Efficient modeling and inference for event-related fMRI data

Event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging (efMRI) has emerged as a powerful technique for detecting brains' responses to presented stimuli. A primary goal in efMRI data analysis is to estimate the Hemodynamic Response Function (HRF) and to locate activated regions in human brains when specific tasks are performed. This paper develops new methodologies that are important improvements not only to parametric but also to nonparametric estimation and hypothesis testing of the HRF. First, an effective and computationally fast scheme for estimating the error covariance matrix for efMRI is proposed. Second, methodologies for estimation and hypothesis testing of the HRF are developed. Simulations support the effectiveness of our proposed methods. When applied to an efMRI dataset from an emotional control study, our method reveals more meaningful findings than the popular methods offered by AFNI and FSL. (C) 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Ranald Macdonald and statistical inference

Ranald Roderick Macdonald (1945-2007) was an important contributor to mathematical psychology in the UK, as a referee and action editor for British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical Psychology and as a participant and organizer at the British Psychological Society's Mathematics, statistics and computing section meetings. This appreciation argues that his most important contribution was to the foundations of significance testing, where his concern about what information was relevant in interpreting the results of significance tests led him to be a persuasive advocate for the 'Weak Fisherian' form of hypothesis testing.

The relative success of recognition-based inference in multichoice decisions

The utility of an "ecologically rational" recognition-based decision rule in multichoice decision problems is analyzed, varying the type of judgment required (greater or lesser). The maximum size and range of a counterintuitive advantage associated with recognition-based judgment (the "less-is-more effect") is identified for a range of cue validity values. Greater ranges of the less-is-more effect occur when participants are asked which is the greatest of to choices (m > 2) than which is the least. Less-is-more effects also have greater range for larger values of in. This implies that the classic two-altemative forced choice task, as studied by Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002), may not be the most appropriate test case for less-is-more effects.

A little learning is a dangerous thing: an experimental demonstration of ignorance-driven inference

Studies of ignorance-driven decision making have been employed to analyse when ignorance should prove advantageous on theoretical grounds or else they have been employed to examine whether human behaviour is consistent with an ignorance-driven inference strategy (e. g., the recognition heuristic). In the current study we examine whether-under conditions where such inferences might be expected-the advantages that theoretical analyses predict are evident in human performance data. A single experiment shows that, when asked to make relative wealth judgements, participants reliably use recognition as a basis for their judgements. Their wealth judgements under these conditions are reliably more accurate when some of the target names are unknown than when participants recognize all of the names (a "less-is-more effect"). These results are consistent across a number of variations: the number of options given to participants and the nature of the wealth judgement. A basic model of recognition-based inference predicts these effects.

When does ignorance make us smart? Additional factors guiding heuristic inference

“Fast & frugal” heuristics represent an appealing way of implementing bounded rationality and decision-making under pressure. The recognition heuristic is the simplest and most fundamental of these heuristics. Simulation and experimental studies have shown that this ignorance-driven heuristic inference can prove superior to knowledge based inference (Borges, Goldstein, Ortman & Gigerenzer, 1999; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) and have shown how the heuristic could develop from ACT-R’s forgetting function (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Mathematical analyses also demonstrate that, under certain conditions, a “less-is-more effect” will always occur (Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). The further analyses presented in this paper show, however, that these conditions may constitute a special case and that the less-is-more effect in decision-making is subject to the moderating influence of the number of options to be considered and the framing of the question.

Less-is-more effects in knowledge-based heuristic inference

Inference on the basis of recognition alone is assumed to occur prior to accessing further information (Pachur & Hertwig, 2006). A counterintuitive result of this is the “less-is-more” effect: a drop in the accuracy with which choices are made as to which of two or more items scores highest on a given criterion as more items are learned (Frosch, Beaman & McCloy, 2007; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002). In this paper, we show that less-is-more effects are not unique to recognition-based inference but can also be observed with a knowledge-based strategy provided two assumptions, limited information and differential access, are met. The LINDA model which embodies these assumptions is presented. Analysis of the less-is-more effects predicted by LINDA and by recognition-driven inference shows that these occur for similar reasons and casts doubt upon the “special” nature of recognition-based inference. Suggestions are made for empirical tests to compare knowledge-based and recognition-based less-is-more effects