O comportamento eleitoral da nova classe trabalhadora no Rio Grande do Norte 2014: ideologia, avaliação de governo e voto

This thesis investigates the voting behavior of the fractions of the new working class in Rio Grande do Norte, more specifically in the cities of Natal, Mossoró and Caicó, from the presidential election of 2014. This research examined the ideology, the evaluation of government and guidance the vote of a portion of the working classes of RN voters. In Brazil, from 2003, socio-economic change has occurred perceptibly, especially in a part of the working classes who ascended socially and switched to the "C economic class." Thus, there was this period, a significant expansion of this social stratum. The expansion of the "class C" in the past decade in Brazil raised the academic debate and in the media about the emergence of a "new middle class". Neri (2008) termed the "class C" of the "new middle class" and that will be the central part of their studies. But the debate on the "new middle class" can not be simplistic to the point of considering that social mobility, the main variable income, entered this segment of the population in the middle class, because it has different specificities of the popular classes. To understand this phenomenon, the income variable was outdated, adding the importance of ownership of the means of production, control of labor power and the symbolic values in the division of social classes resulting in three fractions of the new working class: the management positions, non-heads and small fighters. In this study, using as a complement to the sociological approach (ideologies and social classes) and the performance evaluation was identified that the new working class (heads) mainly reproduced the ideological and political positioning of the middle class, resulting in the rejection of PT governments (2003-2014) and it’s social, compensatory and redistributive policies. From what has been seen, the new working class (chiefs) approaches the ideological and political behavior of the middle class that will reflect in their electoral choices and class interests. The new working class (not heads and small fighters who voted in the situation) because of its classist and ideological interests approached the Workers' Party positively evaluating the Lula-Dilma governments (2003-2014) due to the implementation of compensatory policies, and redistributive programs government turned to the popular classes. In a counterpoint, the voters of the new working class (not heads and small fighters) who voted null, reproduced the discourse of mainstream media and the middle class about the rejection of compensatory policies, redistribution and government programs of Lula-Dilma governments, and consequently they disapproved of the government Dilma and her candidacy.

Deterministic and probabilistic verification of multi-model meteorological forecasts on the subseasonal timescale

In questo studio, un multi-model ensemble è stato implementato e verificato, seguendo una delle priorità di ricerca del Subseasonal to Seasonal Prediction Project (S2S). Una regressione lineare è stata applicata ad un insieme di previsioni di ensemble su date passate, prodotte dai centri di previsione mensile del CNR-ISAC e ECMWF-IFS. Ognuna di queste contiene un membro di controllo e quattro elementi perturbati. Le variabili scelte per l'analisi sono l'altezza geopotenziale a 500 hPa, la temperatura a 850 hPa e la temperatura a 2 metri, la griglia spaziale ha risoluzione 1 ◦ × 1 ◦ lat-lon e sono stati utilizzati gli inverni dal 1990 al 2010. Le rianalisi di ERA-Interim sono utilizzate sia per realizzare la regressione, sia nella validazione dei risultati, mediante stimatori nonprobabilistici come lo scarto quadratico medio (RMSE) e la correlazione delle anomalie. Successivamente, tecniche di Model Output Statistics (MOS) e Direct Model Output (DMO) sono applicate al multi-model ensemble per ottenere previsioni probabilistiche per la media settimanale delle anomalie di temperatura a 2 metri. I metodi MOS utilizzati sono la regressione logistica e la regressione Gaussiana non-omogenea, mentre quelli DMO sono il democratic voting e il Tukey plotting position. Queste tecniche sono applicate anche ai singoli modelli in modo da effettuare confronti basati su stimatori probabilistici, come il ranked probability skill score, il discrete ranked probability skill score e il reliability diagram. Entrambe le tipologie di stimatori mostrano come il multi-model abbia migliori performance rispetto ai singoli modelli. Inoltre, i valori più alti di stimatori probabilistici sono ottenuti usando una regressione logistica sulla sola media di ensemble. Applicando la regressione a dataset di dimensione ridotta, abbiamo realizzato una curva di apprendimento che mostra come un aumento del numero di date nella fase di addestramento non produrrebbe ulteriori miglioramenti.

Taking a vote at NOW conference in Washington, D.C.

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

ERA Defeat

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Gloria Steinem with bullhorn telling voters to be patient and everone will vote [at International Women's Year]

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

ERA Defeat

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Bella Abzug speaks at Women's Equality Day Rally

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Bella Abzug votes for passage of ERA in NY with husband Martin Abzug to her right

General note: Title and date provided by Bettye Lane.

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

Election forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.

Punishing Local Incumbents for the Local Economy

After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on predominantly national-level economies and national-level elections. In this paper, we show that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are implemented to reach these outcomes.

Institutional Persistence in Eastern Europe: Economic and Political Legacies of Empires and Communism

This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the roles that institutions play in economic development. How do institutions evolve? What mechanisms are responsible for their persistence? What effects do they have on economic development?

I address these questions using historical and contemporary data from Eastern Europe and Russia. This area is relatively understudied by development economists. It also has a very interesting history. For one thing, for several centuries it was divided between different empires. For another, it experienced wars and socialism in the 20th century. I use some of these exogenous shocks as quasi-natural social experiments to study the institutional transformations and its effects on economic development both in the short and long run.

