Canadian Niagara Power Company fonds

Power at the Falls: The first recorded harnessing of Niagara Falls power was in 1759 by Daniel Joncairs. On the American side of the Falls he dug a small ditch and drew water to turn a wheel which powered a sawmill. In 1805 brothers Augustus and Peter Porter expanded on Joncairs idea. They bought the American Falls from New York State at public auction. Using Joncairs old site they built a gristmill and tannery which stayed in business for twenty years. The next attempt at using the Falls came in 1860 when construction of the hydraulic canal began by the Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power and Manufacturing Co. The canal was complete in 1861 and brought water from the Niagara river, above the falls, to the mills below. By 1881 the Niagara Falls Hydraulic Power and Manufacturing Co. had a small generating station which provided some electricity to the village of Niagara Falls and the Mills. This lasted only four years and then the company sold its assets at public auction due to bankruptcy. Jacob Schoellkopf arrived at the Falls in 1877 with the purchase of the hydraulic canal land and water and power rights. In 1879 Schoellkopf teamed up with Charles Brush (of Euclid Ohio) and powered Brush’s generator and carbon arc lights with the power from his water turbines, to illuminate the Falls electrically for the first time. The year 1895 marked the opening of the Adam No. 1 generating station on the American side. The station was the beginnings of modern electrical utility operations. The design and operations of the generating station came from worldwide competitions held by panels of experts. Some who were involved in the project include; George Westinghouse, J. Pierpont Morgan, Lord Kelvin and Nikoli Tesla. The plants were operated by the Niagara Falls Power Company until 1961, when the Robert Moses Plant began operation in Lewiston, NY. The Adams plants were demolished that same year and the site used as a sewage treatment plant. The Canadian side of the Falls began generating their own power on January 1, 1905. This power came from the William Birch Rankine Power Station located 500 yards above the Horseshoe Falls. This power station provided the village of Fort Erie with its first electricity in 1907, using its two 10,000 electrical horsepower generators. Today 11 generators produce 100,000 horsepower (75 megawatts) and operate as part of the Niagara Mohawk and Fortis Incorporated Power Group.

Blueprint - 200 K.W. D.C. Vert. Type Gen. 125 V. 8 P. 600 R.P.M., B 89521, 10586, 2-R1-H21.6

A blueprint produced by Westinghouse Electric & MFG. Co. in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvanna. The blueprint is dated 19 August 1903 and is stamped "OBSOLETE".

Letter - Frederic Nicholls (Canadian General Electric) to W.B. Rankine, 17 December 1897

A letter from 2nd Vice President and General Manager of Canadian General Electric Company, Frederic Nicholls to W. B. Rankine regarding a bid for contract. The letter mentions that the bid for two alternating generators for the Canadian side of Niagara Falls was won by Westinghouse Eletric and Manufacturing Co. Nicholls also mentions that there will be other opportunites to win contracts as more machines are required. Nicholls also implies that Westinghouse may have bid under cost in an effort to secure the first of many contracts with the Canadian Niagara Power Company.

Management Council for Responsible Labour Relations records, 1970-1979, n.d.

The Management Council for Responsible Labour Relations was a group of industry representatives who sought to improve the public image of management in labour disputes. They hoped to accomplish this by improving communication with the media, as well as by educating the general public about labour issues from management’s perspective. The Council had representatives from Inco, Gulf, Algoma, Westinghouse, Kimberly Clark, Ford, Stelco, Massey Ferguson, Alcan, Shell, Northern Electric, Bank of Montreal, Canada Packers and Dupont.

Observation of manganese deposits in the Blake Plateau, Florida and Caribbean sea areas

Designed by the Westinghouse Corporation in collaboration with Jacques Cousteau, DEEPSTAR-4000 is a deep diving research vehicle based on Captain Cousteau's DIVING SAUCER. An evaluation of DEEPSTAR's operational performance at sea is presented in this report through a description of typical dive procedures and the actual NAVOCEANO dive results.

