A new theory of educational change - punctuated equilibrium: the case of the internationalisation of Higher Education institutions

This article argues for a new theoretical paradigm for the analysis of change in educational institutions that is able to deal with such issues as readiness for change, transformational change and the failure of change strategies. Punctuated equilibrium (Tushman and Romanelli, 1985) is a theory which has wide application. It envisages long-term change as being made up of a succession of long periods of relative stability interspersed by brief periods of rapid profound change. In the periods of stability only relatively small incremental changes are possible. The periods of transformational change may be triggered by external or internal influences. A recent study of the long-term process of internationalisation in higher education institutions shows evidence to support the theory: long periods of incremental change, events precipitating profound change and the failure of externally imposed attempts to change. Also, as the theory predicts, changes in collegial organisations are slower and more uncertain than changes in managed organisations.

European Union: Shadow WTO agricultural domestic support notifications

The notification of the level of domestic support to the World Trade Organization (WTO) is intended to reflect compliance with obligations entered into at the time of the Uruguay Round. WTO members have often been slow to provide notification of domestic support levels. This makes the process of notification less useful as an indicator of the degree to which changes in policy have or have not benefited the trade system as a whole and exporting countries in particular. The notification of domestic support in the E.U. illustrates the value of a measure that reflects current policies and can therefore act as a basis for negotiation of further disciplines where these are necessary. The E.U. has made major changes in its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) over the period since 1992 when the MacSharry reforms were implemented. Payments originally notified in the blue box (related to supply control) have over time been changed until in their present form they are unrelated to current production or price levels, and hence can satisfy the criteria for the green box. The E.U. has therefore much more latitude in trade talks to agree to reductions in the allowable trade-distorting support. This paper reproduced the E.U. notifications relating to 2003/04 and extends these with official statistics to the year 2006/07. It then projects forward the components of domestic support until the year 2013/14, based on forecasts of future production and estimates of policy parameters. The impact of a successful Doha Round is simulated, showing that the constraints envisaged in the WTO draft modalities document of May 19, 2008, would be binding by the year 2013, at about the time the next budget cycle in the E.U. starts. Without the Doha Round constraints, further reform might still happen for domestic reasons, but the framework provided by the WTO for domestic policy spending would be less relevant. In that case, much could hinge on the legitimacy of the Single Farm Payment system under the current rules governing the green box.

Principal-agent issues in asset acquisition: UK institutions and their investment agents

This paper explores principal‐agent issues in the stock selection processes of institutional property investors. Drawing upon an interview survey of fund managers and acquisition professionals, it focuses on the relationships between principals and external agents as they engage in property transactions. The research investigated the extent to which the presence of outcome‐based remuneration structures could lead to biased advice, overbidding and/or poor asset selection. It is concluded that institutional property buyers are aware of incentives for opportunistic behaviour by external agents, often have sufficient expertise to robustly evaluate agents’ advice and that these incentives are counter‐balanced by a number of important controls on potential opportunistic behaviour. There are strong counter‐incentives in the need for the agents to establish personal relationships and trust between themselves and institutional buyers, to generate repeat and related business and to preserve or generate a good reputation in the market.