Endogenous Transaction Costs

The paper proposes an alternative general equilibrium formulation of financial asset economies with transactions costs. Transaction costs emerge endogenously at equilibrium and reflect agents decisions of intermediating financial activities at the expense of providing labor services. An equilibrium is shown to exist in the case of real asset structures.

Endogenous protection in Mercosul: an empirical analysis

This paper analyses the equilibrium structure of protection in Mercosul, developing empirical analyses based on the literature ensuing from the sequence of models set forth by Grossman and Helpman since 1994. Not only Mercosul’s common external tariff (CET) may be explained under a political economy perspective, but the existence of deviations, both at the level of the external tariffs and at that of the internal ones, make it interesting to contrast several structures under this approach. Different general equilibrium frameworks, in which governments are concerned with campaign contributions and with the welfare of the average voter, while organized special-interest groups care only about the welfare of their members, are used as the theoretical basis of the empirical tests. We build a single equation for explaining the CET and two fourequations systems (one equation for each member) for explaining deviations from the CET and from the internal free trade between members. The results (at the two-digit level) shed an interesting light on the sectoral dynamics of protection in each country; notably, Brazil seems to fit in better in the model framework, followed by Uruguay. In the case of the CET, and of deviations from it, the interaction between the domestic lobbies in the four countries plays a major role. There is also suggestion that the lobby structure that bid for deviations, be they internal or external, differs from the one which bid for the CET.

Endogenous collateral: arbitrage and equilibrium without bounded short sales

We study the implications of the absence of arbitrage in an two period economy where default is allowed and assets are secured by collateral choosen by the borrowers. We show that non arbitrage sale prices of assets are submartingales, whereas non arbitrage purchase prices of the derivatives (secured by the pool of collaterals) are supermartingales. We use these non arbitrage conditions to establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents. Our results are particularly relevant for the collateralized mortgage obligations(CMO) markets.

Endogenous transactions costs in multi-seller model

vVe examine the problem of a buyer who wishes to purehase and eombine ti. objeets owned by n individual owners to realize a higher V'illue. The owners are able to delay their entry into the sale proeess: They ean either seU now 01' seU later. Among other assumptions, the simple assumptions of compef'if'irnl, · .. that the presenee of more owners at point of sale reduees their surplus .. · and di..,(Jyun,fúl,g lead to interesting results: There is eostly delay in equilibdum. rvIoreover, with suffidently strong eompetition, the probability of delay inereases with n. Thus, buyers who diseount the future \\i11 faee inereased eosts as the number of owners inereases. The souree of transaetions eosts is the owners' desire to dis-eoordinate in the presenee of eompetition. These eosts are unrelated to transaetions eosts eurrently identified in the literature, spedfieally those due to asymmetrie information, 01' publie goods problems where players impose negative externalities on eaeh other by under-eontributing.

Endogenous wage compression and aggregation boundaries in a model of hierarchical human capital

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Endogenous debt constraints in collateralized economies with default penalties

In infinite horizon financial markets economies, competitive equilibria fail to exist if one does not impose restrictions on agents' trades that rule out Ponzi schemes. When there is limited commitment and collateral repossession is the unique default punishment, Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002) proved that Ponzi schemes are ruled out without imposing any exogenous/endogenous debt constraints on agents' trades. Recently Páscoa and Seghir (2009) have shown that this positive result is not robust to the presence of additional default punishments. They provide several examples showing that, in the absence of debt constraints, harsh default penalties may induce agents to run Ponzi schemes that jeopardize equilibrium existence. The objective of this paper is to close a theoretical gap in the literature by identifying endogenous borrowing constraints that rule out Ponzi schemes and ensure existence of equilibria in a model with limited commitment and (possible) default. We appropriately modify the definition of finitely effective debt constraints, introduced by Levine and Zame (1996) (see also Levine and Zame (2002)), to encompass models with limited commitment, default penalties and collateral. Along this line, we introduce in the setting of Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002), Kubler and Schmedders (2003) and Páscoa and Seghir (2009) the concept of actions with finite equivalent payoffs. We show that, independently of the level of default penalties, restricting plans to have finite equivalent payoffs rules out Ponzi schemes and guarantees the existence of an equilibrium that is compatible with the minimal ability to borrow and lend that we expect in our model. An interesting feature of our debt constraints is that they give rise to budget sets that coincide with the standard budget sets of economies having a collateral structure but no penalties (as defined in Araujo, Páscoa and Torres-Martínez (2002)). This illustrates the hidden relation between finitely effective debt constraints and collateral requirements.