Accident Management Actions In An Upper-Head Small-Break Loss-Of-Coolant Accident With High-Pressure Safety Injection Failed

Since the Three Mile Island accident, an important focus of pressurized water reactor (PWR) transient analyses has been a small-break loss-of-coolant accident (SBLOCA). In 2002, the discovery of thinning of the vessel head wall at the Davis Besse nuclear power plant reactor indicated the possibility of an SBLOCA in the upper head of the reactor vessel as a result of circumferential cracking of a control rod drive mechanism penetration nozzle - which has cast even greater importance on the study of SBLOCAs. Several experimental tests have been performed at the Large Scale Test Facility to simulate the behavior of a PWR during an upper-head SBLOCA. The last of these tests, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Nuclear Energy Agency Rig of Safety Assessment (OECD/NEA ROSA) Test 6.1, was performed in 2005. This test was simulated with the TRACE 5.0 code, and good agreement with the experimental results was obtained. Additionally, a broad analysis of an upper-head SBLOCA with high-pressure safety injection failed in a Westinghouse PWR was performed taking into account different accident management actions and conditions in order to check their suitability. This issue has been analyzed also in the framework of the OECD/NEA ROSA project and the Code Applications and Maintenance Program (CAMP). The main conclusion is that the current emergency operating procedures for Westinghouse reactor design are adequate for these kinds of sequences, and they do not need to be modified.

Análisis Integrado de Seguridad de un accidente de SGTR en un reactor nuclear tipo PWR

El accidente de rotura de tubos de un generador de vapor (Steam Generator Tube Rupture, SGTR) en los reactores de agua a presión es uno de los transitorios más exigentes desde el punto de vista de operación. Los transitorios de SGTR son especiales, ya que podría dar lugar a emisiones radiológicas al exterior sin necesidad de daño en el núcleo previo o sin que falle la contención, ya que los SG pueden constituir una vía directa desde el reactor al medio ambiente en este transitorio. En los análisis de seguridad, el SGTR se analiza desde un punto determinista y probabilista, con distintos enfoques con respecto a las acciones del operador y las consecuencias analizadas. Cuando comenzaron los Análisis Deterministas de Seguridad (DSA), la forma de analizar el SGTR fue sin dar crédito a la acción del operador durante los primeros 30 min del transitorio, lo que suponía que el grupo de operación era capaz de detener la fuga por el tubo roto dentro de ese tiempo. Sin embargo, los diferentes casos reales de accidentes de SGTR sucedidos en los EE.UU. y alrededor del mundo demostraron que los operadores pueden emplear más de 30 minutos para detener la fuga en la vida real. Algunas metodologías fueron desarrolladas en los EEUU y en Europa para abordar esa cuestión. En el Análisis Probabilista de Seguridad (PSA), las acciones del operador se tienen en cuenta para diseñar los cabeceros en el árbol de sucesos. Los tiempos disponibles se utilizan para establecer los criterios de éxito para dichos cabeceros. Sin embargo, en una secuencia dinámica como el SGTR, las acciones de un operador son muy dependientes del tiempo disponible por las acciones humanas anteriores. Además, algunas de las secuencias de SGTR puede conducir a la liberación de actividad radiológica al exterior sin daño previo en el núcleo y que no se tienen en cuenta en el APS, ya que desde el punto de vista de la integridad de núcleo son de éxito. Para ello, para analizar todos estos factores, la forma adecuada de analizar este tipo de secuencias pueden ser a través de una metodología que contemple Árboles de Sucesos Dinámicos (Dynamic Event Trees, DET). En esta Tesis Doctoral se compara el impacto en la evolución temporal y la dosis al exterior de la hipótesis más relevantes encontradas en los Análisis Deterministas a nivel mundial. La comparación se realiza con un modelo PWR Westinghouse de tres lazos (CN Almaraz) con el código termohidráulico TRACE, con hipótesis de estimación óptima, pero con hipótesis deterministas como criterio de fallo único o pérdida de energía eléctrica exterior. Las dosis al exterior se calculan con RADTRAD, ya que es uno de los códigos utilizados normalmente para los cálculos de dosis del SGTR. El comportamiento del reactor y las dosis al exterior son muy diversas, según las diferentes hipótesis en cada metodología. Por otra parte, los resultados están bastante lejos de los límites de regulación, pese a los conservadurismos introducidos. En el siguiente paso de la Tesis Doctoral, se ha realizado un análisis de seguridad integrado del SGTR según la metodología