Obama 2: future implications for EU-US relations. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 12, No. 8, November 2012

Introduction. The week following his reelection, President Obama traveled to Asia – Thailand, Myanmar, and Cambodia –, while facing at home a fiscal cliff, the need to select the next Secretaries of State, Defense, and Treasury, and the resignation of one of America’s most senior and respected generals and Director of the CIA, David Petraeus; all this at the moment wherein the Middle East is burning in flames due to another round of violence between Israel and Hamas. On the other side of the pond, the EU is currently trying to solve or at least contain several crises: the Eurozone, agreeing on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014-2020, or MFF 2014-2020,2 and saving France.3 For both giants, the American and European priorities are domestic; they both need to do some ‘nation-building at home.’4 The threat of the fiscal cliff in the US and the one of the Eurocrisis in Europe are too important to be ignored and so visceral that they will affect the way both actors behave internationally and interact with one another. The big question since Obama’s reelection has been what will the EU-US relations look like under his second mandate? And will there be any differences from the first one?5 This paper argues that the US-EU relations will remain quite similar as it was under the first Obama presidency. Nevertheless, with the current shift to Asia, the ‘pivot,’ the EU will be required to increase its contributions to global politics and international security. This paper is structured in three parts. First, the economic and political climax of the EU and the US will be presented. In a second a part, the EU and US strategies and foreign policies will be laid out. Last but not least, several core issues facing the Euro-Atlantic community, such as the Asia pivot, Iran, climate change, and the economy will be addressed. Other issues such as Syria, Afghanistan, and the Middle East and North Africa will not be addressed in this paper.6

Syria and the red lines of international law. CEPS Commentary, 4 September 2013

As the US and its allies France and Turkey dither over whether or not to punish Assad for having used sarin gas to kill his own people, the crucial question is: What response might the outside world legally take without the authority of the UN Security Council, which remains blocked by two veto-wielding members, Russia and China? Sadly, international law provides no clear-cut answers to this dilemma. To respond to what US Secretary of State John Kerry has rightly called a “moral obscenity”, this commentary explores ways in which formal interpretations of international law might give way to a more pragmatic approach to punish the Assad regime for its use of chemical weapons.

The EU and Syria – Time to Play behind Closed Doors. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Special Issue, September 13, 2013

From the Introduction. Since the – presumed – utilization of chemical weapons against civilians by the Assad regime late August, the members of the Euro-Atlantic community have been building the case for a military intervention, a punishing mission against Bashar al-Assad. Despite evidences that sarin gas was used, the UK and Germany seem to be out of the race – for a similar reason: domestic politics –, leaving the US and France in the starting blocks. French President Hollande has expressed his commitment to go to war. The world is now on hold waiting for the US as President Obama, after asking US Congress to postpone a vote on a military intervention, is working on a possible diplomatic solution with Russian President Putin. Since Kerry’s comments in London earlier this week, Russian President Putin has been seeking for a diplomatic solution that would put all Syrian chemical arsenals under international supervision.

Egypt and the EU: where next? CEPS Commentary, 4 November 2013

EU diplomats are still struggling to keep abreast of events in Egypt. A reconstruction of the police state – bankrolled by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE – is the exact opposite of what the EU tried to achieve under the Presidency of Mohamed Morsi, namely long-term stability based on respect for democracy and the rule of law. It is therefore perhaps surprising that the EU has so far not imposed any sanctions against members of the military regime led by General al-Sisi. Instead, it is trying to build an inclusive political dialogue to restore a democratic process. Is this what the EU should do? The answer is, quite plainly, ‘Yes’– at least for the moment.

Policy Lessons for Macroeconomic and Financial Crisis Management in the Southern and Eastern Mediterranean. CEPS Policy Brief No. 308, 13 December 2013

This Policy Brief attempts to draw lessons from the combination of the global financial crisis and the Arab uprisings focusing on the domains related to fiscal, monetary and financial policies. It does so by answering the following questions: What has been the impact of the crisis and the uprisings on the fiscal, monetary and financial policies of the SEMCs? What have been the crisis management actions? And what policy lessons can be drawn for crisis management in the future? And how can the EU contribute to this within the Euro-Med Partnership?

