Compensatory saccades benefit from prediction during head impulse testing in early recovery from vestibular deafferentation

The head impulse test (HIT) can identify a deficient vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR) by the compensatory saccade (CS) generated once the head stops moving. The inward HIT is considered safer than the outward HIT, yet might have an oculomotor advantage given that the subject would presumably know the direction of head rotation. Here, we compare CS latencies following inward (presumed predictable) and outward (more unpredictable) HITs after acute unilateral vestibular nerve deafferentation. Seven patients received inward and outward HITs delivered at six consecutive postoperative days (POD) and again at POD 30. All head impulses were recorded by portable video-oculography. CS included those occurring during (covert) or after (overt) head rotation. Inward HITs included mean CS latencies (183.48 ms ± 4.47 SE) that were consistently shorter than those generated during outward HITs in the first 6 POD (p = 0.0033). Inward HITs induced more covert saccades compared to outward HITs, acutely. However, by POD 30 there were no longer any differences in latencies or proportions of CS and direction of head rotation. Patients with acute unilateral vestibular loss likely use predictive cues of head direction to elicit early CS to keep the image centered on the fovea. In acute vestibular hypofunction, inwardly applied HITs may risk a preponderance of covert saccades, yet this difference largely disappears within 30 days. Advantages of inwardly applied HITs are discussed and must be balanced against the risk of a false-negative HIT interpretation.

Older patients with low Charlson score and high-risk prostate cancer benefit from radical prostatectomy

INTRODUCTION The aim of the study was to identify the appropriate level of Charlson comorbidity index (CCI) in older patients (>70 years) with high-risk prostate cancer (PCa) to achieve survival benefit following radical prostatectomy (RP). METHODS We retrospectively analyzed 1008 older patients (>70 years) who underwent RP with pelvic lymph node dissection for high-risk prostate cancer (preoperative prostate-specific antigen >20 ng/mL or clinical stage ≥T2c or Gleason ≥8) from 14 tertiary institutions between 1988 and 2014. The study population was further grouped into CCI < 2 and ≥2 for analysis. Survival rate for each group was estimated with Kaplan-Meier method and competitive risk Fine-Gray regression to estimate the best explanatory multivariable model. Area under the curve (AUC) and Akaike information criterion were used to identify ideal 'Cut off' for CCI. RESULTS The clinical and cancer characteristics were similar between the two groups. Comparison of the survival analysis using the Kaplan-Meier curve between two groups for non-cancer death and survival estimations for 5 and 10 years shows significant worst outcomes for patients with CCI ≥ 2. In multivariate model to decide the appropriate CCI cut-off point, we found CCI 2 has better AUC and p value in log rank test. CONCLUSION Older patients with fewer comorbidities harboring high-risk PCa appears to benefit from RP. Sicker patients are more likely to die due to non-prostate cancer-related causes and are less likely to benefit from RP.

Special Tax Treatment as Trade Policy: A Database on Export Processing and Special Economic Zones

Many countries treat income generated via exports favourably, especially when production takes places in special zones known as export processing zones (EPZs). EPZs can be defined as specific, geographically defined zones or areas that are subject to special administration and that generally offer tax incentives, such as duty‐free imports when producing for export, exemption from other regulatory constraints linked to import for the domestic market, sometimes favourable treatment in terms of industrial regulation, and the streamlining of border clearing procedures. We describe a database of WTO Members that employ special economic zones as part of their industrial policy mix. This is based on WTO notification and monitoring through the WTO’s trade policy review mechanism (TPRM), supplemented with information from the ILO, World Bank, and primary sources. We also provide some rough analysis of the relationship between use of EPZs and the carbon intensity of exports, and relative levels of investment across countries with and without special zones.

The Optimal Capital Structure of Banks: Balancing Deposit Insurance, Capital Requirements and Tax-Advantaged Debt

The capital structure and regulation of financial intermediaries is an important topic for practitioners, regulators and academic researchers. In general, theory predicts that firms choose their capital structures by balancing the benefits of debt (e.g., tax and agency benefits) against its costs (e.g., bankruptcy costs). However, when traditional corporate finance models have been applied to insured financial institutions, the results have generally predicted corner solutions (all equity or all debt) to the capital structure problem. This paper studies the impact and interaction of deposit insurance, capital requirements and tax benefits on a bankÇs choice of optimal capital structure. Using a contingent claims model to value the firm and its associated claims, we find that there exists an interior optimal capital ratio in the presence of deposit insurance, taxes and a minimum fixed capital standard. Banks voluntarily choose to maintain capital in excess of the minimum required in order to balance the risks of insolvency (especially the loss of future tax benefits) against the benefits of additional debt. Because we derive a closed- form solution, our model provides useful insights on several current policy debates including revisions to the regulatory framework for GSEs, tax policy in general and the tax exemption for credit unions.

