Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Endogenous cycles in a Stiglitz-Weiss economy

The literature on financiaI imperfections and business cycles has focused on propagation mechanisms. In this pape r we model apure reversion mechanism, such that the economy may converge to a two period equilibrium cycle. This mechanism confirms that financiaI imperfections may have a dramatic amplification effect. Unlike in some related models, contracts are complete. Indexation is not assumed away. The welfare properties of a possible stabilizing policy are analyzed. The model i tself is a dynamic extension of the well-known Stigli tz-Weiss model of lending under moral hazard. Although stylized the model still captures some important features of credit cycles.

Extreme observations and diversification in Latin American emerging equity markets

In this paper, we focus on the tails of the unconditional distribution of Latin American emerging markets stock returns. We explore their implications for portfolio diversification according to the safety tirst principIe, tirst proposed by Roy (1952). We tind that the Latin American emerging markets have signiticantly fatter tails than industrial markets. especially, the lower tail of the distrihution. We consider the implication of the safety tirst principIe for a U .S. investor who creates a diversitied portfolio using Latin American stock markets. We tind that a U.S. investor gains by adding Latin American equity markets to her purely domestic portfolio. For different parameter specitications. we finu a more realistic asset allocation than the one suggested by the Iiterature haseu on the traditional mean-variance framework.

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

Stabilization, volatility and the equilibrium real exchange rate

In a general equilibrium model. we show that the value of the equilibrium real exchange rate is affected by its own volatility. Risk averse exporters. that make their exporting decision before observing the realization of the real exchange rate. choose to export less the more volatile is the real exchange rate. Therefore the trude balance and the variance of the real exchange rate are negatively related. An increase in the volatility of the real exchange rate for instance deteriorates the trade balance and to restore equilibrium a real exchange rate depreciation has to take place. In the empirical part of the paper we use the traditional (unconditional) standard deviation of RER changes as our measure of RER volatility.We describe the behavior of the RER volatility for Brazil,Argentina and Mexico.Monthly data for the three countries are used. and also daily data for Bruzil. Interesting patterns of volatility could be associated to the nature of the several stabilization plans adopted in those countries and to changes in the exchange rate regimes .

Effects of trade policy on technology adoption and investment

This paper studies the consequences of trade policy for the adoption of new technologies. It develops a dynamic international trade model with two sectors. Workers in manufacturing decide if new technologies are used, capital owners then choose investment. We analyze three different arrangements: free trade, tariffs, and quotas. In the model economy, free trade as well as tariffs guarantee that the most productive technology available will be used. In contrasL under a quota the most productive technology available will not be used at all times. Further, in the latter case investment and the capital stock are smaller than in the former one. Finally, there exists parameter values for which the computed difference in GDP is a factor of thirty.

Especulative (sic) attack on exchange rate target zone regime : the uncertainty case

We present a continuous time target zone model of speculative attacks. Contrary to most of the literature that considers the certainty case, i.e., agents know for sure the Central Bank behavior in the future, we build uncertainty into the madel in two different ways. First, we consider the case in whicb the leveI of reserves at which the central bank lets the regime collapse is uncertain. Alternatively, we ana1ize the case in which, with some probability, the government may cbange its policy reducing the initially positive trend in domestic credito In both cases, contrary to the case of a fixed exchange rate regime, speculators face a cost of launching a tentative attack that may not succeed. Such cost induces a delay and may even prevent its occurrence. At the time of the tentative attack, the exchange rate moves either discretely up, if the attack succeeds, or down, if it fails. The remlts are consistent with the fact that, typically, an attack involves substantial profits and losses for the speculators. In particular, if agents believed that the government will control fiscal imbalances in the future, or alternatively, if they believe the trend in domestic credit to be temporary, the attack is postponed even in the presence of a signal of an imminent collapse. Finally, we aIso show that the timing of a speculative attack increases with the width of the target zone.