Modelo estrutural de previsão de preço e volume negociado de minério de ferro

O presente estudo apresenta um modelo de previsão do preço e do volume comercializado no mercado transoceânico de minério de ferro. Para tanto, foi desenvolvido um modelo VAR, utilizando, além das variáveis endógenas com um lag de diferença, o preço do petróleo Brent e um índice de produção industrial. Após testar raiz unitária das variáveis e constatar que nenhuma era estacionária, o teste de cointegração atestou que existia relação de longo prazo entre as mesmas que era estacionária, afastando a possibilidade de uma regressão espúria. Como resultado, a modelagem VAR apresentou um modelo consistente, com elevada aderência para a previsão do preço e do volume negociado de minério de ferro no mercado transoceânico, não obstante ele tenha apresentado alguma imprecisão no curto prazo.

Exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty: recursive equilibrium and survival

This paper analyses general equilibrium models with finite heterogeneous agents having exogenous expectations on endogenous uncertainty. It is shown that there exists a recursive equilibrium with the state space consisting of the past aggregate portfolio distribution and the current state of the nature and that it implements the sequential equilibrium. We establish conditions under which the recursive equilibrium is continuous. Moreover, we use the continuous recursive relation of the aggregate variables to prove that if the economy has two types of agents, the one who commits persistent mistakes on the expectation rules of the future endogenous variables is driven out of the market by the others with correct anticipations of the variables, that is, the rational expectations agents.

Um modelo "time-varying markov-Switching" para crescimento econômico e algoritmo de estimação

Este trabalho elabora um modelo para investigação do padrão de variação do crescimento econômico, entre diferentes países e através do tempo, usando um framework Markov- Switching com matriz de transição variável. O modelo desenvolvido segue a abordagem de Pritchett (2003), explicando a dinâmica do crescimento a partir de uma coleção de diferentes estados – cada qual com seu sub-modelo e padrão de crescimento – através dos quais os países oscilam ao longo do tempo. A matriz de transição entre os diferentes estados é variante no tempo, dependendo de variáveis condicionantes de cada país e a dinâmica de cada estado é linear. Desenvolvemos um método de estimação generalizando o Algoritmo EM de Diebold et al. (1993) e estimamos um modelo-exemplo em painel com a matriz de transição condicionada na qualidade das instituições e no nível de investimento. Encontramos três estados de crescimento: crescimento estável, ‘milagroso’ e estagnação - virtualmente coincidentes com os três primeiros de Jerzmanowski (2006). Os resultados mostram que a qualidade das instituições é um importante determinante do crescimento de longo prazo enquanto o nível de investimento tem papel diferenciado: contribui positivamente em países com boa qualidade de instituições e tem papel pouco relevante para os países com instituições medianas ou piores.

A dynamic model of price competition with switching and search costs

Em modelos de competição de preços, somente um custo de procura positivo por parte do consumidor não gera equilíbrio com dispersão de preços. Já modelos dinâmicos de switching cost consistentemente geram este fenômeno bastante documentado para preços no varejo. Embora ambas as literaturas sejam vastas, poucos modelos tentaram combinar as duas fricções em um só modelo. Este trabalho apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição de preços em que consumidores idênticos enfrentam custos de procura e de switching. O equilíbrio gera dispersão nos preços. Ainda, como os consumidores são obrigados a se comprometer com uma amostra fixa de firmas antes dos preços serem definidos, somente dois preços serão considerados antes de cada compra. Este resultado independe do tamanho do custo de procura individual do consumidor.

