Ciclos económicos en economías abiertas y menos desarrolladas: el papel de los "shocks" en los términos de intercambio.The business cycle in open and less developed economies: the rol of terms-of-trade shocks.

Nuestra preocupación reside en estudiar empíricamente el mecanismo de transmisión internacional de ciclos económicos a economías pequeñas y menos desarrolladas (LDC), evaluando el impacto de los shocks en los términos de intercambio en países dónde existen imperfecciones en el mercado crediticio que imponen severas restricciones en el financiamiento de la inversión doméstica y al crecimiento económico. Primero, analizamos si la cuenta corriente responde de manera asimétrica a movimientos de largo plazo en los términos de intercambio. La hipótesis es que “en los buenos tiempos” cuando se produce una mejora permanente en términos de intercambio (y con ello el nivel de ingreso) los individuos no elevan su consumo en un monto acorde con la mejora de su ingreso (permanente) sino que ahorran una fracción del aumento en su dotación para hacer frente a una reversión en la mejora en los términos de intercambios (aunque ésta sea transitoria) en el futuro. En consecuencia, la cuenta corriente (diferencia entre ingreso y absorción) responde de manera positiva a un shock permanente en los términos de intercambio, ya que el individuo ahorra de manera cautelosa –debido a que sabe que no le prestarán para suavizar consumo - aún suponiendo que en el futuro tendrá una reversión transitoria de su ingreso. Segundo, estudiamos la relación dinámica entre los términos de intercambio y la tasa de interés en la economía pequeña abierta y con imperfecciones en el mercado crediticio (información asimétrica). La hipótesis es que la economía doméstica tiene que soportar una prima de riesgo que eleva el costo de la inversión y retarda el crecimiento (Gertler y Rogoff; 1990). Esta prima de riesgo depende, además, en forma negativa del nivel del colateral que tenga la economía. El colateral es la dotación de recursos naturales, por ejemplo, que la economía posee a los fines garantizar el cumplimiento de las obligaciones contraídas (en el modelo presentado las actividades dónde se invierten son independientes del colateral). La hipótesis establecida indica que los cambios en los términos de intercambio generan un aumento del colateral de la economía y una reducción del riesgo país: aumentos en los términos de intercambio reducen la prima de riesgo de la economía que opera en mercados de capitales con asimetrías de información, y como consecuencia aumentarían los ingresos de capitales. De esta forma, se estaría encontrando una explicación a la denominada “Paradoja de Lucas”. Finalmente, el proyecto estudia la conexión entre dos variables “clave” en la economía de los países emergentes: la relación entre los términos de intercambio y el tipo de cambio real. Argumentamos que los efectos de las mejoras de los términos de intercambio sobre los flujos de capitales externos tienden a ser sobreestimadas si no se consideran los efectos “secundarios” de éstas sobre el tipo de cambio real de la economía pequeña menos desarrollada. En este proyecto se controlan estadísticamente esta relación. La estrategia empírica elegida resulta en aplicar a un panel (constituido por dieciocho países de Latinoamérica) el método generalizado de momentos (GMM) a dos modelos de regresión estadística a los fines de abordar de manera eficiente el problema de la endogeneidad de la variable dependiente que actúa como regresor rezagado. La estrategia de estimación elegida enfatiza el análisis de la relación dinámica de las variables económicas incluidas en el análisis. The paper analyzes the general problem related to the transmission of economic cycles to Small Open Economies. The analysis focuses on terms-of-trade shocks, which are considered one of the major sources of income volatility in developing economies. Specifically, we tackle the problem related to the impact of terms-of-trade shocks in Less Developed SOEs. ‘Less Developed SOEs’ are understood as those countries who have borrowing constraints. First, we put to a test the hypothesis of asymmetric response of current account to terms-of-trade shocks (the impact of the shock on current account differs depending whether it is positive or negative), which originates from considering binding restrictions in international capital markets (Agénor and Aizenman; 2004). Second, we investigate about the main determinants of External Capital Flows (ECF) directed to Developing Countries. We put to a test the Gertler and Rogoff (1990) hypothesis that a “risky rate” arises in that markets because the economy has not sufficient amount of wealth to “collateralize” the capital she needs to borrow to take advantage of the investment opportunities she has and additionally because the lender does not have the chance of observing what the borrowed does with the funds (that is information asymmetry arises because the lender can check the realized output of investment but he can not observe if he really invest in the project or secretly lend abroad). Finally, Following Prasad, E. S., Rajan and R. Subramanian, A (2007) we measure the relationship between external capital flows and domestic currency overvaluation. We run a panel GMM estimation for a set of 18 Latin American Countries during the period 1973-2008.

