Stated attribute non-attendance in successive choice experiments

Attribute non-attendance in choice experiments affects WTP estimates and therefore the validity of the method. A recent strand of literature uses attenuated estimates of marginal utilities of ignored attributes. Following this approach, we propose a generalisation of the mixed logit model whereby the distribution of marginal utility coefficients of a stated non-attender has a potentially lower mean and lower variance than those of a stated attender. Model comparison shows that our shrinkage approach fits the data better and produces more reliable WTP estimates. We further find that while reliability of stated attribute non-attendance increases in successive choice experiments, it does not increase when respondents report having ignored the same attribute twice.

What determines religious school choice? Theory and evidence from rural Bangladesh

This paper looks at the determinants of school selection in rural Bangladesh, focusing on the choice between registered Islamic and non-religious schools. Using a unique dataset on secondary school-age children from rural Bangladesh, we find that madrasah enrolment falls as household income increases. At the same time, more religious households, and those that live further away from a non-religious school are more likely to send their children to madrasahs. However, in contrast to the theory, we find that Islamic school demand does not respond to the average quality of schools in the locality.

Whole-brain functional connectivity during emotional word classification in medication-free Major Depressive Disorder: abnormal salience circuitry and relations to positive emotionality

Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) has been associated with biased processing and abnormal regulation of negative and positive information, which may result from compromised coordinated activity of prefrontal and subcortical brain regions involved in evaluating emotional information. We tested whether patients with MDD show distributed changes in functional connectivity with a set of independently derived brain networks that have shown high correspondence with different task demands, including stimulus salience and emotional processing. We further explored if connectivity during emotional word processing related to the tendency to engage in positive or negative emotional states. In this study, 25 medication-free MDD patients without current or past comorbidity and matched controls (n=25) performed an emotional word-evaluation task during functional MRI. Using a dual regression approach, individual spatial connectivity maps representing each subject’s connectivity with each standard network were used to evaluate between-group differences and effects of positive and negative emotionality (extraversion and neuroticism, respectively, as measured with the NEO-FFI). Results showed decreased functional connectivity of the medial prefrontal cortex, ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, and ventral striatum with the fronto-opercular salience network in MDD patients compared to controls. In patients, abnormal connectivity was related to extraversion, but not neuroticism. These results confirm the hypothesis of a relative (para)limbic-cortical decoupling that may explain dysregulated affect in MDD. As connectivity of these regions with the salience network was related to extraversion, but not to general depression severity or negative emotionality, dysfunction of this network may be responsible for the failure to sustain engagement in rewarding behavior.

Still feeling it: the time course of emotional recovery from an attentional perspective

Emotional reactivity and the time taken to recover, particularly from negative, stressful, events, are inextricably linked, and both are crucial for maintaining well-being. It is unclear, however, to what extent emotional reactivity during stimulus onset predicts the time course of recovery after stimulus offset. To address this question, 25 participants viewed arousing (negative and positive) and neutral pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) followed by task-relevant face targets, which were to be gender categorized. Faces were presented early (400–1500 ms) or late (2400–3500 ms) after picture offset to capture the time course of recovery from emotional stimuli. Measures of reaction time (RT), as well as face-locked N170 and P3 components were taken as indicators of the impact of lingering emotion on attentional facilitation or interference. Electrophysiological effects revealed negative and positive images to facilitate face-target processing on the P3 component, regardless of temporal interval. At the individual level, increased reactivity to: (1) negative pictures, quantified as the IAPS picture-locked Late Positive Potential (LPP), predicted larger attentional interference on the face-locked P3 component to faces presented in the late time window after picture offset. (2) Positive pictures, denoted by the LPP, predicted larger facilitation on the face-locked P3 component to faces presented in the earlier time window after picture offset. These results suggest that subsequent processing is still impacted up to 3500 ms after the offset of negative pictures and 1500 ms after the offset of positive pictures for individuals reacting more strongly to these pictures, respectively. Such findings emphasize the importance of individual differences in reactivity when predicting the temporality of emotional recovery. The current experimental model provides a novel basis for future research aiming to identify profiles of adaptive and maladaptive recovery.

Neural correlates of cognitive dissonance and choice-induced preference change

According to many modern economic theories, actions simply reflect an individual's preferences, whereas a psychological phenomenon called “cognitive dissonance” claims that actions can also create preference. Cognitive dissonance theory states that after making a difficult choice between two equally preferred items, the act of rejecting a favorite item induces an uncomfortable feeling (cognitive dissonance), which in turn motivates individuals to change their preferences to match their prior decision (i.e., reducing preference for rejected items). Recently, however, Chen and Risen [Chen K, Risen J (2010) J Pers Soc Psychol 99:573–594] pointed out a serious methodological problem, which casts a doubt on the very existence of this choice-induced preference change as studied over the past 50 y. Here, using a proper control condition and two measures of preferences (self-report and brain activity), we found that the mere act of making a choice can change self-report preference as well as its neural representation (i.e., striatum activity), thus providing strong evidence for choice-induced preference change. Furthermore, our data indicate that the anterior cingulate cortex and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex tracked the degree of cognitive dissonance on a trial-by-trial basis. Our findings provide important insights into the neural basis of how actions can alter an individual's preferences.

