"It could be one thing or another" - on the construction of an archaeological category

This article explores the history of the archaeological category Sámi circular offering sites, which refers to certain dry wall structures in Finnmark and Troms in northern Norway. In recent years the term has been used more frequently outside this geographical area too, at times to refer to structures vastly different from those originally labelled as circular offering sites. Such interpretations may be questioned, but perhaps it is the category itself that needs to be re-evaluated; a study ofthe research history suggests that the term is a result of a mid-19th century hypothesis that was established due to a lack of other plausible explanations rather than based on indicative finds or on local traditions. This interpretation has later been adopted by key researchers and has never really been challenged by any alternative hypothesis. This article proposes that the stone structures in question could represent other cultural phenomena, and that this needs further investigation.

Category learning induces position invariance of pattern recognition across the visual field

Human object recognition is considered to be largely invariant to translation across the visual field. However, the origin of this invariance to positional changes has remained elusive, since numerous studies found that the ability to discriminate between visual patterns develops in a largely location-specific manner, with only a limited transfer to novel visual field positions. In order to reconcile these contradicting observations, we traced the acquisition of categories of unfamiliar grey-level patterns within an interleaved learning and testing paradigm that involved either the same or different retinal locations. Our results show that position invariance is an emergent property of category learning. Pattern categories acquired over several hours at a fixed location in either the peripheral or central visual field gradually become accessible at new locations without any position-specific feedback. Furthermore, categories of novel patterns presented in the left hemifield are distinctly faster learnt and better generalized to other locations than those learnt in the right hemifield. Our results suggest that during learning initially position-specific representations of categories based on spatial pattern structure become encoded in a relational, position-invariant format. Such representational shifts may provide a generic mechanism to achieve perceptual invariance in object recognition.

An investigation into children’s inductive reasoning strategies:What drives the development of category induction?

In a series of studies, I investigated the developmental changes in children’s inductive reasoning strategy, methodological manipulations affecting the trajectory, and driving mechanisms behind the development of category induction. I systematically controlled the nature of the stimuli used, and employed a triad paradigm in which perceptual cues were directly pitted against category membership, to explore under which circumstances children used perceptual or category induction. My induction tasks were designed for children aged 3-9 years old using biologically plausible novel items. In Study 1, I tested 264 children. Using a wide age range allowed me to systematically investigate the developmental trajectory of induction. I also created two degrees of perceptual distractor – high and low – and explored whether the degree of perceptual similarity between target and test items altered children’s strategy preference. A further 52 children were tested in Study 2, to examine whether children showing a perceptual-bias were in fact basing their choice on maturation categories. A gradual transition was observed from perceptual to category induction. However, this transition could not be due to the inability to inhibit high perceptual distractors as children of all ages were equally distracted. Children were also not basing their strategy choices on maturation categories. In Study 3, I investigated category structure (featural vs. relational category rules) and domain (natural vs. artefact) on inductive preference. I tested 403 children. Each child was assigned to either the featural or relational condition, and completed both a natural kind and an artefact task. A further 98 children were tested in Study 4, on the effect of using stimuli labels during the tasks. I observed the same gradual transition from perceptual to category induction preference in Studies 3 and 4. This pattern was stable across domains, but children developed a category-bias one year later for relational categories, arguably due to the greater demands on executive function (EF) posed by these stimuli. Children who received labels during the task made significantly more category choices than those who did not receive labels, possibly due to priming effects. Having investigated influences affecting the developmental trajectory, I continued by exploring the driving mechanism behind the development of category induction. In Study 5, I tested 60 children on a battery of EF tasks as well as my induction task. None of the EF tasks were able to predict inductive variance, therefore EF development is unlikely to be the driving factor behind the transition. Finally in Study 6, I divided 252 children into either a comparison group or an intervention group. The intervention group took part in an interactive educational session at Twycross Zoo about animal adaptations. Both groups took part in four induction tasks, two before and two a week after the zoo visits. There was a significant increase in the number of category choices made in the intervention condition after the zoo visit, a result not observed in the comparison condition. This highlights the role of knowledge in supporting the transition from perceptual to category induction. I suggest that EF development may support induction development, but the driving mechanism behind the transition is an accumulation of knowledge, and an appreciation for the importance of category membership.

What May the Sheep safely know?

The relationship of knowledge and liberties in modern societies presents a multitude of fascinating issues that deserve to be explored more systematically. The production of knowledge is dynamic, and the conditions and practice of freedom is undergoing transformation. These changes ensure that the linkages between liberty and knowledge are always subject to changes. In the past, the connection between scientific knowledge, democracy, and emancipation seemed self-evident. More recently, the close linkage between democracy and knowledge has been viewed with skepticism. This volume explores the relationship between knowledge and democracy, Do they support each other, do they mutually depend on each other, or are they perhaps even in conflict with each other? Does knowledge increase the freedom to act? If additional knowledge contributes to individual and social well being, does it also enhance freedoms? Knowledge and Democracy focuses on the interpenetration of knowledge, freedom and democracy, and does so from various perspectives, theoretical as well as practical. Modern societies are transforming themselves into knowledge societies. This has a fundamental impact on political systems and the relationship of citizens to large social institutions. The contributors to this book systemically explore whether, and in what ways, these modern-day changes and developments are connected to expansion of the capacities of individual citizens to act. They focus on the interrelation of democracy and knowledge, and the role of democratic institutions, as well as on the knowledge and social conduct of actors within democratic institutions. In the process of investigation, they arrive at a newplatform for future research and theory, one that is sensitive to present-day societal conflicts, cleavages, and transformations generated by new knowledge.

Measuring the influence of similarity on category-specific effects

There is evidence for both advantages and disadvantages in normal recognition of living over nonliving things. This paradox has been attributed to high levels of perceptual similarity within living categories having a different effect on performance in different contexts. However, since living things are intrinsically more similar to each other, previous studies could not determine whether the various category effects were due to perceptual similarity, or to other characteristics of living things. We used novel animal and vehicle stimuli that were matched for similarity to measure the influence of perceptual similarity in different contexts. We found that displaying highly similar objects in blocked sets reduced their perceived similarity, eliminating the detrimental effect on naming performance. Experiment 1 demonstrated a disadvantage for highly similar objects in name learning and name verification using mixed groups of similar and dissimilar animals and vehicles. Experiment 2 demonstrated no disadvantage for the same highly similar objects when they were blocked, e.g., similar animals presented alone. Thus, perceptual similarity, rather than other characteristics particular to living things, is affected by context, and could create apparent category effects under certain testing conditions.

Differential impact of posterior lesions in the left and right hemisphere on visual category learning and generalization to contrast reversal

Hemispheric differences in the learning and generalization of pattern categories were explored in two experiments involving sixteen patients with unilateral posterior, cerebral lesions in the left (LH) or right (RH) hemisphere. In each experiment participants were first trained to criterion in a supervised learning paradigm to categorize a set of patterns that either consisted of simple geometric forms (Experiment 1) or unfamiliar grey-level images (Experiment 2). They were then tested for their ability to generalize acquired categorical knowledge to contrast-reversed versions of the learning patterns. The results showed that RH lesions impeded category learning of unfamiliar grey-level images more severely than LH lesions, whereas this relationship appeared reversed for categories defined by simple geometric forms. With regard to generalization to contrast reversal, categorization performance of LH and RH patients was unaffected in the case of simple geometric forms. However, generalization to of contrast-reversed grey-level images distinctly deteriorated for patients with LH lesions relative to those with RH lesions, with the latter (but not the former) being consistently unable to identify the pattern manipulation. These findings suggest a differential use of contrast information in the representation of pattern categories in the two hemispheres. Such specialization appears in line with previous distinctions between a predominantly lefthemispheric, abstract-analytical and a righthemispheric, specific-holistic representation of object categories, and their prediction of a mandatory representation of contrast polarity in the RH. Some implications for the well-established dissociation of visual disorders for the recognition of faces and letters are discussed.