Issues of information support for the process of scientific enterprise's management in the universities and research organizations

This article describes the problem of commercializing of scientific researches in universities. Management tasks are reduced to subtasks and combined formal algorithm. The overall control problem is reduced to a set of formal subtasks combined into a single algorithm. Here the necessity of joint control of all commercialization projects as well as the use of information systems for the successful implementation of the existing commercialpotential is shown.

Old Akkadian inscriptions in Chicago Natural History Museum; texts of legal and business interest / Ignace J. Gelb, Professor of Assyriology, The Oriential Institute, The University of Chicago.

v.44:no.2(1955)

Transactions of the Department of Agriculture of the State of Illinois with reports from county and district agricultural organizations for the year ...

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Observability and overcoming coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because its members fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. In previous research, we have shown that financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Here we examine the sensitivity of this result to the ability of people to observe others' choices. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by the employees of an experimental firm is a weak-link game. Treatments vary along two dimensions. First, subjects either start with low financial incentives for coordination, which typically leads to coordination failure, and then are switched to higher incentives or start with high incentives, which typically yield effective coordination, and are switched to low incentives. Second, as the key treatment variable, subjects either observe the effort levels chosen by all employees in their experimenta

A change would do you good . . . An experimental study on how to overcome coordination failure in organizations

Many organizations suffer poor performance because individuals within the organization fail to coordinate on efficient patterns of behavior. Using controlled laboratory experiments, we study how financial incentives can be used to find a way out of such performance traps. Our experiments are set in a corporate environment where subjects' payoffs depend on coordinating at high effort levels; the underlying game being played repeatedly by employees is a weak-link game. In an initial phase, the benefits of coordination are low relative to the cost of increased effort. Play in this initial phase typically converges to an inefficient outcome with employees failing to coordinate at high effort levels. The experimental design then explores the effects of varying the financial incentives to coordinate at a higher effort level. We find that an increase in the benefits of coordination leads to improved coordination, but, surprisingly, large increases have no more impact than small increases. Once subj

New business formation and employment growth: some evidence for the Spanish manufacturing industry

This paper explores the effects of new business formation on employment growth in Spanish manufacturing industries. New firms are believed to make an important contribution to economic growth but the extent of this contribution is unclear. We consider time lags of new firm formation as explanatory variables of employment change and identify how long the effect of new firm entries on employment lasts. Our main results show that the effects of new business formation are positive in the short term, negative in the medium term and positive in the long term, thus confirming the existence of indirect supply-side effects found in similar studies for other countries. Key words: regional growth, firm entry, time lags and Spanish economy. JEL classifications: L00, L60, R11, R12

What works best for getting the unemployed back to work: employment services or small-business assistance programs? evidence from Romania

Recent empirical evidence has found that employment services and small-business assistance programmes are often successful at getting the unemployed back to work. Â One important concern of policy makers is to decide which of these two programmes is more effective and for whom. Â Using unusually rich (for transition economies) survey data and matching methods, I evaluate the relative effectiveness of these two programmes in Romania. Â While I find that employment services (ES) are, on average, more successful than a small-business assistance programme (SBA), estimation of heterogeneity effects reveals that, compared to non-participation, ES are effective for workers with little access to informal search channels, and SBA works for less-qualified workers and those living in rural areas. Â When comparing ES to SBA, I find that ES tend to be more efficient than SBA for workers without a high-school degree, and that the opposite holds for the more educated workers.