Updating existing emotional memories involves the frontopolar/orbitofrontal cortex in ways that acquiring new emotional memories does not

In life, we must often learn new associations to people, places, or things we already know. The current fMRI study investigated the neural mechanisms underlying emotional memory updating. Nineteen participants first viewed negative and neutral pictures and learned associations between those pictures and other neutral stimuli, such as neutral objects and encoding tasks. This initial learning phase was followed by a memory updating phase, during which participants learned picture-location associations for old pictures (i.e., pictures previously associated with other neutral stimuli) and new pictures (i.e., pictures not seen in the first phase). There was greater frontopolar/orbito-frontal (OFC) activity when people learned picture–location associations for old negative pictures than for new negative pictures, but frontopolar OFC activity did not significantly differ during learning locations of old versus new neutral pictures. In addition, frontopolar activity was more negatively correlated with the amygdala when participants learned picture–location associations for old negative pictures than for new negative or old neutral pictures. Past studies revealed that the frontopolar OFC allows for updating the affective values of stimuli in reversal learning or extinction of conditioning [e.g., Izquierdo, A., & Murray, E. A. Opposing effects of amygdala and orbital PFC lesions on the extinction of instrumental responding in macaque monkeys. European Journal of Neuroscience, 22, 2341–2346, 2005]; our findings suggest that it plays a more general role in updating associations to emotional stimuli.

Beyond arousal and valence: the importance of the biological versus social relevance of emotional stimuli

The present study addressed the hypothesis that emotional stimuli relevant to survival or reproduction (biologically emotional stimuli) automatically affect cognitive processing (e.g., attention, memory), while those relevant to social life (socially emotional stimuli) require elaborative processing to modulate attention and memory. Results of our behavioral studies showed that (1) biologically emotional images hold attention more strongly than do socially emotional images, (2) memory for biologically emotional images was enhanced even with limited cognitive resources, but (3) memory for socially emotional images was enhanced only when people had sufficient cognitive resources at encoding. Neither images’ subjective arousal nor their valence modulated these patterns. A subsequent functional magnetic resonance imaging study revealed that biologically emotional images induced stronger activity in the visual cortex and greater functional connectivity between the amygdala and visual cortex than did socially emotional images. These results suggest that the interconnection between the amygdala and visual cortex supports enhanced attention allocation to biological stimuli. In contrast, socially emotional images evoked greater activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and yielded stronger functional connectivity between the amygdala and MPFC than did biological images. Thus, it appears that emotional processing of social stimuli involves elaborative processing requiring frontal lobe activity.

Allocation of spatial attention to emotional stimuli depends upon arousal and not valence

Attentional allocation to emotional stimuli is often proposed to be driven by valence and in particular by negativity. However, many negative stimuli are also arousing leaving the question whether valence or arousal accounts for this effect. The authors examined whether the valence or the arousal level of emotional stimuli influences the allocation of spatial attention using a modified spatial cueing task. Participants responded to targets that were preceded by cues consisting of emotional pictures varying on arousal and valence. Response latencies showed that disengagement of spatial attention was slower for stimuli high in arousal than for stimuli low in arousal. The effect was independent of the valence of the pictures and not gender-specific. The findings support the idea that arousal affects the allocation of attention.

Emotional geographies of enthusiasm: belonging to the Telecommunications Heritage Group

Enthusiasm has long been associated with notions of impassioned mood, intensity of feeling and passionate dedication. Despite this burgeoning field of ‘enthusiastic geographies’, the conceptualisation of enthusiasm has until now remained largely untouched by geographers. This article develops recent work on emotional geographies in order to shed light on the emergence, experience and spatial implications of enthusiasm in group settings. It draws upon interview material with members of the UK’s Telecommunications Heritage Group in order to examine enthusiasm as an emotional affiliation. It is argued in this article that enthusiasm influences passions, performances and actions in space, revealing the mutual ‘closeness’, exclusivity of knowledgeability and sociability among participants.

The stochastic component in choice and regression to the mean

In this article, we illustrate experimentally an important consequence of the stochastic component in choice behaviour which has not been acknowledged so far. Namely, its potential to produce ‘regression to the mean’ (RTM) effects. We employ a novel approach to individual choice under risk, based on repeated multiple-lottery choices (i.e. choices among many lotteries), to show how the high degree of stochastic variability present in individual decisions can distort crucially certain results through RTM effects. We demonstrate the point in the context of a social comparison experiment.

