Fracking/Takings

As the use of fracking has spread during the recent oil and gas boom, inevitable conflicts have arisen between industry and its neighbors, particularly as fracking has moved into densely populated urban and suburban areas. Concerned over the impacts of fracking – such as risks to health and safely, diminished property values, air and water pollution, as well as noise, traffic, and other annoyances – many people have demanded a government response. Government regulation of fracking has struggled to catch up, although in recent years many state and local governments have taken steps to reduce the impacts of fracking in their communities. This article focuses on government restrictions in New York and Colorado, two of the key battlegrounds in the fight over fracking. New York recently prohibited fracking across the entire state, after several towns had enacted their own bans. In Colorado, the people have used the ballot initiative process to enact restrictions on fracking directly. The industry has responded not only with public relations spending to improve the fracking’s damaged reputation, but also legal challenges to these efforts to rein in oil and gas development. In addition to suing local governments, often arguing they do not have authority to regulate fracking, industry threatens to bring costly takings claims for compensation due to alleged economic harms. This Article examines the numerous legal and factual issues that should make it difficult for industry to succeed on fracking/takings claims. First, regulation of fracking, even including outright bans, can almost always be defended as necessary to prevent a nuisance or other background principle of law that justifies government regulation. Even if a nuisance defense could be overcome, industry would have difficulty proving that regulation has destroyed all economic value in their property, unless courts take a narrow view of property that would highlight the arbitrary nature of the “denominator problem.” When fracking/takings claims are considered under the default balancing of the Penn Central case, takings are unlikely to be found except in rare outlier cases. Finally, because requiring governments to pay compensation in fracking/takings cases would likely create a windfall for industry, particularly if the oil and gas eventually is extracted in the future, courts should resist the temptation to rule against government restrictions to protect public health, safety, and the environment.

The prospects for the EU-Ukraine free trade agreement. OSW Commentary No. 94, 2012-10-15

The European Union and Ukraine initialled the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA) on 19 July 2012. The scope of the agreement which the EU and Ukraine reached following their negotiations is much more extensive than that of a typical free trade agreement. It envisages not only the lifting of tariff and extra-tariff barriers but also, more importantly, Kyiv adopting EU legal solutions and standards in this area. Whether the agreement will be signed and implemented is still an open question and depends on the existing political conditions. On the one hand, the repression imposed by the government in Kyiv on its political opponents (including the detention of the former prime minister, Yulia Tymoshenko) has provoked criticism from the EU, which refuses to sign the agreement if the government in Kyiv continues to violate democratic principles. The manner in which Ukraine’s parliamentary elections are conducted this October will be the key test. On the other hand, Russia is increasingly active in its efforts to involve Ukraine in the integration projects it has initiated (the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Community). It should be noted that Moscow has effective instruments to exert its will, such as the dependence of the Ukrainian economy on supplies of Russian oil and gas and on exports to the Russian market. Besides, Moscow also has political instruments at its disposal. It is impossible to participate in integration projects both with the EU and with Russia. Therefore, Kyiv will have to make a strategic decision and choose the direction of its economic integration. Unless Ukraine takes concrete action to implement its agreements with the EU, primarily including the free trade agreement, its economic dependence on Russia will grow, and it will be more likely to join the Russian integration projects.

Renewables: The great uncertainty of the EU energy strategy. Egmont Paper No. 71, November 2014

