The link between foreign aid, public investment and economic growth

Länsimaat ovat rahoittaneet kehitysyhteistyöhankkeita jo lähes kuuden vuosikymmenen ajan, mutta kehitysavun tehokkuudesta ei olla edelleenkään päästy yksimielisyyteen. Yksi avunantajamaiden tapa vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen, eli avun vaikutukseen vastaanottajamaan taloudellisen kasvun kiihdyttäjänä, on sitoa ne julkisen sektorin infrastruktuurihankkeisiin. Joissain tapauksissa tämä vaikuttaa avun vastaanottajan käytökseen ja asenteisiin kehitysapua kohtaan. Tutkielmassa käsitellään kehitysavun tehokkuutta tilanteessa, jossa se on sidottu julkisen sektorin investointeihin kehitysmaassa. Tutkimus pohjaa Kalaitzidakisin ja Kalyvitisin (2008) malliin, jossa osa kehitysmaan julkisen talouden investoinneista rahoitetaan kehitysavulla. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (rent- seeking) vaikutusta kehitysavun tehokkuuteen pohjaten Economidesin, Kalyvitisin ja Philippopoulosin (2008) malliin. Tutkielmassa referoidaan lisäksi tutkimuskysymystä sivuavia empiirisiä tutkimuksia, esitellään aluksi tavallisimmat kehitysyhteistyön muodot, sekä esitellään talousteoreettisia näkökulmia kehitysyhteistyön tehokkuuden määrittelylle. Tutkielma perustuu puhtaasti teoreettisiin malleihin ja niissä sovelletut menetelmät ovat matemaattisia. Tutkielmassa käsitellään ensin tapaus, jossa kehitysyhteistyöllä rahoitetaan julkisen sektorin investointihankkeita. Jossain tapauksissa kehitysavun kasvu lasku siirtää vastaanottajamaan kulutusta julkisista investoinneista kulutukseen, jolloin kehitysyhteistyövaroin osittain rahoitettujen hankkeiden koko pienenee, ja suhteellinen tehokkuus laskee. Seuraavaksi tarkastellaan tilannetta, jossa kehitysyhteistyövaroista vain osa päätyy hankkeen rahoittamiseen, ja todetaan, että kehitysavun tehokkuus ja vaikutus maan kansantulon kasvuun vähenee talouden toimijoiden ylijäämää tavoittelevan käyttäytymisen (mukaan lukien korruptio) myötä entisestään. Tämän tutkimuksen perusteella voidaan todeta, että kehitysapu vaikuttaa kehittyvän maan talouden kasvuun tapauksessa, jossa julkisia infrastruktuurihankkeita rahoitetaan osittain maan omin verovaroin ja osittain kehitysyhteistyövaroin. Ylijäämää tavoitteleva käyttäytyminen vaikuttaa kehitysavun tehokkuuteen negatiivistesti vähentäen kehitysavun positiivisia kasvuvaikutuksia.

Stock Option Compensation in Finland: An Analysis of Economic Determinants, Contracting Frequency, and Design

This paper addresses several questions in the compensation literature by examining stock option compensation practices of Finnish firms. First, the results indicate that principal-agent theory succeeds quite well in predicting the use of stock options. Proxies for monitoring costs, growth opportunities, ownership structure, and risk are found to determine the use of incentives consistent with theory. Furthermore, the paper examines whether determinants of stock options targeted to top management differ from determinants of broad-based stock option plans. Some evidence is found that factors driving these two types of incentives differ. Second, the results reveal that systematic risk significantly increases the likelihood that firms adopt stock option plans, whereas total firm risk and unsystematic risk do not seem to affect this decision. Third, the results show that growth opportunities are related to time-dimensional contracting frequency, consistent with the argument that incentive levels deviate more rapidly from optimum in firms with high growth opportunities. Finally, the results suggest that vesting schedules are decreasing in financial leverage, and that contract maturity is decreasing in firm focus. In addition, both vesting schedules and contract maturity tend to be longer in firms involving state ownership.

Appropriate Institutions and Economic Growth - one size fits no-one

Modern-day economics is increasingly biased towards believing that institutions matter for growth, an argument that has been further enforced by the recent economic crisis. There is also a wide consensus on what these growth-promoting institutions should look like, and countries are periodically ranked depending on how their institutional structure compares with the best-practice institutions, mostly in place in the developing world. In this paper, it is argued that ”non-desirable” or “second-best” institutions can be beneficial for fostering investment and thus providing a starting point for sustained growth, and that what matters is the appropriateness of institutions to the economy’s distance to the frontier or current phase of development. Anecdotal evidence from Japan and South-Korea is used as a motivation for studying the subject and a model is presented to describe this phenomenon. In the model, the rigidity or non-rigidity of the institutions is described by entrepreneurial selection. It is assumed that entrepreneurs are the ones taking part in the imitation and innovation of technologies, and that decisions on whether or not their projects are refinanced comes from capitalists. The capitalists in turn have no entrepreneurial skills and act merely as financers of projects. The model has two periods, and two kinds of entrepreneurs: those with high skills and those with low skills. The society’s choice of whether an imitation or innovation – based strategy is chosen is modeled as the trade-off between refinancing a low-skill entrepreneur or investing in the selection of the entrepreneurs resulting in a larger fraction of high-skill entrepreneurs with the ability to innovate but less total investment. Finally, a real-world example from India is presented as an initial attempt to test the theory. The data from the example is not included in this paper. It is noted that the model may be lacking explanatory power due to difficulties in testing the predictions, but that this should not be seen as a reason to disregard the theory – the solution might lie in developing better tools, not better just better theories. The conclusion presented is that institutions do matter. There is no one-size-fits-all-solution when it comes to institutional arrangements in different countries, and developing countries should be given space to develop their own institutional structures that cater to their specific needs.

