Economising, Strategising and the Decision to Outsource

We study the make-or-buy decision of oligopolistic firms in an industry in which final good production requires specialised inputs. Firms’ mode of operation decision depends on both the incentive to economize on costs and on strategic considerations. We explore the strategic incentives to outsource and show that asymmetric equilibria emerge, with firms choosing different modes of operation, even when they are ex-ante identical. With ex-ante asymmetries, higher cost firms are more likely to outsource. We apply our model to a number of different international trading setups.

Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules

We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provided. We supply an explicit formula to determine the unique alternative that prevails, as impatience vanishes, for each majority. As an application, we examine the efficiency of majority rules. For symmetric distributions of peaks unanimity is the unanimously preferred majority rule. For asymmetric populations rules maximizing social surplus are characterized.

When Do We Learn to Cooperate? The Role of Social Learning in Social Dilemmas

In this paper, I look at the interaction between social learning and cooperative behavior. I model this using a social dilemma game with publicly observed sequential actions and asymmetric information about pay offs. I find that some informed agents in this model act, individually and without collusion, to conceal the privately optimal action. Because the privately optimal action is socially costly the behavior of informed agents can lead to a Pareto improvement in a social dilemma. In my model I show that it is possible to get cooperative behavior if information is restricted to a small but non-zero proportion of the population. Moreover, such cooperative behavior occurs in a finite setting where it is public knowledge which agent will act last. The proportion of cooperative agents within the population can be made arbitrarily close to 1 by increasing the finite number of agents playing the game. Finally, I show that under a broad set of conditions that it is a Pareto improvement on a corner value, in the ex-ante welfare sense, for an interior proportion of the population to be informed.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the rm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).

Unionism and Peer-Referencing

This study assesses the 'fair-wage-effort' hypothesis, by examining (a) the relationship between relative wage comparisons and job satisfaction and quitting intensions, and (b) the relative ranking of stated effort inducing-incentives, in a novel dataset of unionised and non-unionised European employees. By distinguishing between downward and upward-looking wage comparisons, it is shown that wage comparisons to similar workers exert an asymmetric impact on the job satisfaction of union workers, a pattern consistent with inequity-aversion and conformism to the reference point. Moreover, union workers evaluate peer observation and good industrial relations more highly than payment and other incentives. In contrast, non-union workers are found to be more status-seeking in their satisfaction responses and less dependent on their peers in their effort choices The results are robust to endogenous union membership, considerations of generic loss aversion and across different tenure profiles. They are supportive of the individual egalitarian bias of collective wage determination and self-enforcing effort norms.

Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes

In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding rm profitability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefi t of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding profitability is controlled for.

Rebellion against Reason? A Study of Expressive Choice and Strikes

In this paper we challenge the conventional view that strikes are caused by asymmetric information regarding firm protability such that union members are uninformed. Instead, we build an expressive model of strikes where the perception of unfairness provides the expressive benefit of voting for a strike. The model predicts that larger union size increases both wage offers and the incidence of strikes. Furthermore, while asymmetric information is still important in causing strikes, we find that it is the employer who is not fully informed about the level of emotionality within the union, thereby contributing to strike incidence. An empirical test using UK data provides support for the predictions. In particular, union size has a positive effect on the incidence of strikes and other industrial actions even when asymmetric information regarding protability is controlled for.

Stochastic Choice and Consideration Sets

We model a boundedly rational agent who suffers from limited attention. The agent considers each feasible alternative with a given (unobservable) probability, the attention parameter, and then chooses the alternative that maximises a preference relation within the set of considered alternatives. We show that this random choice rule is the only one for which the impact of removing an alternative on the choice probability of any other alternative is asymmetric and menu independent. Both the preference relation and the attention parameters are identi fied uniquely by stochastic choice data.

Confidence and Competence in Communication

This paper studies information transmission between an uninformed decision maker (receiver) and an informed player (sender) who have asymmetric beliefs ("con fidence") on the sender s ability ("competence") to observe the state of nature. We fi nd that even when the material payoffs of are perfectly aligned, the sender s over- and underconfi dence on his information give rise to information loss in communication, although they do not by themselves completely eliminate information transmission in equilibrium. However, an underconfi dent sender may prefer no communication to informative communication. We also show that when the sender is biased, overconfi dence can lead to more information transmission and welfare improvement.

