853 resultados para Saw-flies.
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Occupational exposures to wood dust have been associated with an elevated risk of sinonasal cancer (SNC). Wood dust is recognized as a human carcinogen but the specific cancer causative agent remains unknown. One possible explanation is a co-exposure to; wood dust and polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs). PAHs could be generated during incomplete combustion of wood due to heat created by use of power tools. To determine if PAHs are generated from wood during common wood working operations, PAH concentrations in wood dust samples collected in an experimental chamber operated under controlled conditions were analyzed. In addition, personal air samples from workers exposed to wood dust (n = 30) were collected. Wood dust was generated using three different power tools: vibrating sander, belt sander, and saw; and six wood materials: fir, Medium Density Fiberboard (MDF), beech, mahogany, oak and wood melamine. Monitoring of wood workers was carried out by means of personal sampler device during wood working operations. We measured 21 PAH concentrations in wood dust samples by capillary gas chromatography-ion trap mass spectrometry (GC-MS). Total PAH concentrations in wood dust varied greatly (0.24-7.95 ppm) with the lowest being in MDF dust and the highest in wood melamine dust. Personal PAH exposures were between 37.5-119.8 ng m(-3) during wood working operations. Our results suggest that PAH exposures are present during woodworking operations and hence could play a role in the mechanism of cancer induction related to wood dust exposure.
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Tutkimuksen tavoite Tutkimuksen tavoite oli kerätä FI:n johdolle tietoa henkilöstön suhtautumisesta organisaatiomuutokseen. Tutkimus toimii pohjana muutosprosessin kriittiselle tarkastelulle ja mahdollisille muutoksille resurssien kohdentamisessa. Tutkimusmenetelmä Organisaatiomuutosta käsittelevä kirjallisuus muodosti tutkielman teoriapohjan. Tutkimuksen aineisto kerättiin kyselylomakkeella FI:n henkilöstölle ja neljällä haastattelulla henkilöstön ja johdon kanssa. Johtopäätökset Yleisesti tuloksista on nähtävissä, että vastaajat ovat aluksi vastustaneet muutosta, vaikka muutos itsessään onkin nähty positiivisena kehityksenä. Vastarintaa ovat aiheuttaneet pääasiallisesti muutoksen johtamisen tyyli ja tiedotuksen kokeminen riittämättömänä.
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Magical ideation and belief in the paranormal is considered to represent a trait-like character; people either believe in it or not. Yet, anecdotes indicate that exposure to an anomalous event can turn skeptics into believers. This transformation is likely to be accompanied by altered cognitive functioning such as impaired judgments of event likelihood. Here, we investigated whether the exposure to an anomalous event changes individuals' explicit traditional (religious) and non-traditional (e.g., paranormal) beliefs as well as cognitive biases that have previously been associated with non-traditional beliefs, e.g., repetition avoidance when producing random numbers in a mental dice task. In a classroom, 91 students saw a magic demonstration after their psychology lecture. Before the demonstration, half of the students were told that the performance was done respectively by a conjuror (magician group) or a psychic (psychic group). The instruction influenced participants' explanations of the anomalous event. Participants in the magician, as compared to the psychic group, were more likely to explain the event through conjuring abilities while the reverse was true for psychic abilities. Moreover, these explanations correlated positively with their prior traditional and non-traditional beliefs. Finally, we observed that the psychic group showed more repetition avoidance than the magician group, and this effect remained the same regardless of whether assessed before or after the magic demonstration. We conclude that pre-existing beliefs and contextual suggestions both influence people's interpretations of anomalous events and associated cognitive biases. Beliefs and associated cognitive biases are likely flexible well into adulthood and change with actual life events.
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BACKGROUND: Digoxin intoxication results in predominantly digestive, cardiac and neurological symptoms. This case is outstanding in that the intoxication occurred in a nonagenarian and induced severe, extensively documented visual symptoms as well as dysphagia and proprioceptive illusions. Moreover, it went undiagnosed for a whole month despite close medical follow-up, illustrating the difficulty in recognizing drug-induced effects in a polymorbid patient. CASE PRESENTATION: Digoxin 0.25 mg qd for atrial fibrillation was prescribed to a 91-year-old woman with an estimated creatinine clearance of 18 ml/min. Over the following 2-3 weeks she developed nausea, vomiting and dysphagia, snowy and blurry vision, photopsia, dyschromatopsia, aggravated pre-existing formed visual hallucinations and proprioceptive illusions. She saw her family doctor twice and visited the eye clinic once until, 1 month after starting digoxin, she was admitted to the emergency room. Intoxication was confirmed by a serum digoxin level of 5.7 ng/ml (reference range 0.8-2 ng/ml). After stopping digoxin, general symptoms resolved in a few days, but visual complaints persisted. Examination by the ophthalmologist revealed decreased visual acuity in both eyes, 4/10 in the right eye (OD) and 5/10 in the left eye (OS), decreased color vision as demonstrated by a score of 1/13 in both eyes (OU) on Ishihara pseudoisochromatic plates, OS cataract, and dry age-related macular degeneration (ARMD). Computerized static perimetry showed non-specific diffuse alterations suggestive of either bilateral retinopathy or optic neuropathy. Full-field electroretinography (ERG) disclosed moderate diffuse rod and cone dysfunction and multifocal ERG revealed central loss of function OU. Visual symptoms progressively improved over the next 2 months, but multifocal ERG did not. The patient was finally discharged home after a 5 week hospital stay. CONCLUSION: This case is a reminder of a complication of digoxin treatment to be considered by any treating physician. If digoxin is prescribed in a vulnerable patient, close monitoring is mandatory. In general, when facing a new health problem in a polymorbid patient, it is crucial to elicit a complete history, with all recent drug changes and detailed complaints, and to include a drug adverse reaction in the differential diagnosis.
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This is a study of one participant's reflective practice as she worked to develop online communities in a face-to-face science course. Her process of reflective practice was examined in order to address factors that influenced her learning path, and the benefits and challenges of collaborative action research. These research goals were pursued using a collaborative action research methodology, initially chosen for its close match with Schon's (1983) model of reflective practice. The participant's learning fit vnth Mezirow's (1991) model of transformative learning. She began with beliefs that matched her goals, and she demonstrated significant learning in three areas. First, she demonstrated instrumental learning around the constraints of workload and time, and achieving online learning community indicators. Second, she demonstrated communicative learning that helped her to see her own needs for feedback and communication more clearly, and how other process partners had been a support to her. Third, her emancipatory learning saw her revisiting and questioning her goals. It was through the reflective conversation during the planned meetings and the researcher's reframing and interrogation of that reflection that the participant was able to clarify and extend her thinking, and in so doing, critically reflect on her practice as she worked to develop online learning communities. In this way, the collaborative action research methodology was an embodiment of co-constructivism through collaborative reflective practice. Schon's (1983) model of reflective practice positions a lone practitioners moving through cycles ofplan-act-observe-reflect. The results fi"om this study suggest that collaboration is an important piece of the reflective practice model.
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Black flies are opportunistic sugar-feeders. They take sugar meals from Homopteran honeydew secretions or plant nectars, depending on availability. Homopteran honeydew secretions contain both simple and complex carbohydrates while plant nectars contain primarily simple carbohydrates. In order to determine whether honeydew secretions offer more energy than plant nectars to their insect visitors a study of wild-caught black flies was undertaken in Algonquin Provincial Park, Canada during the spring of 1 998 and 1 999. It was hypothesized that female black flies maintained on honeydew sugars will survive longer, produce more eggs and have a greater parasite vectoring potential than those maintained on artificial nectar or distilled water. Results demonstrated that: (1) host-seeking female Prosimulimfuscum/mixtum and Simulium venustum maintained on artificial honeydew did not survive longer than those maintained on artificial nectar when fed ad libitum; (2) fiiUy engorged S. venustum and Simulium rugglesi maintained on artificial honeydew did not produce more eggs than those maintained on artificial nectar when fed ad libitum; and (3) S. rugglesi did not have a greater vectoring potential of Leucocytozoon simondi when maintained on artificial honeydew as opposed to artificial nectar when fed ad libitum. However, all flies maintained on the two sugars (artificial honeydew and artificial nectar) survived longer, produce more eggs and had greater vectoring potential than those maintained on distilled water alone.
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The addition of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms represented a fundamental shift in Canadian governance. Many saw the tabling of such a document as a further, even fmal, step towards the Americanization of the Canadian polity. While the Charter's presence has significantly altered the relationship between citizens, government and the courts, it has done so by maintaining the traditional values and experiences that has been the hallmarks of Canadian constitutionalism. This is in contrast to the fears harboured by critics suggesting that the Charter was a further Americanization of the Canadian Polity, notwithstanding the very different natures of the American Bill of Rights and the Canadian Charter. Analyzing American Supreme Court precedent use by the Canadian Supreme Court has demonstrated that such an Americanization has not, in fact, occurred. In the present analysis of American precedent use in section 1 limitation of rights cases, the citation of these precedents are at best episodic, at least on the quantitative level. Qualitatively, the Canadian Supreme Court generally uses American jurisprudence to further support broad definitions of 'great rights' . As for the more intricate details of rights limitations and the process involved in detennining how Charter rights are limited, one would be hard pressed to find even cursory references to American case law.
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The writings of John Dewey (1859-1952) and Simone Weil (1909-1943) were analyzed with a view to answering 3 main questions: What is wisdom? How is wisdom connected to experience? How does one educate for a love of wisdom? Using a dialectical method whereby Dewey (a pragmatist) was critiqued by Weil (a Christian Platonist) and vice versa, commonalities and differences were identified and clarified. For both, wisdom involved the application of thought to specific, concrete problems in order to secure a better way of life. For Weil, wisdom was centered on a love of truth that involved a certain way of applying one's attention to a concrete or theoretical problem. Weil believed that nature was subject to a divine wisdom and that a truly democratic society had supernatural roots. Dewey believed that any attempt to move beyond nature would stunt the growth of wisdom. For him, wisdom could be nourished only by natural streams-even if some ofthem were given a divine designation. For both, wisdom emerged through the discipline of work understood as intelligent activity, a coherent relationship between thinking and acting. