839 resultados para setting aside judgments


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First and second year students enrolled in a four-year movement education based university Physical Education program completed a questionnaire regarding their expectations on entering university. In addition, graduates of the program were interviewed, one year after graduation, with regard to their understanding of and attitude towards movement education and how these had developed relative to their overall degree program. Most students had no knowledge of movement education prior to entering the program and the selection of this particular program was simply coincidental with their desire to pursue physical education. Whereas the students did participate in an activity course and a theory course in Year 1, it was only when participating in a Year 2 movement course which combined theory and practice within the same course that students recognized the movement base of the content. The progress of the students through the program reflects distinct declarative and procedural stages in knowledge development followed by an ability to generalize that knowledge a conceptual stage. The real understanding of movement education came as the students were required to teach movement education to students, children, and other groups.

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Standards reduce production costs and increase products’ value to consumers. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the chosen technology normally lacks credible substitutes. The owner of the patented technology might thus have additional market power relative to locked-in licensees, and might exploit this power to charge higher access rates. In the economic literature this phenomenon is referred to as ‘hold-up’. To reduce the risk of hold-up, standard-setting organisations often require patent holders to disclose their standard-essential patents before the adoption of the standard and to commit to license on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. The European Commission normally investigates unfair pricing abuse in a standard-setting context if a patent holder who committed to FRAND ex-ante is suspected not to abide to it ex-post. However, this approach risks ignoring a number of potential abuses which are likely harmful for welfare. That can happen if, for example, ex-post a licensee is able to impose excessively low access rates (‘reverse hold-up’) or if a patent holder acquires additional market power thanks to the standard but its essential patents are not encumbered by FRAND commitments, for instance because the patent holder did not directly participate to the standard setting process and was therefore not required by the standard-setting organisations to commit to FRAND ex-ante. A consistent policy by the Commission capable of tackling all sources of harm should be enforced regardless of whether FRAND commitments are given. Antitrust enforcement should hinge on the identification of a distortion in the bargaining process around technology access prices, which is determined by the adoption of the standard and is not attributable to pro-competitive merits of any of the involved players.

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Standards reduce production costs and increase the value of products to consumers; ultimately they significantly contribute to economic development. Standards however entail risks of anti-competitive abuse. After the adoption of a standard, the elimination of competition between technologies can lead to consumer harm. Fair, reasonable, nondiscriminatory (FRAND) commitments made by patent holders have been used to mitigate that risk. The European Commission recognises the importance of standards, but European Union competition policy is still seeking to identify well-targeted and efficient enforcement rules.