ISA, desarrollada por el Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear español (CSN). Para ello, se ha realizado un análisis termo-hidráulico con un modelo de PWR Westinghouse de 3 lazos con el código MAAP. La metodología ISA permite la obtención del árbol de eventos dinámico del SGTR, teniendo en cuenta las incertidumbres en los tiempos de actuación del operador. Las simulaciones se realizaron con SCAIS (sistema de simulación de códigos para la evaluación de la seguridad integrada), que incluye un acoplamiento dinámico con MAAP. Las dosis al exterior se calcularon también con RADTRAD. En los resultados, se han tenido en cuenta, por primera vez en la literatura, las consecuencias de las secuencias en términos no sólo de daños en el núcleo sino de dosis al exterior. Esta tesis doctoral demuestra la necesidad de analizar todas las consecuencias que contribuyen al riesgo en un accidente como el SGTR. Para ello se ha hecho uso de una metodología integrada como ISA-CSN. Con este enfoque, la visión del DSA del SGTR (consecuencias radiológicas) se une con la visión del PSA del SGTR (consecuencias de daño al núcleo) para evaluar el riesgo total del accidente. Abstract Steam Generator Tube Rupture accidents in Pressurized Water Reactors are known to be one of the most demanding transients for the operating crew. SGTR are special transient as they could lead to radiological releases without core damage or containment failure, as they can constitute a direct path to the environment. The SGTR is analyzed from a Deterministic and Probabilistic point of view in the Safety Analysis, although the assumptions of the different approaches regarding the operator actions are quite different. In the beginning of Deterministic Safety Analysis, the way of analyzing the SGTR was not crediting the operator action for the first 30 min of the transient, assuming that the operating crew was able to stop the primary to secondary leakage within that time. However, the different real SGTR accident cases happened in the USA and over the world demonstrated that operators can took more than 30 min to stop the leakage in actual sequences. Some methodologies were raised in the USA and in Europe to cover that issue. In the Probabilistic Safety Analysis, the operator actions are taken into account to set the headers in the event tree. The available times are used to establish the success criteria for the headers. However, in such a dynamic sequence as SGTR, the operator actions are very dependent on the time available left by the other human actions. Moreover, some of the SGTR sequences can lead to offsite doses without previous core damage and they are not taken into account in PSA as from the point of view of core integrity are successful. Therefore, to analyze all this factors, the appropriate way of analyzing that kind of sequences could be through a Dynamic Event Tree methodology. This Thesis compares the impact on transient evolution and the offsite dose of the most relevant hypothesis of the different SGTR analysis included in the Deterministic Safety Analysis. The comparison is done with a PWR Westinghouse three loop model in TRACE code (Almaraz NPP), with best estimate assumptions but including deterministic hypothesis such as single failure criteria or loss of offsite power. The offsite doses are calculated with RADTRAD code, as it is one of the codes normally used for SGTR offsite dose calculations. The behaviour of the reactor and the offsite doses are quite diverse depending on the different assumptions made in each methodology. On the other hand, although the high conservatism, such as the single failure criteria, the results are quite far from the regulatory limits. In the next stage of the Thesis, the Integrated Safety Assessment (ISA) methodology, developed by the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council (CSN), has been applied to a thermohydraulical analysis of a Westinghouse 3-loop PWR plant with the MAAP code. The ISA methodology allows obtaining the SGTR Dynamic Event Tree taking into account the uncertainties on the operator actuation times. Simulations are performed with SCAIS (Simulation Code system for Integrated Safety Assessment), which includes a dynamic coupling with MAAP thermal hydraulic code. The offsite doses are calculated also with RADTRAD. The results shows the consequences of the sequences in terms not only of core damage but of offsite doses. This Thesis shows the need of analyzing all the consequences in an accident such as SGTR. For that, an it has been used an integral methodology like ISA-CSN. With this approach, the DSA vision of the SGTR (radiological consequences) is joined with the PSA vision of the SGTR (core damage consequences) to measure the total risk of the accident.