Regionale Integration in der arabischen Welt – eine neofunktionalistische Analyse = Regional integration in the Arab world - a neofunctional analysis. ZEI Discussion Paper C222, 2014

No abstract.

Shaping the emerging consensus on Syria. CEPS Commentaries, 26 February 2014

Notwithstanding the failure on February 15th of the second round of the Geneva II talks on Syria, Luigi Scazzieri and Steven Blockmans take note in this CEPS commentary of several welcome signs that the international community as a whole is starting to move in a more coordinated manner on the Syrian peace process.

Next steps toward a final deal with Iran. CEPS Policy Brief No. 316, 14 February 2014

On January 20th, the International Atomic Energy Agency confirmed that Iran had been implementing its commitments as part of the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) agreed with the so-called ‘E3+3’ in Geneva (also known as P5+1) on 24 November 2013. The forging of this interim deal, the successful start to its implementation and the temporary sanctions relief represent resounding success for international diplomacy but they should not be allowed to conceal the underlying issues. Reaching agreement on the JPA was achieved at the cost of clarity over what is to follow and it was decided to eschew a structured agreement in favour of a two-step process. The stated aim of the negotiating parties remains that of starting the implementation of a comprehensive solution by November 2014. If agreement is not reached on a comprehensive solution by the expiry of the JPA by July 20th, the action plan can be renewed by mutual consent. The latter might well be the likeliest outcome of the forthcoming negotiations. Apart from the large gap between the E3+3 and Iranian positions on the substance of a final deal, several domestic policy constraints will likely define the parameters of what is achievable in the future. This CEPS Policy Brief argues that the best hope for success lies in continued engagement and consistent incremental progress in the negotiations, with structured concessions on both sides. This should occur, however, not in a two- but a three-step framework based on lengthening Iran’s ‘breakout’ period while re-engaging with the country both politically and economically. The EU is in a unique position to lead this process. Having greater flexibility than either the US or Iran, its main tasks will be that of maintaining the negotiating momentum and broadening dialogue with Iran.

Why the EU must reengage with Turkey. EPC Commentary, 29 September 2014

Democratic values and basic rights in Turkey are hanging by a thread. Over the past eighteen months the rule of law, civil liberties and freedoms have been eroded which has left many Turks anxious over the direction in which their country is heading. With Turkey’s accession negotiations de facto frozen, the EU finds itself with little leverage over Ankara. Calls of concern have fallen on deaf ears as Turkey’s leadership has become increasingly belligerent, with its EU related narrative overflowing with resentment. Because Turkey’s accession negotiations are irreversibly intertwined with Turkey-EU cooperation in other areas, this has had a negative impact on the broader relationship between both sides. Recent examples include the issue of foreign fighters traveling from Europe to Syria via Turkey. Each side has accused the other of not doing enough to stem the flow. Likewise, following the decision of Russian President, Vladimir Putin, to ban the import of agricultural goods from countries that have placed sanctions on Moscow, the EU asked Turkey to demonstrate solidarity, as a “candidate country”, and not to increase exports of agricultural products to Russia. Turkey rejected this request and is reportedly working on strengthening trade ties with Moscow. Turkey remains an important partner in a number of key areas including trade, energy, foreign and security policy and migration. At a time when the EU faces crises in both its Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, a reliable and predictable Turkey, with which it can cooperate in the Black Sea and Middle East neighbourhoods is crucial. Hence the vision and plans of the EU’s new leadership, in particular new Foreign Policy Chief, Federica Mogherini, and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, how to shape relations with Ankara is particularly significant. The Union’s current policy is counterproductive and is further eroding trust and cooperation rather than enhancing it. It needs to be turned around.