Summary. For more than two decades, the development of renewable energy sources (RES) has been an important aim of EU energy policy. It accelerated with the adoption of a 1997 White Paper and the setting a decade later of a 20% renewable energy target, to be reached by 2020. The EU counts on renewable energy for multiple purposes: to diversify its energy supply; to increase its security of supply; and to create new industries, jobs, economic growth and export opportunities, while at the same time reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Many expectations rest on its development. Fossil fuels have been critical to the development of industrial nations, including EU Member States, which are now deeply reliant upon coal, oil and gas for nearly every aspect of their existence. Faced with some hard truths, however, the Member States have begun to shelve fossil fuel. These hard truths are as follows: firstly, fossil fuels are a finite resource, sometimes difficult to extract. This means that, at some point, fossil fuels are going to be more difficult to access in Europe or too expensive to use.1 The problem is that you cannot just stop using fossil fuels when they become too expensive; the existing infrastructure is profoundly reliant on fossil fuels. It is thus almost normal that a fierce resistance to change exists. Secondly, fossil fuels contribute to climate change. They emit GHG, which contribute greatly to climate change. As a consequence, their use needs to be drastically reduced. Thirdly, Member States are currently suffering a decline in their own fossil fuel production. This increases their dependence on increasingly costly fossil fuel imports from increasingly unstable countries. This problem is compounded by global developments: the growing share of emerging economies in global energy demand (in particular China and India but also the Middle East) and the development of unconventional oil and gas production in the United States. All these elements endanger the competitiveness of Member States’ economies and their security of supply. Therefore, new indigenous sources of energy and a diversification of energy suppliers and routes to convey energy need to be found. To solve all these challenges, in 2008 the EU put in place a strategy based on three objectives: sustainability (reduction of GHG), competitiveness and security of supply. The adoption of a renewable energy policy was considered essential for reaching these three strategic objectives. The adoption of the 20% renewable energy target has undeniably had a positive effect in the EU on the growth in renewables, with the result that renewable energy sources are steadily increasing their presence in the EU energy mix. They are now, it can be said, an integral part of the EU energy system. However, the necessity of reaching this 20% renewable energy target in 2020, combined with other circumstances, has also engendered in many Member States a certain number of difficulties, creating uncertainties for investors and postponing benefits for consumers. The electricity sector is the clearest example of this downside. Subsidies have become extremely abundant and vary from one Member State to another, compromising both fair competition and single market. Networks encountered many difficulties to develop and adapt. With technological progress these subsidies have also become quite excessive. The growing impact of renewable electricity fluctuations has made some traditional power plants unprofitable and created disincentives for new investments. The EU does clearly need to reassess its strategy. If it repeats the 2008 measures it will risk to provoke increased instability and costs.

Prime Minister Fico’s Russian card. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER NUMBER 175/01.07.2015

Since the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, the position of Slovakia’s left-wing government towards Russia has been ambiguous. Bratislava has accepted the EU sanctions targeting Russia and the plan for strengthening NATO’s eastern flank. At the same time, however, Prime Minister Robert Fico’s government has maintained close political relations with the Kremlin. It has called for the intensification of Slovak-Russian economic relations and has repeatedly criticised the sanctions, speaking in tandem with Russian propaganda in so doing. Slovakia’s Prime Minister is hoping that by playing the role of one of the leaders in the EU and NATO who are most willing to cooperate with Russia, he will gain economic benefits and win votes in next spring’s upcoming parliamentary elections. Despite numerous pro-Russian gestures, Slovakia has been limiting the number of areas in which Moscow could exert pressure on Bratislava. As it strives to become independent of Russia, Slovakia has ensured possible alternative fuel supplies for itself. Moreover, it has been gradually replacing Russian-made military equipment with equipment made in the West. The Slovak government does intend to develop the country’s cooperation with Russia, including in strategic areas involving supplies and transit of oil and gas, as well as supplies of nuclear fuel. Nevertheless, it has been making efforts to gain easy access to an alternative source of supplies in each of these areas. Beset by crises, Russia has ever fewer economic cooperation opportunities to offer Slovakia, and Slovak businesses operating on the Russian market have to take into account the growing risk of insolvency of local contractors. To a great extent, therefore, Slovak-Russian relations have been reduced to rhetorical statements confirming the desire for closer cooperation, and to visions of joint projects accompanied by an ever shorter list of feasible cooperation initiatives.

The consequences for Russia of the nuclear deal with Iran. OSW COMMENTARY NUMBER 177/03.08.2015

The five permanent members of the UN Security Council (the USA, the United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) plus Germany and the European Union signed a deal with Iran on 14 July in Vienna (a Plan of Action with five appendices, henceforth referred to as the Vienna Agreement). Under this agreement, Iran undertook to restrict its nuclear programme and to bring it under international scrutiny for 15 years in exchange for a gradual lifting of international sanctions (both those imposed between 2006 and 2010 by the UN Security Council and the unilateral US and EU sanctions). Even though Russia has officially reacted positively to this deal, the consequences it will have are rather ambiguous from Moscow’s point of view. Iran looks set to become stronger and will possibly normalise its relations with the West, and especially the United States. This, in political terms, is a disadvantage for Russia. The Kremlin’s ability to use its policy towards Iran as a bargaining chip in contacts with Washington will be reduced significantly. In turn, the benefits will include improving the perception of Russia in the West and the opening up of new opportunities for the geopolitical game in the region, both with Iran and its opponents in the Arab world. Similarly, in economic terms, the possible lifting of sanctions will offer Russia new opportunities to achieve immediate benefits owing to co-operation in the nuclear and military-technical areas. In the short term, the lifting of sanctions will not pose any threat to Russia’s position on the global energy markets. However, in the long term, the end of Iran’s international isolation may bring negative consequences for Russia, such as the dominant position of Western and/or Chinese companies in the Iranian upstream sector, rising exports of Iranian oil and gas to EU and Asian markets (which are essential for Russia) and the downward pressure on oil and gas prices.

