Limited memory and the essentiality of money

This paper investigates the relationship between memory and the essentiality of money. We consider a random matching economy with a large finite population in which commitment is not possible and memory is limited in the sense that only a fraction m E(0; 1) of the population has publicly observable histories. We show that no matter how limited memory is, there exists a social norm that achieves the first best regardless of the population size. In other words, money can fail to be essential irrespective of the amount of memory in the economy. This suggests that the emphasis on limited memory as a fundamental friction for money to be essential deserves a deeper examination.

Money versus memory

A well–established fact in monetary theory is that a key ingredient for the essentiality of money is its role as a form of memory. In this paper we study a notion of memory that includes information about an agent’s past actions and trading opportunities but, in contrast to Kocherlakota (1998), does not include information about the past actions and trading opportunities of an agent’s past partners. We first show that the first–best can be achieved with memory even if it only includes information about an agent’s very recent past. Thus, money can fail to be essential even if memory is minimal. We then establish, more interestingly, that if information about trading opportunities is not part of an agent’s record, then money can be better than memory. This shows that the societal benefit of money lies not only on being a record of past actions, but also on being a record of past trading opportunities, a fact that has been overlooked by the monetary literature.

Money supply and capital accumulation on the transition path revisited

Fischer (1979) and Asako (1983) analyze the sign of the correlation between the growth rate of money and the rate of capital accumulation on the transition path. Both plug a CRRA utility (based on a Cobb-Douglas and a Leontief function, respectively) into Sidrauski's model - yet return contrasting results. The present analysis, by using a more general CES utility, presents both of those settings and conclusions as limiting cases, and generates economic gures more consistent with reality (for instance, the interest-rate elasticity of the money demands derived from those previous works is necessarily 1 and 0, respectively).

Divisia indexes, money and welfare

We suggest the use of a particular Divisia index for measuring welfare losses due to interest rate wedges and in‡ation. Compared to the existing options in the literature: i) when the demands for the monetary assets are known, closed-form solutions for the welfare measures can be obtained at a relatively lower algebraic cost; ii) less demanding integrability conditions allow for the recovery of welfare measures from a larger class of demand systems and; iii) when the demand speci…cations are not known, using an index number entitles the researcher to rank di¤erent vectors of opportunity costs directly from market observations. We use two examples to illustrate the method.

Coordination in the use of money

Fundamental models of money, while explicit about the frictions that render money essential, are silent on how agents actually coordinate in its use. This paper studies this coordination problem, providing an endogenous map between the primitives of the environment and the beliefs on the acceptability of money. We show that an increase in the frequency of trade meetings, besides its direct impact on payo¤s, facilitates coordination. In particular, for a large enough frequency of trade meetings, agents always coordinate in the use of money.

Money distribution with intermediation

This pap er analyzes the distribution of money holdings in a commo dity money search-based mo del with intermediation. Intro ducing heterogeneity of costs to the Kiyotaki e Wright ( 1989 ) mo del, Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010) gives rise to a non-degenerated distribution of money. We extend further this mo del intro ducing intermediation in the trading pro cess. We show that the distribution of money matters for savings decisions. This gives rises to a xed p oint problem for the saving function that di cults nding the optimal solution. Through some examples, we show that this friction shrinks the distribution of money. In contrast to the Cavalcanti e Puzzello ( 2010 ) mo del, the optimal solution may not present the entire surplus going to the consumer. At the end of the pap er, we present a strong result, for a su cient large numb er of intermediaries the distribution of money is degenerated.

Social norms and money

In an economy where there is no double coincidence of wants and without recordkeeping of past transactions, money is usually seen as the only mechanism that can support exchange. In this paper, we show that, as long as the population is finite and agents are sufficiently patient, a social norm establishing gift-exchange can substitute for money. Notwithstanding, for a given discount factor, the growth of the population size eventually leads to the breakdown of the social norm, while money still works. 1 Introduction

Balance of payment crises and capital flows : the role of liquidity

A model of externaI CrISIS is deveIoped focusing on the interaction between Iiquidity creation by financiaI intermediaries and foreign exchange collapses. The intermediaries' role of transforming maturities is shown to result in larger movements of capital and a higher probability of crisis. This resembles the observed cycle in capital fiows: large infiows, crisis and abrupt outfiows. The mo deI highlights how adverse productivity and international interest rate shocks can be magnified by the behavior of individual foreign investors linked together through their deposits in the intermediaries. An eventual collapse of the exchange rate can link investors' behavior even further. The basic model is then extended, quite naturally, to study the effects of capital fiow contagion between countries.

WeIfare costs of inflation the case for interest-bearing money and empiricaI Estimates for Brazil

We provide in this paper a closed fonn for the Welfare Cost of Inflation which we prove to be closer than Bailey's expression to the correct solution of the corresponding non-separable differential equation. Next, we extend this approach to an economy with interest-bearing money, once again presenting a better appoximation than the one given by Bailey's approach. Finally, empirical estimates for Brazil are presented.

Economic recovery from the Argentine great depression : institutions, expectations, and the change of macroeconomic regime

This work explores how Argentina overcame the Great Depression and asks whether active macroeconomic interventions made any contribution to the recovery. In particular, we study Argentine macroeconomic policy as it deviated from gold-standard orthodoxy after the final suspension of convertibility in 1929. As elsewhere, fiscal policy in Argentina was conservative, and had little power to smooth output. Monetary policy became heterodox after 1929. The first and most important stage of institutional change took place with the switch from a metallic monetary regime to a fiduciary regime in 1931; the Caja de Conversión (Conversion Office, a currency board) began rediscounting as a means to sterilize gold outflows and avoid deflationary pressures, thus breaking from orthodox "mIes of the game." However, the actual injections of liquidity were small' and were not enough to fully offset the incipient monetary contractions: the "Keynes" effect was weak or negative. Rather, recovery derived from changes in beliefs and expectations surrounding the shift in the monetary and exchange-rate regime,and the delinking of gold flows and the money base. Agents perceivod a new regime, as shown by the path of consumption, investment, and estimated ex ante real interest rates: the "Mundell" effect was dominant. Notably, this change of regime predated a later, and supposedly more significant, stage of institutional reform, namely the creation of the central bank in 1935. Still, the extent of intervention was weak, and insufficient to fully offset externaI shocks to prices and money. Argentine macropolicy was heterodox in terms of the change of regime, but still conservative in terms of the tentative scope of the measures taken .

Endogenous supply of fiat money

We address whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a self-interested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a plan of action, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that such equilibrium is no longer possible when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that there is no monetary equilibrium where overissue happens only infrequently. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result obtained in the presence of commitment.