Mirror-image relations in category learning

The discrimination of patterns that are mirror-symmetric counterparts of each other is difficult and requires substantial training. We explored whether mirror-image discrimination during expertise acquisition is based on associative learning strategies or involves a representational shift towards configural pattern descriptions that permit resolution of symmetry relations. Subjects were trained to discriminate between sets of unfamiliar grey-level patterns in two conditions, which either required the separation of mirror images or not. Both groups were subsequently tested in a 4-class category-learning task employing the same set of stimuli. The results show that subjects who had successfully learned to discriminate between mirror-symmetric counterparts were distinctly faster in the categorization task, indicating a transfer of conceptual knowledge between the two tasks. Additional computer simulations suggest that the development of such symmetry concepts involves the construction of configural, protoholistic descriptions, in which positions of pattern parts are encoded relative to a spatial frame of reference.

A systematic exploration of perceptual and semantic differences in category-specific object-processing using magnetoencephalography

In a series of experiments, we tested category-specific activation in normal parti¬cipants using magnetoencephalography (MEG). Our experiments explored the temporal processing of objects, as MEG characterises neural activity on the order of milliseconds. Our experiments explored object-processing, including assessing the time-course of ob¬ject naming, early differences in processing living compared with nonliving objects and processing objects at the basic compared with the domain level, and late differences in processing living compared with nonliving objects and processing objects at the basic compared with the domain level. In addition to studies using normal participants, we also utilised MEG to explore category-specific processing in a patient with a deficit for living objects. Our findings support the cascade model of object naming (Humphreys et al., 1988). In addition, our findings using normal participants demonstrate early, category-specific perceptual differences. These findings are corroborated by our patient study. In our assessment of the time-course of category-specific effects as well as a separate analysis designed to measure semantic differences between living and nonliving objects, we found support for the sensory/motor model of object naming (Martin, 1998), in addition to support for the cascade model of object naming. Thus, object processing in normal participants appears to be served by a distributed network in the brain, and there are both perceptual and semantic differences between living and nonliving objects. A separate study assessing the influence of the level at which you are asked to identify an object on processing in the brain found evidence supporting the convergence zone hypothesis (Damasio, 1989). Taken together, these findings indicate the utility of MEG in exploring the time-course of object processing, isolating early perceptual and later semantic effects within the brain.

The anatomical and functional correlates of category-specificity

The dramatic effects of brain damage can provide some of the most interesting insights into the nature of normal cognitive performance. In recent years a number of neuropsychological studies have reported a particular form of cognitive impairment where patients have problems recognising objects from one category but remain able to recognise those from others. The most frequent ‘category-specific’ pattern is an impairment identifying living things, compared to nonliving things. The reverse pattern of dissociation, i.e., an impairment recognising and naming nonliving things relative to living things, has been reported albeit much less frequently. The objective of the work carried out in this thesis was to investigate the organising principles and anatomical correlates of stored knowledge for categories of living and nonliving things. Three complementary cognitive neuropsychological research techniques were employed to assess how, and where, this knowledge is represented in the brain: (i) studies of normal (neurologically intact) subjects, (ii) case-studies of neurologically impaired patients with selective deficits in object recognition, and (iii) studies of the anatomical correlates of stored knowledge for living and nonliving things on the brain using magnetoencephalography (MEG). The main empirical findings showed that semantic knowledge about living and nonliving things is principally encoded in terms of sensory and functional features, respectively. In two case-study chapters evidence was found supporting the view that category-specific impairments can arise from damage to a pre-semantic system, rather than the assumption often made that the system involved must be semantic. In the MEG study, rather than finding evidence for the involvement of specific brain areas for different object categories, it appeared that, when subjects named and categorised living and nonliving things, a non-differentiated neural system was involved.