Organic geochemistry at DSDP Leg 80 Holes

The four sites drilled on the Irish continental margin (Goban Spur) yielded sediments ranging in age from Holocene to Barremian. Most of the sediments were deposited in well oxygenated waters, and the small amounts of organic matter they contain are highly oxidized. During a few time intervals from the Cenomanian to earliest Turonian, however, the oxygen content of the bottom waters reached very low levels, resulting in the deposition of homogeneous or laminated black sediments containing from 0.5 to 11% total organic carbon (TOC). The original organic matter was of mixed marine and terrestrial origin. The oxidizing-reducing cycles represented by interbedded black and light sediments are probably a result of changes in both circulation and productivity. The black sediments at Sites 550, 551, and 549 were probably deposited near the lower end, middle, and upper end, respectively, of an expanded oxygen-minimum layer. The oil and gas source potential of the laminated black sediments is very good to excellent. The organic-carbon-lean sediments deposited under oxidizing conditions have no oil or gas source potential. The thermal maturity of all sediments is low.

Ecological effects of an artificial island, Rincon Island, Punta Gorda, California /

This study documents marine ecological conditions at Rincon Island, located approximately 0.8 kilometer offshore between Ventura and Santa Barbara, California, in a depth of 14 meters. The island, which was constructed between 1957 and 1958 to serve as a permanent platform for oil and gas production, is particularly suitable for ecological study. Habitat features associated with the armor rock and concrete tetrapods surrounding the island support a 'microecosystem' which differs in biotic composition from surrounding natural bottom areas. A major part of the study was devoted to analysis of seasonal dynamics in biotic composition. Permanent transects extending from the high intertidal to natural bottom were established normal to each of the four cardinal sides of the island. All macrobiota were censused in duplicate 1-square meter quadrats along each transect during each of the four seasons. Data analysis indicated that many species exhibit significant variability in abundance from one season to the next. In general, the findings indicate a rich and varied fauna and flora associated with the high-relief solid substrate of Rincon Island which differs substantially from the more depauperate natural bottom habitats in the area.

Petroleum industry in Illinois, 1959 /

pt. 1. Oil and gas developments. Introduction -- Production and economics -- Drilling and development -- Productive acreage -- Estimated petroleum reserves -- Gas and gas products -- Underground gas storage -- pt. 2. Waterflood operations. Introduction -- Summary -- Project numbers, by county -- Illinois waterfloods operating during 1959 -- Illinois pressure maintenance projects using water injection during 1959 -- Illinois waterflood projects reported abandoned.

Petroleum industry in Illinois in 1955.

pt.1. Oil and gas developments, [by] Alfred H. Bell, Virginia Kline -- pt. 2. Waterflood operations, [by] Paul A. Witherspoon, Donald A. Pierre.

Petroleum industry in Illinois in 1957.

pt. 1. Oil and gas developments. Introduction -- Production and value -- Drilling and development -- Productive acreage -- Estimated petroleum reserves -- Gas and gas products -- Underground gas storage -- County reports -- pt. 2. Waterflood operations. Introduction -- Summary of results -- Project numbers, by county -- Illinois waterflood projects operating during 1957 -- Illinois waterflood projects reported abandoned -- Illinois pressure maintenance projects using water injection during 1957.

Proposed Southern California lease offering, April, 1984 : final environmental impact statement /

Mode of access: Internet.

Coal report of Illinois.

Vols. for 188 -1893 include the annual reports of mine inspectors; 1894-1898 include the ... annual reports of the state inspectors of mines.

Report.

Report for 1881-82 issued as the survey's monograph 1.

Report.

Report year irregular.

Proposed Norton Basin lease sale 100 : final environmental impact statement /

"OCS EIS/ES; MMS 85-0085"--Cover.