Business plan: Ibéricosandwich

El present estudi és el desenvolupament d’un pla de viabilitat per saber si una idea de negoci pot ésser rendible. Consisteix en una anàlisi sobre els diferents factors que componen un pla de negoci. Així com el pla de màrqueting, el pla d’operacions, el pla d’organització i el pla econòmic financer. L’empresa anomenada Ibericosandwich es dedicarà a produir i distribuir sandvitxos envasats, en el mercat espanyol. Amb el pla de negoci s’ha analitzat el mercat i les oportunitats, i s’ha pogut observar que hi ha un segment de mercat que està sense explotar, que consisteix a oferir-hi una gamma alta de sandvitxos. És un projecte que inclou una anàlisi econòmica financera, amb l’objectiu de reduir el risc i poder obtenir la màxima rendibilitat amb aquesta oportunitat que se’ns presenta.

Business-science research collaboration under moral hazard

I analyze, in the context of business and science research collaboration, how the characteristics of partnership agreements are the result of an optimal contract between partners. The final outcome depends on the structure governing the partnership, and on the informational problems towards the efforts involved. The positive effect that the effort of each party has on the success of the other party, makes collaboration a preferred solution. Divergence in research goals may, however, create conflicts between partners. This paper shows how two different structures of partnership governance (a centralized, and a decentralized ones) may optimally use the type of project to motivate the supply of non-contractible efforts. Decentralized structure, however, always choose a project closer to its own preferences. Incentives may also come from monetary transfers, either from partners sharing each other benefits, or from public funds. I derive conditions under which public interventio

Understanding sources of the change in international business cycles

Macroeconomic activity has become less volatile over the past three decades in most G7 economies. Current literature focuses on the characterization of the volatility reduction and explanations for this so called "moderation" in each G7 economy separately. In opposed to individual country analysis and individual variable analysis, this paper focuses on common characteristics of the reduction and common explanations for the moderation in G7 countries. In particular, we study three explanations: structural changes in the economy, changes in common international shocks and changes in domestic shocks. We study these explanations in a unified model structure. To this end, we propose a Bayesian factor structural vector autoregressive model. Using the proposed model, we investigate whether we can find common explanations for all G7 economies when information is pooled from multiple domestic and international sources. Our empirical analysis suggests that volatility reductions can largely be attributed to the decline in the magnitudes of the shocks in most G7 countries while only for the U.K., the U.S. and Italy they can partially be attributed to structural changes in the economy. Analyzing the components of the volatility, we also find that domestic shocks rather than common international shocks can account for a large part of the volatility reduction in most of the G7 countries. Finally, we find that after mid-1980s the structure of the economy changes substantially in five of the G7 countries: Germany, Italy, Japan, the U.K. and the U.S..

Business Cycle Regimes in CEECs Production: A Threshold SURE Approach

We use a threshold seemingly unrelated regressions specification to assess whether the Central and East European countries (CEECs) are synchronized in their business cycles to the Euro-area. This specification is useful in two ways: First, it takes into account the common institutional factors and the similarities across CEECs in their process of economic transition. Second, it captures business cycle asymmetries by allowing for the presence of two distinct regimes for the CEECs. As the CEECs are strongly affected by the Euro-area these regimes may be associated with Euro-area expansions and contractions. We discuss representation, estimation by maximum likelihood and inference. The methodology is illustrated by using monthly industrial production in 8 CEECs. The results show that apart from Lithuania the rest of the CEECs experience “normal” growth when the Euro-area contracts and “high” growth when the Euro-area expands. Given that the CEECs are “catching up” with the Euro-area this result shows that most CEECs seem synchronized to the Euro-area cycle. Keywords: Threshold SURE; asymmetry; business cycles; CEECs. JEL classification: C33; C50; E32.

Raising the Level of Moral Thinking among Managers Will Not Help. Kohlberg's Conventionality and Systemic Ethical Flaws in Business

Business ethicists often assume that unethical behavior arises when individuals deviate from the norms and responsibilities that are institutionalized to frame economic activities. People's greed motivates them to violate the rules of the game. In Kohlberg's terms, it is assumed that such actors make decisions in a preconventional way and act opportunistically. In this article, we propose an alternative interpretation of deviant behavior, arguing that such behavior does not result from a lack of conventional moral guidance but rather from the fact that characteristics attributed to preconventional morality by Kohlberg - the purely incentive and punishment driven opportunistic morality - have become the conventionalized morality. The prevailing norms that economic actors have internalized as their yardstick are those of the preconventional Homo economicus. Not the deviation from, but the compliance with the rules of the game explains many forms of harmful and illegal decisions made in corporations.