The 2011 Constitutional reform in Morocco: more flaws than merits. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 07/2014

Introduction. In the speech given to both Houses of Parliament on 11 October 2013 during the first parliamentary session, King Mohammed VI said that the “Moroccan democratic model” was “a precursor in the region as well as on the continental level.”1 Similarly, with the purpose of stressing the “democratic exceptionalism”2 of the country, the new government, led by Abdeilah Benkirane, emphasised that Morocco represents a “third way” compared to countries such as Tunisia, Libya or Egypt since it “…has not embarked on a limited process of reform from the top, driven and controlled by the King. Nor has it experienced a revolution brought a angry citizens rising up against the regime. Rather, it has chosen an alternate path based on a genuine partnership between the King and the PJD (Parti de la justice et du développement) that promises to bring about more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took more far-reaching reform than palace alone would grant, without the disruption caused by uncontrolled popular upheaval.”4 It should not be at all surprising that the regime and the new Government consider Morocco a “democratic model” or a “third way.” After all, they are refe country. What is harder to understand is that when discussing the Arab uprisings, even prominent Western political leaders, representatives of the European Union institutions and the mainstream media (when they do not forget about Morocc to praise the process of democratic reform carried out by Mohammed VI. For example, on 12 September 2012, Hillary Clinton, former US Secretary of State, said, “in many ways, the United States looks to Morocco to be a leader and a model […] On political reform, we have all seen remarkable changes taking place across North Africa and the Middle East. I commend Morocco and your government for your efforts to stay ahead of these changes by holding free and fair elections, empowering the elected parliament, taking other steps to ensure that the government reflects the will of the people.”5 Similarly, former French President Nicolas Sarkozy sang the praises of the process that led to the adoption of the new 2011 Constitution: “King Mohammed VI has shown the path towards a profound, peaceful and modern transformation of Moroccan institutions and society […] France fully supports this exemplary process.” Interestingly enough, even at the European Union level the constitutional reform that took place in Morocco was considered an extremely positive step taken by the country, as well as a means to strengthen the cooperation between the EU and Morocco. Indeed, according to the High Representative Catherine Ashton, this reform “constitute[s] a significant response to the legitimate aspirations of the Moroccan people and [is] consistent with Morocco’s Advanced Status with the EU.”7 When it comes to the media, it is worth noting that following the ratification of the 2011 Constitution, The New York Times headlined: “All Hail the (Democratic) King.” Even sections of the academic literature have commended the constitutional reform carried out by the Moroccan Sovereign.9 In this paper I argue against the aforementioned idea, according to which Morocco should be considered a model in the region, and in particular I show that the constitution-making process, the 2011 Constitution and its subsequent implementation have more flaws than merits. Accordingly, this paper proceeds in five steps. First of all, I examine the reaction of the regime to the upheavals that broke out in the country after 20 February 2011. Secondly, I analyse the process of constitution showing its main strengths and weaknesses, and comparing it with other constituent processes that took place in the region following the Arab uprisings. In the third section, I highlight the most significant elements of continuity and discontinuity with the previous 1996 Constitution. The fourth section deals with the process of implementation: specifically process is proceeding quite slowly and that in some cases ordinary legislation is in contrast with the new Constitution and international human rights treaties. Moreover, I discuss the role that the judiciary and the Constitutional Court can play in the implementation and interpretation of the Constitution. Finally, I draw some concluding remarks.

State-building in Iraq since 2003: the Challenges and Lessons. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 12/2014

Introduction. In 2003, Iraq was invaded by the US coalition forces that ousted Saddam Hussein’s regime from power before occupying the whole country. The intension, declared by the then American George W. Bush, was to ‘build a decent and democratic society at the centre of the Middle East’ that ‘will become a place of progress and peace.’1 In 2014, three years after the withdrawal of the last American soldier, however, it is difficult to overestimate or exaggerate what is at stake. National unity and territorial integrity have never been so seriously threatened since the country is experiencing the internal fighting in its modern history. Many parts of Iraq, including the northern oil city of Kirkuk, long claimed as an integral part of the semi-autonomous region of Kurdistan, are out of the control of the central government. Large areas in the north including the strategic city of Mosul were seized by the fighters of the Islamic State, an Al-Qaeda offshoot, formerly known as ISIS, who threatened to invade the Kurdistan region before being attacked by airstrikes by the US. They proclaimed a caliphate on both sides of the border with Syria, where they also control vast territory.