Nonlinear mixture autoregressive model: economic applications

The aim of this dissertation is to model economic variables by a mixture autoregressive (MAR) model. The MAR model is a generalization of linear autoregressive (AR) model. The MAR -model consists of K linear autoregressive components. At any given point of time one of these autoregressive components is randomly selected to generate a new observation for the time series. The mixture probability can be constant over time or a direct function of a some observable variable. Many economic time series contain properties which cannot be described by linear and stationary time series models. A nonlinear autoregressive model such as MAR model can a plausible alternative in the case of these time series. In this dissertation the MAR model is used to model stock market bubbles and a relationship between inflation and the interest rate. In the case of the inflation rate we arrived at the MAR model where inflation process is less mean reverting in the case of high inflation than in the case of normal inflation. The interest rate move one-for-one with expected inflation. We use the data from the Livingston survey as a proxy for inflation expectations. We have found that survey inflation expectations are not perfectly rational. According to our results information stickiness play an important role in the expectation formation. We also found that survey participants have a tendency to underestimate inflation. A MAR model has also used to model stock market bubbles and crashes. This model has two regimes: the bubble regime and the error correction regime. In the error correction regime price depends on a fundamental factor, the price-dividend ratio, and in the bubble regime, price is independent of fundamentals. In this model a stock market crash is usually caused by a regime switch from a bubble regime to an error-correction regime. According to our empirical results bubbles are related to a low inflation. Our model also imply that bubbles have influences investment return distribution in both short and long run.

Economic evaluation of forest policy programs.

XVIII IUFRO World Congress, Ljubljana 1986.

Influence of subcontracting on innovation and economic performance of SMEs in Indian automobile industry

Trans-national corporations (TNCs) expanding their production bases to developing countries having better conditions of manufacturing and domestic markets provide increasing opportunities for local small and medium enterprises (SMEs) to have subcontracting relationships with these TNCs Even though some theoretical and a few empirical studies throw light on the nature of assistance provided by TNCs to local SMEs through subcontracting relationships none of the studies so far quantitatively analysed the role of this assistance on the innovative performance of SMEs leading to better economic performance This paper probes the extent and diversity of assistance received by SMEs from a TNC through subcontracting and its influence on technological innovations and economic performance of SMEs in the Indian automobile industry Indian SMEs were able to receive mainly product related and purchase process assistance thereby implying that subcontracting is largely confined to purchase-supply relationships However assistance received through subcontracting is beneficial as It promoted technological innovations of SMEs the higher the degree of assistance the higher the level of innovations carried out by these SMEs which in turn facilitated their economic performance Thus this paper substantiates in the Indian context that subcontracting relationship with a TNC can be an important source of technological innovations and enhanced economic performance for SMEs (C) 2010 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved

Income inequality in the process of economic development : An empirical approach

This thesis studies the effect of income inequality on economic growth. This is done by analyzing panel data from several countries with both short and long time dimensions of the data. Two of the chapters study the direct effect of inequality on growth, and one chapter also looks at the possible indirect effect of inequality on growth by assessing the effect of inequality on savings. In Chapter two, the effect of inequality on growth is studied by using a panel of 70 countries and a new EHII2008 inequality measure. Chapter contributes on two problems that panel econometric studies on the economic effect of inequality have recently encountered: the comparability problem associated with the commonly used Deininger and Squire s Gini index, and the problem relating to the estimation of group-related elasticities in panel data. In this study, a simple way to 'bypass' vagueness related to the use of parametric methods to estimate group-related parameters is presented. The idea is to estimate the group-related elasticities implicitly using a set of group-related instrumental variables. The estimation results with new data and method indicate that the relationship between income inequality and growth is likely to be non-linear. Chapter three incorporates the EHII2.1 inequality measure and a panel with annual time series observations from 38 countries to test the existence of long-run equilibrium relation(s) between inequality and the level of GDP. Panel unit root tests indicate that both the logarithmic EHII2.1 inequality measure and the logarithmic GDP per capita series are I(1) nonstationary processes. They are also found to be cointegrated of order one, which implies that there is a long-run equilibrium relation between them. The long-run growth elasticity of inequality is found to be negative in the middle-income and rich economies, but the results for poor economies are inconclusive. In the fourth Chapter, macroeconomic data on nine developed economies spanning across four decades starting from the year 1960 is used to study the effect of the changes in the top income share to national and private savings. The income share of the top 1 % of population is used as proxy for the distribution of income. The effect of inequality on private savings is found to be positive in the Nordic and Central-European countries, but for the Anglo-Saxon countries the direction of the effect (positive vs. negative) remains somewhat ambiguous. Inequality is found to have an effect national savings only in the Nordic countries, where it is positive.