Choice-induced preference change in the free-choice paradigm: a critical methodological review

Choices not only reflect our preference, but they also affect our behavior. The phenomenon of choice-induced preference change has been of interest to cognitive dissonance researchers in social psychology, and more recently, it has attracted the attention of researchers in economics and neuroscience. Preference modulation after the mere act of making a choice has been repeatedly demonstrated over the last 50 years by an experimental paradigm called the “free-choice paradigm.” However, Chen and Risen (2010) pointed out a serious methodological flaw in this paradigm, arguing that evidence for choice-induced preference change is still insufficient. Despite the flaw, studies using the traditional free-choice paradigm continue to be published without addressing the criticism. Here, aiming to draw more attention to this issue, we briefly explain the methodological problem, and then describe simple simulation studies that illustrate how the free-choice paradigm produces a systematic pattern of preference change consistent with cognitive dissonance, even without any change in true preference. Our stimulation also shows how a different level of noise in each phase of the free-choice paradigm independently contributes to the magnitude of artificial preference change. Furthermore, we review ways of addressing the critique and provide a meta-analysis to show the effect size of choice-induced preference change after addressing the critique. Finally, we review and discuss, based on the results of the stimulation studies, how the criticism affects our interpretation of past findings generated from the free-choice paradigm. We conclude that the use of the conventional free-choice paradigm should be avoided in future research and the validity of past findings from studies using this paradigm should be empirically re-established. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved)(journal abstract)

Motivational, emotional, and behavioral correlates of fear of missing out

Social media utilities have made it easier than ever to know about the range of online or offline social activities one could be engaging. On the upside, these social resources provide a multitude of opportunities for interaction; on the downside, they often broadcast more options than can be pursued, given practical restrictions and limited time. This dual nature of social media has driven popular interest in the concept of Fear of Missing Out – popularly referred to as FoMO. Defined as a pervasive apprehension that others might be having rewarding experiences from which one is absent, FoMO is characterized by the desire to stay continually connected with what others are doing. The present research presents three studies conducted to advance an empirically based understanding of the fear of missing out phenomenon. The first study collected a diverse international sample of participants in order to create a robust individual differences measure of FoMO, the Fear of Missing Out scale (FoMOs); this study is the first to operationalize the construct. Study 2 recruited a nationally representative cohort to investigate how demographic, motivational and well-being factors relate to FoMO. Study 3 examined the behavioral and emotional correlates of fear of missing out in a sample of young adults. Implications of the FoMOs measure and for the future study of FoMO are discussed.

Visual attention and attribute attendance in multi-attribute choice experiments

Decision strategies in multi-attribute Choice Experiments are investigated using eye-tracking. The visual attention towards, and attendance of, attributes is examined. Stated attendance is found to diverge substantively from visual attendance of attributes. However, stated and visual attendance are shown to be informative, non-overlapping sources of information about respondent utility functions when incorporated into model estimation. Eye-tracking also reveals systematic nonattendance of attributes only by a minority of respondents. Most respondents visually attend most attributes most of the time. We find no compelling evidence that the level of attention is related to respondent certainty, or that higher or lower value attributes receive more or less attention

Using attribute importance rankings within discrete choice experiments: an application to valuing bread attributes

We present a new Bayesian econometric specification for a hypothetical Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) incorporating respondent ranking information about attribute importance. Our results indicate that a DCE debriefing question that asks respondents to rank the importance of attributes helps to explain the resulting choices. We also examine how mode of survey delivery (online and mail) impacts model performance, finding that results are not substantively a§ected by the mode of survey delivery. We conclude that the ranking data is a complementary source of information about respondent utility functions within hypothetical DCEs

Purpose in life predicts better emotional recovery from negative stimuli

Purpose in life predicts both health and longevity suggesting that the ability to find meaning from life’s experiences, especially when confronting life’s challenges, may be a mechanism underlying resilience. Having purpose in life may motivate reframing stressful situations to deal with them more productively, thereby facilitating recovery from stress and trauma. In turn, enhanced ability to recover from negative events may allow a person to achieve or maintain a feeling of greater purpose in life over time. In a large sample of adults (aged 36-84 years) from the MIDUS study (Midlife in the U.S., http://www.midus.wisc.edu/), we tested whether purpose in life was associated with better emotional recovery following exposure to negative picture stimuli indexed by the magnitude of the eyeblink startle reflex (EBR), a measure sensitive to emotional state. We differentiated between initial emotional reactivity (during stimulus presentation) and emotional recovery (occurring after stimulus offset). Greater purpose in life, assessed over two years prior, predicted better recovery from negative stimuli indexed by a smaller eyeblink after negative pictures offset, even after controlling for initial reactivity to the stimuli during the picture presentation, gender, age, trait affect, and other well-being dimensions. These data suggest a proximal mechanism by which purpose in life may afford protection from negative events and confer resilience is through enhanced automatic emotion regulation after negative emotional provocation.