Asymmetric Information, Tax Evasion and Alternative Instruments of Government Revenue

Using a pure-exchange overlapping generations model, characterized with tax evasion and information asymmetry between the government (the social planner) and the financial intermediaries, we try and seek for the optimal tax and seigniorage plans, derived from the welfare maximizing objective of the social planner. We show that irrespective of whether the economy is characterized by tax evasion, or asymmetric information, a benevolent social planner, maximizing welfare and simultaneously financing the budget constraint, should optimally rely on explicit rather than implicit taxation.

Church and State

Church and state have historically had an uneasy relationship, sometimes close allies, at others harsh adversaries, and at still others largely independent of one another. This paper develops an economic model of this relationship, where the state's objective is to maximize net tax revenue, while the church provides religious goods. Religious goods benefit the state in two ways: first, they provide utility to citizens, thus allowing the state to extract more taxes before running up against citizens' reservation utility (the point at which they would revolt), and second, they potentially provide legitimacy to the state, thereby lowering the costs of tax collection. If the latter effect is strong enough, the state may find it optimal to take control of the church, either to enhance its legitimizing effect, or to suppress its de-legitimizing effect. To evaluate the model's implications, we use recent cross-country data on the relationship between religion and state, including measures coded from the 2001, 2003, and 2005 International Religious Freedom reports. We also examine in more detail some of the paradigmatic cases indicated by the model, presenting various types of evidence from current and historical examples of each case.

Ottoman Tax Registers (Tahrir Defterleri)

The Ottoman government obtained current information on the empire's sources of revenue through periodic registers called tahrir defterleri. These documents include detailed information on tax-paying subjects and taxable resources, making it possible to study the economic and social history of the Middle East and Eastern Europe in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Although the use of these documents have been typically limited to the construction of local histories, adopting a more optimistic attitude toward their potential and using appropriate sampling procedures can greatly increase their contribution to historical scholarship. They can be used in comprehensive quantitative studies and in addressing questions of broader historical significance or larger social scientific relevance.

Corporate Tax Avoidance and High Powered Incentives

This paper analyzes the links between corporate tax avoidance, the growth of highpowered incentives for managers, and the structure of corporate governance. We develop and test a simple model that highlights the role of complementarities between tax sheltering and managerial diversion in determining how high-powered incentives influence tax sheltering decisions. The model generates the testable hypothesis that firm governance characteristics determine how incentive compensation changes sheltering decisions. In order to test the model, we construct an empirical measure of corporate tax avoidance - the component of the book-tax gap not attributable to accounting accruals - and investigate the link between this measure of tax avoidance and incentive compensation. We find that, for the full sample of firms, increases in incentive compensation tend to reduce the level of tax sheltering, suggesting a complementary relationship between diversion and sheltering. As predicted by the model, the relationship between incentive compensation and tax sheltering is a function of a firm.s corporate governance. Our results may help explain the growing cross-sectional variation among firms in their levels of tax avoidance, the .undersheltering puzzle,. and why large book-tax gaps are associated with subsequent negative abnormal returns.

Tax Motivated Takings

Tax motivated takings are takings by a local government aimed purely at increasing its tax base. Such an action was justified by the Supreme Court's ruling in Kelo v. New London, which allowed the use of eminent domain for a private redevelopment project on the grounds that the project promised spillover public benefits in the form of jobs and taxes. This paper argues that tax motivated takings can lead to inefficient transfers of land for the simple reason that assessed values understate owners' true values. We therefore propose a reassessment scheme that greatly reduces the risk of this sort of inefficiency.

Risk, Transaction Costs, and Tax Assignment: Government Finance in the Ottoman Empire

Risk and transaction costs often provide competing explanations of institutional outcomes. In this paper we argue that they offer opposing predictions regarding the assignment of fixed and variable taxes in a multi-tiered governmental structure. While the central government can pool regional risks from variable taxes, local governments can measure variable tax bases more accurately. Evidence on tax assignment from the mid-sixteenth century Ottoman Empire supports the transaction cost explanation, suggesting that risk matters less because insurance can be obtained in a variety of ways.

Tax Collection in History

Methods of tax collection employed by modern governments seem dull when compared to the rich variety observed in history. Whereas most governments today typically use salaried agents to collect taxes, various other types of contractual relationships have been observed in history, including sharing arrangements which divide the tax revenue between the government and collectors at fixed proportions, negotiated payment schemes based on the tax base, and sale of the revenue to a collector in exchange for a lump-sum payment determined at auction. We propose an economic theory of tax collection that can coherently explain the temporal and spatial variation in contractual forms. We begin by offering a simple classification of tax collection schemes observed in history. We then develop a general economic model of tax collection that specifies the cost and benefits of alternative schemes and identifies the conditions under which a government would choose one contractual form over another in maximizing the net revenue. Finally, we use the conclusions of the model to explain some of the well-known patterns of tax collection observed in history and how choices varied over time and space.

The Sierra Leone Hut-tax disturbances : a reply to Mr. Stephen

by E. D. M.