Commemorative Medals of the War of 1812, 1963

In the original set, there were 10 medals with inventory numbers 1740-1749. This included Tecumseh, Chief of the Shawnees and construction in 1812 of Fort Prescott in Upper Niagara. These are not included in this collection. The Franklin Mint purchased the Wellings Mint in 1973.

A Brief Statement of the Transactions and Accounts of Qr. M. Gen. James Thomas, attached to the Army on the Niagara Frontier, in the year 1812-1813 (1815)

A principle cause of the failure of the campaign on the Niagara Frontier in 1812 was the deficiency of subsistence for the troops; as quartermaster general, Thomas received much of the blame. His defense is offered here.

Message from the President of the United States, Recommending an Immediate Declaration of War Against Great Britain (1812)

"June 1st, 1812. Referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations. June 3d, 1812. Bill reported, declaring war ..."

Proceedings of the Convention of the State of New York ; held at the Capitol in the City of Albany, on the seventeenth and eighteenth days of September, 1812

Signed by Jacob Morris, President, and William Henderson, Secretary.

Naval and military chronicle of the United States : attack on Fort Erie

Includes rare 1816 battle plan map.

Camp Niagara, with a historical sketch of Niagara-on-the-Lake and Niagara Camp (1906)

Historical sketch of Niagara on the Lake and Niagara Camp.

Letter written by Mahlon Taylor to Samuel Clarke commenting on US troops during Fort George occupation, July 26, 1813

Fort George, situated on the west side of the Niagara River in Niagara-on-the-Lake, served as the headquarters for the Centre Division of the British Army during the War of 1812. On May 25, 1813, the Americans launched an artillery attack on the Fort, destroying most of the buildings. Two days later, the Americans invaded the Town of Niagara and occupied Fort George. They remained in the Fort for almost seven months, but suffered defeats at the Battle of Stoney Creek and Beaver Dams. Only a small number of militia remained stationed at the Fort. Fearing an attack by the British, the Americans retreated back across the Niagara River in December, 1813. The Fort remained in British possession for the rest of the War.

Laura Dexter letter, commenting on the McLeod murder trial, October 5, 1841

Alexander McLeod was Deputy Sheriff of the Niagara District during the Rebellion of 1837-38 in Upper Canada. On December 24, 1837, he became aware of a scheme by the rebels to use the American steamboat Caroline to provide supplies to William Lyon Mackenzie and his followers on Navy Island in the Niagara River. McLeod notified the authorities in Upper Canada about the situation. A few days later, on December 29, Commodore Andrew Drew led a band of men, including McLeod, to the American side, where the Caroline was moored at Schlosser’s Wharf. A scuffle ensued, in which American Amos Durfee was killed. The Caroline was then released from its moorings, set on fire, and drifted downstream before sinking. Many Americans viewed the incident as a violation of their sovereignty. Tensions between the United States and England were already strained over a boundary dispute between Maine and New Brunswick, and the situation with the Caroline further escalated the tension. McLeod was subsequently arrested in November, 1840 in Lewiston, NY and indicted for arson and murder. The British foreign secretary, Lord Palmerston, insisted that McLeod be released and could not be held personally responsible for the incident, as he was acting on orders from authorities in Canada. Eventually, McLeod was acquitted.

Letter written by Mahlon Taylor to Samuel Clarke commenting on US troops during Fort George occupation - July 26, 1813

A letter written by Mahlon Taylor to his uncle, Samuel Clarke, dated at Marcellus [New York], July 26, 1813. Mahlon Taylor writes that he believes the mail he has sent out is not making it past Princeton, as he has not had a reply to any of his sent correspondence. He also writes that he has heard there are 3500 men at Fort George, 1000 are unfit for duty, and that there is skirmishing daily. He comments that the general opinion is that the troops will withdraw from Canada entirely. The letter is signed Mahlon C Taylor and is addressed to Mr. Samuel Clarke, no. 227 South Front Street, Philadelphia.