Application of a dynamic event tree methodolgy to steam generator tube rupture sequences

The Integrated Safety Assessment (ISA) methodology, developed by the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council (CSN), has been applied to a thermo-hydraulical analysis of a Westinghouse 3-loop PWR plant by means of the dynamic event trees (DET) for Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) sequences. The ISA methodology allows obtaining the SGTR Dynamic Event Tree taking into account the operator actuation times. Simulations are performed with SCAIS (Simulation Code system for Integrated Safety Assessment), which includes a dynamic coupling with MAAP thermal hydraulic code. The results show the capability of the ISA methodology and SCAIS platform to obtain the DET of complex sequences.

Analysis of the operator action and the single failure criteria in a SGTR sequence using best estimate assumptions with TRACE 5.0

Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR) sequences in Pressurized Water Reactors are known to be one of the most demanding transients for the operating crew. SGTR are a special kind of transient as they could lead to radiological releases without core damage or containment failure, as they can constitute a direct path from the reactor coolant system to the environment. The first methodology used to perform the Deterministic Safety Analysis (DSA) of a SGTR did not credit the operator action for the first 30 min of the transient, assuming that the operating crew was able to stop the primary to secondary leakage within that period of time. However, the different real SGTR accident cases happened in the USA and over the world demonstrated that the operators usually take more than 30 min to stop the leakage in actual sequences. Some methodologies were raised to overcome that fact, considering operator actions from the beginning of the transient, as it is done in Probabilistic Safety Analysis. This paper presents the results of comparing different assumptions regarding the single failure criteria and the operator action taken from the most common methodologies included in the different Deterministic Safety Analysis. One single failure criteria that has not been analysed previously in the literature is proposed and analysed in this paper too. The comparison is done with a PWR Westinghouse three loop model in TRACE code (Almaraz NPP) with best estimate assumptions but including deterministic hypothesis such as single failure criteria or loss of offsite power. The behaviour of the reactor is quite diverse depending on the different assumptions made regarding the operator actions. On the other hand, although there are high conservatisms included in the hypothesis, as the single failure criteria, all the results are quite far from the regulatory limits. In addition, some improvements to the Emergency Operating Procedures to minimize the offsite release from the damaged SG in case of a SGTR are outlined taking into account the offsite dose sensitivity results.

Entorno de simulación para verificación y validación de equipamiento CBTC

Debido a sus características de seguridad, los sistemas de señalización ferroviarios requieren una gran cantidad de pruebas para su verificación y validación durante las diferentes etapas de su ciclo de vida, y en particular durante la instalación y puesta en marcha de una nueva línea o rehabilitación de una línea existente, siendo esta última aún más complicada debido a los cortos períodos de tiempo disponibles durante la noche para los trabajos. Este proyecto tiene como objetivo desarrollar una herramienta para reducir los esfuerzos antes mencionados mediante la simulación de los diferentes subsistemas de una línea equipada con sistema CBTC, el cumplimiento de las interfaces entre los subsistemas y el uso dentro de la simulación de equipos reales. Con estas premisas se desarrolló un entorno de pruebas para equipos y datos de señalización para líneas equipadas con el sistema CBTC. Los objetivos del proyecto que fueron establecidos en el inicio del desarrollo y han sido cumplidos con el desarrollo que se presenta en este artículo son los siguientes: • Poder realizar ensayos reales de equipos CBTC y su integración: equipos embarcados, equipos de control de área, etc. • Poder realizar ensayos reales con otros elementos de señalización y su integración: enclavamientos y ATS. • Poder realizar validación de datos vía CBTC. Para lograr estos objetivos se han desarrollado diversas aplicaciones de simulación, de las cuales, los más importantes son las siguientes: infraestructura, trenes automáticos, simulación de sistemas de tren, herramienta de gestión de los escenarios de simulación, etc Este sistema ha sido desarrollado y está añadiendo actualmente nuevos módulos y funcionalidades para las empresas del Grupo Invensys: Westinghouse Rail Systems en el Reino Unido y Dimetronic Signals en España, y está en uso en las nuevas líneas CBTC bajo su responsabilidad.

Development of a PWR-W and an AP1000® containment building 3D model with a CFD code for Best-Estimate Thermal-Hydraulic Analysis

The simulation of design basis accidents in a containment building is usually conducted with a lumped parameter model. The codes normally used by Westinghouse Electric Company (WEC) for that license analysis are WGOTHIC or COCO, which are suitable to provide an adequate estimation of the overall peak temperature and pressure of the containment. However, for the detailed study of the thermal-hydraulic behavior in every room and compartment of the containment building, it could be more convenient to model the containment with a more detailed 3D representation of the geometry of the whole building. The main objective of this project is to obtain a standard PWR Westinghouse as well as an AP1000® containment model for a CFD code to analyze the thermal-hydraulic detailed behavior during a design basis accident. In this paper the development and testing of both containment models is presented.

Análisis de secuencias de accidente de pérdida de refrigerante en centrales nucleares de agua a presión mediante la metodología ISA

El accidente de pérdida de refrigerante (LOCA) en un reactor nuclear es uno de los accidentes Base de Diseño más preocupantes y estudiados desde el origen del uso de la tecnología de fisión en la industria productora de energía. El LOCA ocupa, desde el punto de vista de los análisis de seguridad, un lugar de vanguardia tanto en el análisis determinista (DSA) como probabilista (PSA), cuya diferenciada perspectiva ha ido evolucionando notablemente en lo que al crédito a la actuación de las salvaguardias y las acciones del operador se refiere. En la presente tesis se aborda el análisis sistemático de de las secuencias de LOCA por pequeña y mediana rotura en diferentes lugares de un reactor nuclear de agua a presión (PWR) con fallo total de Inyección de Seguridad de Alta Presión (HPSI). Tal análisis ha sido desarrollado en base a la metodología de Análisis Integrado de Seguridad (ISA), desarrollado por el Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear (CSN) y consistente en la aplicación de métodos avanzados de simulación y PSA para la obtención de Dominios de Daño, que cuantifican topológicamente las probabilidades de éxito y daño en función de determinados parámetros inciertos. Para la elaboración de la presente tesis, se ha hecho uso del código termohidráulico TRACE v5.0 (patch 2), avalado por la NRC de los EEUU como código de planta para la simulación y análisis de secuencias en reactores de agua ligera (LWR). Los objetivos del trabajo son, principalmente: (1) el análisis exhaustivo de las secuencias de LOCA por pequeña-mediana rotura en diferentes lugares de un PWR de tres lazos de diseño Westinghouse (CN Almaraz), con fallo de HPSI, en función de parámetros de gran importancia para los transitorios, tales como el tamaño de rotura y el tiempo de retraso en la respuesta del operador; (2) la obtención y análisis de los Dominios de Daño para transitorios de LOCA en PWRs, de acuerdo con la metodología ISA; y (3) la revisión de algunos de los resultados genéricos de los análisis de seguridad para secuencias de LOCA en las mencionadas condiciones. Los resultados de la tesis abarcan tres áreas bien diferenciadas a lo largo del trabajo: (a) la fenomenología física de las secuencias objeto de estudio; (b) las conclusiones de los análisis de seguridad practicados a los transitorios de LOCA; y (c) la relevancia de las consecuencias de las acciones humanas por parte del grupo de operación. Estos resultados, a su vez, son de dos tipos fundamentales: (1) de respaldo del conocimiento previo sobre el tipo de secuencias analizado, incluido en la extensa bibliografía examinada; y (2) hallazgos en cada una de las tres áreas mencionadas, no referidos en la bibliografía. En resumidas cuentas, los resultados de la tesis avalan el uso de la metodología ISA como método de análisis alternativo y sistemático para secuencias accidentales en LWRs. ABSTRACT The loss of coolant accident (LOCA) in nuclear reactors is one of the most concerning and analized accidents from the beginning of the use of fission technology for electric power production. From the point of view of safety analyses, LOCA holds a forefront place in both Deterministic (DSA) and Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA), which have significantly evolved from their original state in both safeguard performance credibility and human actuation. This thesis addresses a systematic analysis of small and medium LOCA sequences, in different places of a nuclear Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) and with total failure of High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI). Such an analysis has been grounded on the Integrated Safety Assessment (ISA) methodology, developed by the Spanish Nuclear Regulatory Body (CSN). ISA involves the application of advanced methods of simulation and PSA for obtaining Damage Domains that topologically quantify the likelihood of success and damage regarding certain uncertain parameters.TRACE v5.0 (patch 2) code has been used as the thermalhydraulic simulation tool for the elaboration of this work. Nowadays, TRACE is supported by the US NRC as a plant code for the simulation and analysis of sequences in light water reactors (LWR). The main objectives of the work are the following ones: (1) the in-depth analysis of small and medium LOCA sequences in different places of a Westinghouse three-loop PWR (Almaraz NPP), with failed HPSI, regarding important parameters, such as break size or delay in operator response; (2) obtainment and analysis of Damage Domains related to LOCA transients in PWRs, according to ISA methodology; and (3) review some of the results of generic safety analyses for LOCA sequences in those conditions. The results of the thesis cover three separated areas: (a) the physical phenomenology of the sequences under study; (b) the conclusions of LOCA safety analyses; and (c) the importance of consequences of human actions by the operating crew. These results, in turn, are of two main types: (1) endorsement of previous knowledge about this kind of sequences, which is included in the literature; and (2) findings in each of the three aforementioned areas, not reported in the reviewed literature. In short, the results of this thesis support the use of ISA-like methodology as an alternative method for systematic analysis of LWR accidental sequences.

Low-cost substrates for polycrystalline-silicon solar cells by electrodeposition processes : thord quarterly progress report for April 1 - June 30, 1980 /

"Work Performed Under Contract No. AC02-77CH00178."

Development of copper sulfide/cadmium sulfide thin-film solar cell s : third technical progress report, January 13 - April 12, 1980 /

"Work Performed Under Contract No. AC02-77CH00178."

Development of copper sulfide/cadmium sulfide thin film solar cell s : fourth technical progress report, April 13 - July 12, 1980 /

"Work Performed Under Contract No. AC02-77CH00178."