Suppliers of Priors: A Theory of Retailing Inspired by the Market for Chinese Antiquities

Adverse selection may thwart trade between an informed seller, who knows the probability p that an item of antiquity is genuine, and an uninformed buyer, who does not know p. The buyer might not be wholly uninformed, however. Suppose he can perform a simple inspection, a test of his own: the probability that an item passes the test is g if the item is genuine, but only f < g if it is fake. Given that the buyer is no expert, his test may have little power: f may be close to g. Unfortunately, without much power, the buyer's test will not resolve the difficulty of adverse selection; gains from trade may remain unexploited. But now consider a "store", where the seller groups a number of items, perhaps all with the same quality, the same probability p of being genuine. (We show that in equilibrium the seller will choose to group items in this manner.) Now the buyer can conduct his test across a large sample, perhaps all, of a group of items in the seller's store. He can thereby assess the overall quality of these items; he can invert the aggregate of his test results to uncover the underlying p; he can form a "prior". There is thus no longer asymmetric information between seller and buyer: gains from trade can be exploited. This is our theory of retailing: by grouping items together - setting up a store - a seller is able to supply buyers with priors, as well as the items themselves. We show that the weaker the power of the buyer�s test (the closer f is to g), the greater the seller�s profit. So the seller has no incentive to assist the buyer � e.g., by performing her own tests on the items, or by cleaning them to reveal more about their true age. The paper ends with an analysis of which sellers should specialise in which qualities. We show that quality will be low in busy locations and high in expensive locations.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

Chemical genetic analysis of cdc2p : new insights into the regulation of cytokinesis in "Schizosaccharomyces pombe"

RÉSUMÉ La protéine kinase cyciine-cdc2p (Cdk) joue un rôle fondamental dans la progression du cycle cellulaire dans la levure de fission Schizosaccharomyces pombe. Nous avons étudié le rôle de cdc2p dans la régulation de la cascade de septation ou SIN (septation initiation network) en mitose et en méiose. Le SIN contrôle l'initiation de la cytokinèse à la fin de la mitose, et est supposé être négativement régulé par cdc2p. Nous avons mutagénéisé le site actif de cdc2p afin qu'il puisse lier un analogue de l'ATP (PP1) qui agit comme inhibiteur. Cet analogue ne peut pas lier la kinase de type sauvage. Cette approche dite «chemical genetics» permet une meilleure résolution temporelle comparée à l'approche classique utilisant les mutants sensibles à une température élevée. Nous avons montré que ce mutant cdc2-as (analogue sensitive) est fonctionnel et que, in vitro, l'activité kinase est inhibée en présence de l'analogue. Les cellules portant cette mutation, contrairement aux cellules de type sauvage s'arrêtent de manière irréversible soit en G2 soit en G1 et G2, suivant la concentration de l'inhibiteur. L'inactivation de cdc2p-as dans des cellules arrêtées en métaphase conduit au recrutement asymétrique des protéines du SIN sur le pôle du fuseau mitotique et au recrutement des composants du SIN, ainsi que de la ß-(1,3)glucan synthase à l'anneau contractile. De plus, nos résultats montrent que l'orthologue de la phosphatase cdc14p dans S. pombe, fip1p/clp1p, joue un rôle dans la régulation de la localisation des protéines du SIN suite à l'inactivation de cdc2p. Finalement, l'activité de cdc2p est requise pour maintenir la polo-like kinase plo1p sur les pôles du fuseau mitotique dans les premiers stages de la mitose. C'est pourquoi nous concluons que l'inactivation de cdc2p est suffisante pour activer le SIN et promouvoir la cytokinèse. Dans une étude séparée, nous avons caractérisé des potentiellement nouveaux composants ou régulateurs du SIN qui ont été isolés dans deux criblages génétiques visant à isoler des mutants atténuants la signalisation du SIN. Summary : The cyclin dependent protein kinase (Cdk) cdc2p plays a central role in the cell cycle progression of fission yeast Schizosaccharomyces pombe. We have studied the role of cdc2p in regulating the septation initiation network (SIN) in mitosis and meiosis. The SIN regulates the initiation of cytokinesis at the end of mitosis and is thought to be inhibited by cdc2p. We have mutated the active site of cdc2p to permit binding of an inhibitory ATP analogue (PP1), which is unable to bind unmodified kinases. This "chemical genetic" approach provides a much higher temporal resolution than it can be achieved with classical temperature-sensitive mutants. We demonstrate that cdc2-as (analogue sensitive) is functional and that addition of PP1 inhibits cdc2p kinase activity in vitro. Cells carrying the cdc2-as allele, but not cdc2+, undergo reversible cell cycle arrest following addition of PP1 either in G2, or at both major commitment points in the cell cycle (G1 and G2), depending upon the concentration of PP1. Inactivation of cdc2p-as in cells arrested in early mitosis promotes both the asymmetric recruitment of SIN proteins to the spindle pole bodies (SPBs), and the recruitment of the most downstream SIN components and ß-(1,3)-glucan synthase to the contractile ring. Furthermore, our results indicate that the S. pombe orthologue of Cdc14p, flp1p/clp1p, plays a role in regulating the relocalisation of SIN proteins following inactivation of cdc2p, and that cdc2p activity is required to retain the polo like kinase plot p on the SPBs in early mitosis. Thus, we conclude that inactivation of cdc2p is sufficient to activate the SIN and to promote cytokinesis. In a separate study, we have initially characterised potential novel components or regulators of the SIN pathway identified by two genetic screens for mutants attenuating SIN signaling.