This first chapter explores whether economic, social, and political institutions vary in their resistance to policies designed to remove them. The empirical context for the analysis is Romania from 1690 to the 2000s. Romania represents an excellent laboratory for studying the persistence of different types of historical institutional legacies. In the 18th and 19th centuries, Romania was split between the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires, where political and economic institutions differed. The Habsburgs imposed less extractive institutions relative to the Ottomans: stronger rule of law, a more stable and predictable state, a more developed civil society, and less corruption. In the 20th century, the Romanian Communist regime tried deliberately to homogenize the country along all relevant dimensions. It was only partially successful. Using a regression discontinuity design, I document the persistence of economic outcomes, social capital, and political attitudes. First, I document remarkable convergence in urbanization, education, unemployment, and income between the two former empires. Second, regarding social capital, no significant differences in organizational membership, trust in bureaucracy, and corruption persist today. Finally, even though the Communists tried to change all political attitudes, significant discontinuities exist in current voting behavior at the former Habsburg-Ottoman border. Using data from the parliamentary elections of 1996-2008, I find that former Habsburg rule decreases by around 6 percentage points the vote share of the major post-Communist left party and increases by around 2 and 5 percentage points the vote shares of the main anti-Communist and liberal parties, respectively.

The second chapter investigates the effects of Stalin’s mass deportations on distrust in central authority. Four deported ethnic groups were not rehabilitated after Stalin’s death; they remained in permanent exile until the disintegration of the Soviet Union. This allows one to distinguish between the effects of the groups that returned to their homelands and those of the groups that were not allowed to return. Using regional data from the 1991 referendum on the future of the Soviet Union, I find that deportations have a negative interim effect on trust in central authority in both the regions of destination and those of origin. The effect is stronger for ethnic groups that remained in permanent exile in the destination regions. Using data from the Life in Transition Survey, the chapter also documents a long-term effect of deportations in the destination regions.

The third chapter studies the short-term effect of Russian colonization of Central Asia on economic development. I use data on the regions of origin of Russian settlers and push factors to construct an instrument for Russian migration to Central Asia. This instrument allows me to interpret the outcomes causally. The main finding is that the massive influx of Russians into the region during the 1897-1926 period had a significant positive effect on indigenous literacy. The effect is stronger for men and in rural areas. Evidently, interactions between natives and Russians through the paid labor market was an important mechanism of human capital transmission in the context of colonization.

The findings of these chapters provide additional evidence that history and institutions do matter for economic development. Moreover, the dissertation also illuminates the relative persistence of institutions. In particular, political and social capital legacies of institutions might outlast economic legacies. I find that most economic differences between the former empires in Romania have disappeared. By the same token, there are significant discontinuities in political outcomes. People in former Habsburg Romania provide greater support for liberalization, privatization, and market economy, whereas voters in Ottoman Romania vote more for redistribution and government control over the economy.

In the former Soviet Union, Stalin’s deportations during World War II have a long-term negative effect on social capital. Today’s residents of the destination regions of deportations show significantly lower levels of trust in central authority. This is despite the fact that the Communist regime tried to eliminate any source of opposition and used propaganda to homogenize people’s political and social attitudes towards the authorities. In Central Asia, the influx of Russian settlers had a positive short-term effect on human capital of indigenous population by the 1920s, which also might have persisted over time.

From a development perspective, these findings stress the importance of institutions for future paths of development. Even if past institutional differences are not apparent for a certain period of time, as was the case with the former Communist countries, they can polarize society later on, hampering economic development in the long run. Different institutions in the past, which do not exist anymore, can thus contribute to current political instability and animosity.

A THEOLOGICAL NORMATIVE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF FATHERHOOD IN THE AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITY

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the theological correlation between the role of the church, the identity and role of the African American male, and the effectiveness of fatherhood. The study begins with an in-depth analysis of how absentee fathers cause a crisis in the family. The absence of fathers from the home causes children to suffer financially, socially and psychologically, and therefore causes a disruption in the community as a whole. Focus on the Family founder and leader, Dr. James Dobson, confirms that “our very survival as a people will depend upon the presence or absence of masculine leadership in millions of homes.” In person interviews of African American Christian males and interpretation of the scriptures are just two of the methods used in this study to explore the theological norm of fatherhood. Collectively, the case studies and statistical data within this study explore attempts to remedy the crisis through governmental policies and networking within the community. The final chapter examines the role of urban churches and clergy in teaching effective fatherhood practices. Within the conclusion, it is made clear that the church is responsible for establishing the theological framework and principles for understanding the intended role of being a father. Another conclusion of this study is the acknowledgement of the African American community’s role in shaping and reforming the identity and role of the African American male as a father in the home. The African American community and the church must continue working in tandem to encourage organic social networks that will promote a model for effective fatherhood practices.

Equitable representation in councils: theory and an application to the United Nations Security Council

We analyze democratic equity in council voting games (CVGs). In a CVG, a voting body containing all members delegates decision-making to a (time-varying) subset of its members, as describes, e.g., the relationship between the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). We develop a theoretical framework for analyzing democratic equitability in CVGs at both the country and region levels, and for different assumptions regarding preference correlation. We apply the framework to evaluate the equitability of the UNSC, and the claims of those who seek to reform it. We find that the individual permanent members are overrepresented by between 21.3 times (United Kingdom) and 3.8 times (China) from a country-level perspective, while from a region perspective Eastern Europe is the most heavily overrepresented region with more than twice its equitable representation, and Africa the most heavily underrepresented. Our equity measures do not preclude some UNSC members from exercising veto rights, however.