COPD: A stepwise or a hit hard approach?

Current guidelines differ slightly on the recommendations for treatment of Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) patients, and although there are some undisputed recommendations, there is still debate regarding the management of COPD. One of the hindrances to deciding which therapeutic approach to choose is late diagnosis or misdiagnosis of COPD. After a proper diagnosis is achieved and severity assessed, the choice between a stepwise or "hit hard" approach has to be made. For GOLD A patients the stepwise approach is recommended, whilst for B, C and D patients this remains debatable. Moreover, in patients for whom inhaled corticosteroids (ICS) are recommended, a step-up or "hit hard" approach with triple therapy will depend on the patient's characteristics and, for patients who are being over-treated with ICS, ICS withdrawal should be performed, in order to optimize therapy and reduce excessive medications. This paper discusses and proposes stepwise, "hit hard", step-up and ICS withdrawal therapeutic approaches for COPD patients based on their GOLD group. We conclude that all approaches have benefits, and only a careful patient selection will determine which approach is better, and which patients will benefit the most from each approach.

Proof theory for lattice-ordered groups

Proof-theoretic methods are developed and exploited to establish properties of the variety of lattice-ordered groups. In particular, a hypersequent calculus with a cut rule is used to provide an alternative syntactic proof of the generation of the variety by the lattice-ordered group of automorphisms of the real number chain. Completeness is also established for an analytic (cut-free) hypersequent calculus using cut elimination and it is proved that the equational theory of the variety is co-NP complete.

Strategy-proof choice of acts : a preliminary study

We model social choices as acts mapping states of the world to (social) outcomes. A (social choice) rule assigns an act to every profile of subjective expected utility preferences over acts. A rule is strategy-proof if no agent ever has an incentive to misrepresent her beliefs about the world or her valuation of the outcomes; it is ex-post efficient if the act selected at any given preference profile picks a Pareto-efficient outcome in every state of the world. We show that every two-agent ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rule is a top selection: the chosen act picks the most preferred outcome of some (possibly different) agent in every state of the world. The states in which an agent’s top outcome is selected cannot vary with the reported valuations of the outcomes but may change with the reported beliefs. We give a complete characterization of the ex-post efficient and strategy-proof rules in the two-agent, two-state case, and we identify a rich class of such rules in the two-agent case.