Regulation of lymphocyte development and activation

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Habil.-Schr., 2012

Four essays on capital regulation of banks

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Wirtschaftswiss., Diss., 2013

Regulation of nuclear factor kappa-light-chain-enhancer of activated B cells (NF-[kappa]B) by protein Kinase C theta (PKC-[theta]) and cylindromatosis (CYLD) in murine listeriosis and toxoplasmosis

Magdeburg, Univ., Fak. für Naturwiss., Diss., 2013

Regulation der Interleukin-2-Sekretion in primären humanen T-Lymphozyten durch Cannabinoide

Magdeburg, Univ., Med. Fak., Diss., 2015

Efficiency and environmental regulation: a 'complex situation'

Production of desirable outputs is often accompanied by undesirable by products that have damaging effects on the environment, and whose disposal is frequently regulated by public authorities. In this paper, we compute directional technology distance functions under particular assumptions concerning disposability of bads in order to test for the existence of what we call ‘complex situations’, where the biggest producer is not the greatest polluter. Furthermore, we show that how in such situations, environmental regulation could achieve an effective reduction in the aggregate level of bad outputs without reducing the production of good outputs. Finally, we illustrate our methodology with an empirical application to a sample of Spanish tile ceramic producers.

Governance mechanisms in Spanish financial intermediaries

This paper examines the governance of Spanish Banks around two main issues. First, does a poor economic performance activate those governance interventions that favor the removal of executive directors and the merger of non-performing banks? And second, does the relationship between governance intervention and economic performance vary with the ownership form of the bank? Our results show that a bad performance does activate governance mechanisms in banks, although for the case of Savings Banks intervention is confined to a merger or acquisition. Nevertheless, the distinct ownership structure of Savings Banks does not fully protect non-performing banks from disappearing. Product-market competition compensates for those weak internal governance mechanisms that result from an ownership form which gives voice to several stakeholder groups.

Are one factor logarithmic volatility models useful to fit the features of financial data? An application to microsoft data.

This paper provides empirical evidence that continuous time models with one factor of volatility, in some conditions, are able to fit the main characteristics of financial data. It also reports the importance of the feedback factor in capturing the strong volatility clustering of data, caused by a possible change in the pattern of volatility in the last part of the sample. We use the Efficient Method of Moments (EMM) by Gallant and Tauchen (1996) to estimate logarithmic models with one and two stochastic volatility factors (with and without feedback) and to select among them.

Taxation of banks: a theoretical framework

The goal of this paper is to develop a model of financial intermediation analyze the impact of various forms of taxation. The model considers in a unified framework various functions of banks: monitoring, transaction services and asset transformation. Particular attention is devoted to conditions for separability between deposits and loans. The analysis focuses on: (i) competition between banks and alternative financial arrangements (investment funds and organized security markets), (ii) regulation, and (iii) bank's monopoly power and risk taking behavior.

Pressure groups and experts in environmental regulation

We study a problem of adverse selection in the context of environmental regulation, where the firm may suffer from a certain degree of ignorance about its own type. In a framework like the construction of a certain infrastructure project, the presence of ignorance about its impact on the environment, can play an important role in the determination of the regulatory policy. First, an optimal contract is constructed for any exogenous level of ignorance. Second, the presence of potentially informed third-parties is studied from the perspective of the regulator, which allows us to analyze the impact on the efficiency of the contract, of the presence of environmentalists and of experts. Then, we obtain some insights on how the problem differs when the degree of ignorance is a choice variable for the firm. We finally use our results to derive policy implications concerning the existing envoronmental regulation, and the potential role of interested parties as information providers.

Financial intermediation in a model of growth through creative destruction

This paper presents an endogenous growth model in which the research activity is financed by intermediaries that are able to reduce the incidence of researcher's moral hazard. It is shown that financial activity is growth promoting because it increases research productivity. It is also found that a subsidy to the financial sector may have larger growth effects than a direct subsidy to research. Moreover, due to the presence of moral hazard, increasing the subsidy rate to R\&D may reduce the growth rate. I show that there exists a negative relation between the financing of innovation and the process of capital accumulation. Concerning welfare, the presence of two externalities of opposite sign steaming from financial activity may cause that the no-tax equilibrium provides an inefficient level of financial services. Thus, policies oriented to balance the effects of the two externalities will be welfare improving.

Optimal regulation of specialized medical care in a mixed system

We study the optimal public intervention in setting minimum standards of formation for specialized medical care. The abilities the physicians obtain by means of their training allow them to improve their performance as providers of cure and earn some monopoly rents.. Our aim is to characterize the most efficient regulation in this field taking into account different regulatory frameworks. We find that the existing situation in some countries, in which the amount of specialization is controlled, and the costs of this process of specialization are publicly financed, can be supported as the best possible intervention.

Environmental regulation: choice of instruments under imperfect compliance

Compliance is an important issue in environmental regulation. In this paper, we discuss some of the key elements of the problem and analyze a situation where emissions are not random and firms are risk-neutral. We study the firm's decision on emissions and compliance when the environmental regulation is based on standards and the enforcement agency audits the firm with a certain probability. We then compare total emissions when environmental regulation is based on different instruments: standards, taxes, and tradable permits. We show that when compliance is an issue, environmental taxes are superior to the other instruments. We also analyze the (static) efficiency of the solution.