Modeling Dependence Structure and Forecasting Portfolio Value-at-Risk with Dynamic Copulas

We study the asymmetric and dynamic dependence between financial assets and demonstrate, from the perspective of risk management, the economic significance of dynamic copula models. First, we construct stock and currency portfolios sorted on different characteristics (ex ante beta, coskewness, cokurtosis and order flows), and find substantial evidence of dynamic evolution between the high beta (respectively, coskewness, cokurtosis and order flow) portfolios and the low beta (coskewness, cokurtosis and order flow) portfolios. Second, using three different dependence measures, we show the presence of asymmetric dependence between these characteristic-sorted portfolios. Third, we use a dynamic copula framework based on Creal et al. (2013) and Patton (2012) to forecast the portfolio Value-at-Risk of long-short (high minus low) equity and FX portfolios. We use several widely used univariate and multivariate VaR models for the purpose of comparison. Backtesting our methodology, we find that the asymmetric dynamic copula models provide more accurate forecasts, in general, and, in particular, perform much better during the recent financial crises, indicating the economic significance of incorporating dynamic and asymmetric dependence in risk management.

A Theory of Wage Setting Behavior

Concerns for fairness, workers' morale and reciprocity infuence firms' wage setting policy. In this paper we formalize a theory of wage setting behavior in a simple and tractable model that explicitly considers these behavioral aspects. A worker is assumed to have reference-dependent preferences and displays loss aversion when evaluating the fairness of a wage contract. The theory establishes a wage-effort relationship that captures the worker's reference-dependent reciprocity, which in turn in uences the firm's optimal wage policy. The paper makes two key contributions: it identifies loss aversion as an explanation for a worker's asymmetric reciprocity; and it provides realistic and generalized microfoundation for downward wage rigidity. We further illustrate the implications of our theory for both wage setting and hiring behavior. Downward wage rigidity generates several implications for the outcome of the initial employment contract. The worker's reference wage, his extent of negative reciprocity and the firms expectations are key drivers of the propositions derived.

Unionisation, International Integration and Selection

We study how unionisation affects competitive selection between heterogeneous firms when wage negotiations can occur at the firm or at the profit-centre level. With productivity specific wages, an increase in union power has: (i) a selection-softening; (ii) a counter-competitive; (iii) a wage-inequality; and (iv) a variety effect. In a two-country asymmetric setting, stronger unions soften competition for domestic firms and toughen it for exporters. With profit-centre bargaining, we show how trade liberalisation can affect wage inequality among identical workers both across firms (via its effects on competitive selection) and within firms (via wage discrimination across destination markets).