986 resultados para root canal obturation
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The aim of this study was to evaluate the diagnostic agreement of conventional panoramic radiographs and their inverted scanned images in the detection of the mandibular canal and mental foramen. A total of 77 panoramic radiographs obtained from the files of totally edentulous patients were used. Digitization was done by means of a scanner with brightness and contrast adjustment, as well as image inversion. The extension of mandibular canal was divided into anterior, middle, and posterior regions, and the presence of a radiopaque line that characterized the mandibular canal was classified according to a 5-point confidence scale. The mental foramen was classified in 4 types: continuous, separated, diffuse, and unidentified. Both conventional and inverted scanned panoramic radiographs were evaluated by 3 calibrated implantologists at 2 distinct moments with a minimum interval of 10 days between them. Intraexaminer agreement was evaluated by Kappa statistics by point and by 95% confidence interval. Because the intraexaminer level of agreement was low, interexaminer agreements could not be carried out. The results showed a substantial (in 2 situations), moderate (in 16 situations), and fair (in 18 situations) intraexaminer agreement for mandibular canal and a substantial (in 1 situation), fair (in 1 situation), and moderate (in 10 situations) intraeaminer agreement for mental foramen. There were no statistically significant differences in most instances. In conclusion, the diagnostic agreement of conventional and inverted scanned panoramic radiographs for detection of mandibular canal and mental foramen was low.
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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Pós-graduação em Odontologia - FOAR
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Pós-graduação em Odontologia Restauradora - ICT
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Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)
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Pós-graduação em Odontologia - FOAR
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Since instrumentation of the apical foramen has been suggested for cleaning and disinfection of the cemental canal, selection of the file size and position of the apical foramen have challenging steps. This study analyzed the influence of apical foramen lateral opening and file size can exert on cemental canal instrumentation. Thirty-four human maxillary central incisors were divided in two groups: Group 1 (n=17), without flaring, and Group 2 (n=17), with flaring with LA Axxess burs. K-files of increasing diameters were progressively inserted into the canal until binding at the apical foramen was achieved and tips were visible and bonded with ethyl cyanoacrylate adhesive. Roots/files set were cross-sectioned 5 mm from the apex. Apices were examined by scanning electron microscopy at ×140 and digital images were captured. Data were analyzed statistically by Student’s t test and Fisher’s exact test at 5% significance level. SEM micrographs showed that 19 (56%) apical foramina emerged laterally to the root apex, whereas 15 (44%) coincided with it. Significantly more difficulty to reach the apical foramen was noted in Group 2. Results suggest that the larger the foraminal file size, the more difficult the apical foramen instrumentation may be in laterally emerged cemental canals.
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A 7 year old male mongrel dog was presented with a 3 weeks history of gait disturbance in the pelvic limbs more pronounced on the left side associated with pain in the lumbar spine. At presentation neurologic deficits consisted of mild bilateral proprioceptive deficits and nerve root signature in the left pelvic limb. A large intervertebral disc herniation L3-L4 located in a right ventrolateral area of the spinal canal was diagnosed by magnetic resonance imaging. The herniated disc was removed through right hemilaminectomy and fenestration. The dog recovered quickly and returned to the owners 4 days after surgery with a slight lameness in the left pelvic limb. On the follow-up examination 2 months later the dog showed normal gait and normal neurological examination. Nerve root signature is not always indicative for the side of the lesion in case of lateralized intervertebral disc herniation
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Purpose The sedimentation sign (SedSign) has been shown to discriminate well between selected patients with and without lumbar spinal stenosis (LSS). The purpose of this study was to compare the pressure values associated with LSS versus non-LSS and discuss whether a positive SedSign may be related to increased epidural pressure at the level of the stenosis. Methods We measured the intraoperative epidural pressure in five patients without LSS and a negative SedSign, and in five patients with LSS and a positive SedSign using a Codman TM catheter in prone position under radioscopy. Results Patients with a negative SedSign had a median epidural pressure of 9 mmHg independent of the measurement location. Breath and pulse-synchronous waves accounted for 1–3 mmHg. In patients with monosegmental LSS and a positive SedSign, the epidural pressure above and below the stenosis was similar (median 8–9 mmHg). At the level of the stenosis the median epidural pressure was 22 mmHg. A breath and pulse-synchronous wave was present cranial to the stenosis, but absent below. These findings were independent of the cross-sectional area of the spinal canal at the level of the stenosis. Conclusions Patients with LSS have an increased epidural pressure at the level of the stenosis and altered pressure wave characteristics below. We argue that the absence of sedimentation of lumbar nerve roots to the dorsal part of the dural sac in supine position may be due to tethering of affected nerve roots at the level of the stenosis.