A time-varying markov-switching model for economic growth

This paper investigates economic growth’s pattern of variation across and within countries using a Time-Varying Transition Matrix Markov-Switching Approach. The model developed follows the approach of Pritchett (2003) and explains the dynamics of growth based on a collection of different states, each of which has a sub-model and a growth pattern, by which countries oscillate over time. The transition matrix among the different states varies over time, depending on the conditioning variables of each country, with a linear dynamic for each state. We develop a generalization of the Diebold’s EM Algorithm and estimate an example model in a panel with a transition matrix conditioned on the quality of the institutions and the level of investment. We found three states of growth: stable growth, miraculous growth, and stagnation. The results show that the quality of the institutions is an important determinant of long-term growth, whereas the level of investment has varying roles in that it contributes positively in countries with high-quality institutions but is of little relevance in countries with medium- or poor-quality institutions.

A dynamic model of simultaneous price competition with switching and search costs

Esse artigo apresenta um modelo dinâmico de competição em precos que incorpora tanto custos de procura quanto custos de switching e onde que as decisões do consumidor e das firmas são simultâneas. Dadas as hipóteses feitas n ós veremos que este modelo possui equilí brio. As principais propriedades do equil íbrio deste modelo são: Se os custos de procura forem baixos o suficiente, em equilí brio o consumidor vai procurar todas as firmas no mercado enquanto que o aumento dos custos de procura vai reduzir a propor cão de firmas que o consumidor busca. Um resultado contraintuitivo e que os pre cos esperados pagos pelo consumidor normalmente decresce em nossas computa cões numéricas do equil íbrio quando os custos de procura aumentam. Enquanto que aumentar os custos de switching tamb ém vai produzir o resultado contraituitivo que as firmas unmatched vão diminuir suas ofertas de modo a atrair o consumidor.

Analysis of contagion from the constant conditional correlation model with Markov regime switching

Over the last decades, the analysis of the transmissions of international nancial events has become the subject of many academic studies focused on multivariate volatility models volatility. The goal of this study is to evaluate the nancial contagion between stock market returns. The econometric approach employed was originally presented by Pelletier (2006), named Regime Switching Dynamic Correlation (RSDC). This methodology involves the combination of Constant Conditional Correlation Model (CCC) proposed by Bollerslev (1990) with Markov Regime Switching Model suggested by Hamilton and Susmel (1994). A modi cation was made in the original RSDC model, the introduction of the GJR-GARCH model formulated in Glosten, Jagannathan e Runkle (1993), on the equation of the conditional univariate variances to allow asymmetric e ects in volatility be captured. The database was built with the series of daily closing stock market indices in the United States (SP500), United Kingdom (FTSE100), Brazil (IBOVESPA) and South Korea (KOSPI) for the period from 02/01/2003 to 09/20/2012. Throughout the work the methodology was compared with others most widespread in the literature, and the model RSDC with two regimes was de ned as the most appropriate for the selected sample. The set of results provide evidence for the existence of nancial contagion between markets of the four countries considering the de nition of nancial contagion from the World Bank called very restrictive. Such a conclusion should be evaluated carefully considering the wide diversity of de nitions of contagion in the literature.

Contagion and regulation in endogenous bank networks

We develop a simple model of endogenous bank networks to study financial contagion and how leverage regulation may affect it. Banks maximize expected profit by choosing the optimal allocation of resources between three different classes of assets. An interbank network arise as result of loans between banks, creating a direct channel of contagion in the financial system. Contagion may occur when the realized return of the risky asset is sufficiently low to make a bank insolvent, subsequently triggering a cascade effect that propagates through default in interbank loans. Contrary to what would be expected, our results show that despite forcing banks to deleverage, increasing minimum capital requirements may lead to a system with higher aggregate levels of default.