad) performance of procluctivity of fast (slow) growing cconomies. Although growth in the pcriod, on avcragc. is mostly clue to factors accumulation. its variance is explained by productivity.

Differences in the perception of interest representation: a comparision of Brasília and Brussels lobbying activity

The research topic of this paper is focused on the analysis of how trade associations perceive lobbying in Brussels and in Brasília. The analysis will be centered on business associations located in Brasília and Brussels as the two core centers of decision-making and as an attraction for the lobbying practice. The underlying principles behind the comparison between Brussels and Brasilia are two. Firstof all because the European Union and Brazil have maintained diplomatic relations since 1960. Through these relations they have built up close historical, cultural, economic and political ties. Their bilateral political relations culminated in 2007 with the establishment of a Strategic Partnership (EEAS website,n.d.). Over the years, Brazil has become a key interlocutor for the EU and it is the most important market for the EU in Latin America (European Commission, 2007). Taking into account the relations between EU and Brazil, this research could contribute to the reciprocal knowledge about the perception of lobby in the respective systems and the importance of the non-market strategy when conducting business. Second both EU and Brazilian systems have a multi-level governance structure: 28 Member States in the EU and 26 Member States in Brazil; in both systems there are three main institutions targeted by lobbying practice. The objective is to compare how differences in the institutional environments affect the perception and practice of lobbying, where institutions are defined as ‘‘regulative, normative, and cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior’’ (Peng et al., 2009). Brussels, the self-proclaimed "Capital of Europe”, is the headquarters of the European Union and has one of the highest concentrations of political power in the world. Four of the seven Institutions of the European Union are based in Brussels: the European Parliament, the European Council, the Council and the European Commission (EU website, n.d.). As the power of the EU institutions has grown, Brussels has become a magnet for lobbyists, with the latest estimates ranging from between 15,000 and 30,000 professionals representing companies, industry sectors, farmers, civil society groups, unions etc. (Burson Marsteller, 2013). Brasília is the capital of Brazil and the seat of government of the Federal District and the three branches of the federal government of Brazilian legislative, executive and judiciary. The 4 city also hosts 124 foreign embassies. The presence of the formal representations of companies and trade associations in Brasília is very limited, but the governmental interests remain there and the professionals dealing with government affairs commute there. In the European Union, Brussels has established a Transparency Register that allows the interactions between the European institutions and citizen’s associations, NGOs, businesses, trade and professional organizations, trade unions and think tanks. The register provides citizens with a direct and single access to information about who is engaged in This process is important for the quality of democracy, and for its capacity to deliver adequate policies, matching activities aimed at influencing the EU decision-making process, which interests are being pursued and what level of resources are invested in these activities (Celgene, n.d). It offers a single code of conduct, binding all organizations and self-employed individuals who accept to “play by the rules” in full respect of ethical principles (EC website, n.d). A complaints and sanctions mechanism ensures the enforcement of the rules and addresses suspected breaches of the code. In Brazil, there is no specific legislation regulating lobbying. The National Congress is currently discussing dozens of bills that address regulation of lobbying and the action of interest groups (De Aragão, 2012), but none of them has been enacted for the moment. This work will focus on class lobbying (Oliveira, 2004), which refers to the performance of the federation of national labour or industrial unions, like CNI (National Industry Confederation) in Brazil and the European Banking Federation (EBF) in Brussels. Their performance aims to influence the Executive and Legislative branches in order to defend the interests of their affiliates. When representing unions and federations, class entities cover a wide range of different and, more often than not, conflicting interests. That is why they are limited to defending the consensual and majority interest of their affiliates (Oliveira, 2004). The basic assumption of this work is that institutions matter (Peng et al, 2009) and that the trade associations and their affiliates, when doing business, have to take into account the institutional and regulatory framework where they do business.

Inference in differences-in-differences with few treated groups and heteroskedasticity

Differences-in-Differences (DID) is one of the most widely used identification strategies in applied economics. However, how to draw inferences in DID models when there are few treated groups remains an open question. We show that the usual inference methods used in DID models might not perform well when there are few treated groups and errors are heteroskedastic. In particular, we show that when there is variation in the number of observations per group, inference methods designed to work when there are few treated groups tend to (under-) over-reject the null hypothesis when the treated groups are (large) small relative to the control groups. This happens because larger groups tend to have lower variance, generating heteroskedasticity in the group x time aggregate DID model. We provide evidence from Monte Carlo simulations and from placebo DID regressions with the American Community Survey (ACS) and the Current Population Survey (CPS) datasets to show that this problem is relevant even in datasets with large numbers of observations per group. We then derive an alternative inference method that provides accurate hypothesis testing in situations where there are few treated groups (or even just one) and many control groups in the presence of heteroskedasticity. Our method assumes that we can model the heteroskedasticity of a linear combination of the errors. We show that this assumption can be satisfied without imposing strong assumptions on the errors in common DID applications. With many pre-treatment periods, we show that this assumption can be relaxed. Instead, we provide an alternative inference method that relies on strict stationarity and ergodicity of the time series. Finally, we consider two recent alternatives to DID when there are many pre-treatment periods. We extend our inference methods to linear factor models when there are few treated groups. We also derive conditions under which a permutation test for the synthetic control estimator proposed by Abadie et al. (2010) is robust to heteroskedasticity and propose a modification on the test statistic that provided a better heteroskedasticity correction in our simulations.