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En la presente investigación se analiza la causa del hundimiento del cuarto compartimento del Tercer Depósito del Canal de Isabel II el 8 de abril de 1905, uno de los más graves de la historia de la construcción en España: fallecieron 30 personas y quedaron heridas otras 60. El Proyecto y Construcción de esta estructura era de D. José Eugenio Ribera, una de las grandes figuras de la ingeniería civil en nuestro país, cuya carrera pudo haber quedado truncada como consecuencia del siniestro. Dado el tiempo transcurrido desde la ocurrencia de este accidente, la investigación ha partido de la recopilación de la información relativa al Proyecto y a la propia construcción de la estructura, para revisar a continuación la información disponible sobre el hundimiento. De la construcción de la cubierta es interesante destacar la atrevida configuración estructural, cubriéndose una inmensa superficie de 74.000 m2 mediante una sucesión de bóvedas de hormigón armado de tan sólo 5 cm de espesor y un rebajamiento de 1/10 para salvar una luz de 6 m, que apoyaban en pórticos del mismo material, con pilares también muy esbeltos: 0,25 m de lado para 8 m de altura. Y todo ello en una época en la que la tecnología y conocimiento de las estructuras con este "nuevo" material se basaban en buena medida en el desarrollo de patentes. En cuanto a la información sobre el hundimiento, llama la atención en primer lugar la relevancia de los técnicos, peritos y letrados que intervinieron en el juicio y en el procedimiento administrativo posterior, poniéndose de manifiesto la trascendencia que el accidente tuvo en su momento y que, sin embargo, no ha trascendido hasta nuestros días. Ejemplo de ello es el papel de Echegaray -primera figura intelectual de la época- como perito en la defensa de Ribera, de D. Melquiades Álvarez -futuro presidente del Congreso- como abogado defensor, el General Marvá -uno de los máximos exponentes del papel de los ingenieros militares en la introducción del hormigón armado en nuestro país-, que presidiría la Comisión encargada del peritaje por parte del juzgado, o las opiniones de reconocidas personalidades internacionales del "nuevo" material como el Dr. von Emperger o Hennebique. Pero lo más relevante de dicha información es la falta de uniformidad sobre lo que pudo ocasionar el hundimiento: fallos en los materiales, durante la construcción, defectos en el diseño de la estructura, la realización de unas pruebas de carga cuando se concluyó ésta, etc. Pero la que durante el juicio y en los Informes posteriores se impuso como causa del fallo de la estructura fue su dilatación como consecuencia de las altas temperaturas que se produjeron aquella primavera. Y ello a pesar de que el hundimiento ocurrió a las 7 de la mañana... Con base en esta información se ha analizado el comportamiento estructural de la cubierta, permitiendo evaluar el papel que diversos factores pudieron tener en el inicio del hundimiento y en su extensión a toda la superficie construida, concluyéndose así cuáles fueron las causas del siniestro. De los resultados obtenidos se presta especial atención a las enseñanzas que se desprenden de la ocurrencia del hundimiento, enfatizándose en la relevancia de la historia -y en particular de los casos históricos de error- para la formación continua que debe existir en la Ingeniería. En el caso del hundimiento del Tercer Depósito algunas de estas "enseñanzas" son de plena actualidad, tales como la importancia de los detalles constructivos en la "robustez" de la estructuras, el diseño de estructuras "integrales" o la vigilancia del proceso constructivo. Por último, la investigación ha servido para recuperar, una vez más, la figura de D. José Eugenio Ribera, cuyo papel en la introducción del hormigón armado en España fue decisivo. En la obra del Tercer Depósito se arriesgó demasiado, y provocó un desastre que aceleró la transición hacia una nueva etapa en el hormigón estructural al abrigo de un mayor conocimiento científico y de las primeras normativas. También en esta etapa sería protagonista. This dissertation analyses the cause of the collapse of the 4th compartment of the 3th Reservoir of Canal de Isabel II in Madrid. It happened in 1905, on April 8th, being one of the most disastrous accidents occurred in the history of Spanish construction: 30 people died and 60 were injured. The design and construction supervision were carried out by D. José Eugenio Ribera, one of the main figures in Civil Engineering of our country, whose career could have been destroyed as a result of this accident. Since it occurred more than 100 years ago, the investigation started by compiling information about the structure`s design and construction, followed by reviewing the available information about the accident. With regard to the construction, it is interesting to point out its daring structural configuration. It covered a huge area of 74.000 m2 with a series of reinforced concrete vaults with a thickness of not more than 5 cm, a 6 m span and a rise of 1/10th. In turn, these vaults were supported by frames composed of very slender 0,25 m x 0,25 m columns with a height of 8 m. It is noteworthy that this took place in a time when the technology and knowledge about this "new" material was largely based on patents. In relation to the information about the collapse, its significance is shown by the important experts and lawyers that were involved in the trial and the subsequent administrative procedure. For example, Echegaray -the most important intellectual of that time- defended Ribera, Melquiades Álvarez –the future president of the Congress- was his lawyer, and General Marvá -who represented the important role of the military engineers in the introduction of reinforced concrete in our country-, led the Commission that was put in charge by the judge of the root cause analysis. In addition, the matter caught the interest of renowned foreigners like Dr. von Emperger or Hennebique and their opinions had a great influence. Nonetheless, this structural failure is unknown to most of today’s engineers. However, what is most surprising are the different causes that were claimed to lie at the root of the disaster: material defects, construction flaws, errors in the design, load tests performed after the structure was finished, etc. The final cause that was put forth during the trial and in the following reports was attributed to the dilatation of the roof due to the high temperatures that spring, albeit the collapse occurred at 7 AM... Based on this information the structural behaviour of the roof has been analysed, which allowed identifying the causes that could have provoked the initial failure and those that could have led to the global collapse. Lessons have been learned from these results, which points out the relevance of history -and in particular, of examples gone wrong- for the continuous education that should exist in engineering. In the case of the 3th Reservoir some of these lessons are still relevant during the present time, like the importance of detailing in "robustness", the design of "integral" structures or the due consideration of construction methods. Finally, the investigation has revived, once again, the figure of D. José Eugenio Ribera, whose role in the introduction of reinforced concrete in Spain was crucial. With the construction of the 3th Reservoir he took too much risk and caused a disaster that accelerated the transition to a new era in structural concrete based on greater scientific knowledge and the first codes. In this new period he would also play a major role.