Diplomatic Spin: EU3+3 talks on Iran’s nuclear file. CEPS Commentary, 21 November 2014

The Joint Plan of Action agreed upon with Iran on 24 November 2013 gave negotiators one year to forge a comprehensive agreement that restricts the country’s ability to militarise its nuclear programme. That deadline will lapse in the next few days and diplomats involved in the talks have been trying to rein in expectations that a deal will be struck on time. Satisfying domestic constituencies in Iran and the US is what makes the politics of dealing with the nuclear file so much harder than the physics of slowing down the nuclear programme. Any future deal will have to stand on its own merits, enabling Iran and the EU3+3 to cooperate on the other geopolitical challenges they face. Both parties should therefore balance their demands with what they can realistically offer and make concessions to reach a compromise. The author of this CEPS Commentary argues that if no deal is reached on November 24th, then diplomacy should be allowed to keep on spinning for a few more months.

Helpless and lonely: Turkey's attitude towards the war in Syria. OSW Commentary No. 136, 09.05.2014

The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.

Tourism in the Mediterranean: Scenarios up to 2030. MEDPRO Report No. 1/July 2011- (updated May 2013)

From 1990 to 2010, the 11 countries of the south-eastern Mediterranean region (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey, hereafter SMCs) recorded the highest growth rates in inbound world tourism. In the same period, domestic tourism in these countries also increased rapidly, which is astonishing given the security risks, natural disasters, oil prices rises and economic uncertainties in the region. Even the 2008 financial crisis had no severe impact on this growth, confirming the resilience of tourism and the huge potential of the SMCs in this sector. The Arab Spring brought this trend to an abrupt halt in early 2011, but it may resume after 2014 with the gradual democratisation process, despite the economic slowdown of the European Union – its main market. This paper looks at whether this trend will continue up to 2030, and provides four different possible scenarios for the development of the tourism sector in SMCs for 2030: i) reference scenario, ii) common (cooperation) sustainable development scenario, iii) polarised (regional) development scenario and iv) failed development – decline and conflict – scenario. In all cases, international and domestic tourist arrivals will increase. However, three main factors will strongly influence the development of the tourism sector in the SMCs: security, competitiveness linked to the efficient use of ICT, and adjustment to climate change.

Turkey: has the AKP ended its winning streak? OSW Commentary No. 117, 2013-10-07

Since the conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP) took power in Turkey in 2002, it has enjoyed a constant winning streak: it won each election (with a support level of 49.83% in 2011), subordinated the army (which had de facto stood above the civilian government) and was reforming the country. The situation in the country was stable (especially when compared to the crises and restlessness in the 1990s), the economy was booming, Turkey’s position in regional politics was strengthening, and Ankara’s significance on the international arena was growing. This encouraged the ruling class to make long-term plans, leading up to the hundredth anniversary of the republic in 2023. In the coming decade, Turkey governed by the AKP was to become one of the global economic and political centres, a full member of the EU and at the same time a political and economic leader in the Middle East. However, the negative trends in the situation both domestically (mass public protests, the deadlocked Kurdish issue and the unsuccessful attempt to amend the constitution) and abroad (the war in Syria and the coup in Egypt) seen over the past few months have laid bare the limitations of the AKP’s rule and have affected the government’s democratic mandate, prestige and credibility on the international arena, as well as peace and order and domestic security. When compared to the beginning of 2013, the way the situation will develop in Turkey is at this moment definitely less predictable; and the possible scenarios include both relative peace (however, with socio-political tension present in the background) and the threat of destabilisation. Therefore, although the AKP will still remain the sole major political force, this party will have to face challenges which will decide not only its political future but also the directions the country will be developing in. However, a comprehensive solution of the accumulated problems and a simple return to the status quo ante, convenient to the government, seem unlikely in the foreseeable future.