Memorandum - Report on operations of 1st Division against St. Mihiel Salient, 1918

A memorandum describing the days leading up to the Battle of Saint-Mihiel. The document describes 1. Statement of Operation, 2. Character of Terrain, 3. Initial Dispositions, 4. Suitability of Formations, 5. How such formations were, or could have been, best adapted to meet the changing conditions of combat and terrain, 6. Employment of Infantry Weapons, 7. Artillery Support, 8. Passage of Obstacles, 9. Passage of Lines, 10. Destruction of Opposition, 11. Fighting in Intermediate Zone, 12. Organization of Ground, 13. Liaison, 14. General Observations.

Canadian Military Institute: Officers of the British Forces in Canada during the War of 1812-1815

There is a note in the front cover written to Mary from B. Johnston on April 22, 1942. He refers to page 73 of the book in which William Woodruff is listed as a Lieutenant and Richard Woodruff is listed as an Ensign in the Niagara District. A full text version is available at the following link: http://www.archive.org/details/officersbritish00instgoog

British War Medal

This British War Medal was issued to those who had to leave their native shore in any part of the British Empire while they were on service. This is a silver circular medal, 3 1/2 cm in diameter. King George V is depicted on the front and St. George is on the back. This is accompanied by a watered silk ribbon which has a central band of gold and stripes of white, black and blue on both sides. "Lieut S. D. Woodruff" is engraved on the rim. This was issued 1914-1918.

Does just war theory need to get with the times?

La théorie de la guerre juste a fournit les principes qui forment la base de nos intuitions concernant l’éthique de la guerre pendant plus de milles ans. Cependant, la nature de la guerre a changé drastiquement dans les derniers 50 ans. Avec les avancés technologiques, tous les aspects de la guerre, du champ de bataille aux armes utilisées, sont aujourd’hui très différents. Ce qui est proposé dans ce texte est que les principes de jus in bello sont malgré tout encore adéquats pour les guerres contemporaines. Spécifiquement, en utilisant une analyse historique, ce texte argumentera contre la condition de l’urgence suprême de Michael Walzer pour proposer une approche qui laisse les principes de bases du jus in bello intactes. Ce texte suggère que les théoriciens de la guerre juste se penchent sur la question des armes prohibées pour avoir un impacte positif dans le domaine de l’éthique de la guerre.

The great asymmetry : America's closest allies in times of war

This dissertation focuses on military cooperation between the United States and its special allies. It argues that alliance expectations determine the level of military cooperation, while two intervening variables - the level of government cohesion and military capabilities - determine its implementation. This study also shows how secondary states deploy strategies to overcome power asymmetries through bilateral concessions, international organizations and by appealing to principle. The focus of the research is on special allies, as they have the most to gain or lose by going along with American plans. My contention is that secondary allies can rarely influence the dominant ally decisively, but they can act autonomously and resist to pressures exerted by the stronger alliance partner. The argument builds on three central claims. First, power asymmetries between allies translate into different assessments of international threats. Second, when disagreements over threats arise, the outcome of intra-alliance bargaining is not necessarily dictated by the preferences of the stronger power. Third, secondary states, as opposed to the dominant partner, face unique constraints when facing major foreign policy decisions, i.e. they face a trade-off between establishing a credible reputation as an alliance partner in a politically feasible way while minimizing domestic audience costs. To examine the theoretical puzzle presented by asymmetric military cooperation, I introduce a causal explanation that builds on neoclassical realism, to zone in on the interaction between systemic and domestic variables. My research makes a contribution to alliance theory and foreign policy decision-making by studying how special allies respond to American decisions in times of threat and how systemic constraints are channeled through state-level variables. To investigate the causal link between threat perception, alliance expectations and domestic constraints, this study relies on the method of structured focused comparison with three detailed case studies. The focus is on the initial decision made by special allies regarding whether or not to participle in joint mobilization with the United States. The decision-making process is presented from the perspective of secondary allied states and measures the explanatory factors that motivated the decision on military cooperation. The case studies are the UK, Canada and Australia’s response to the war in Afghanistan and the war in Iraq during the period of 2001 to 2003.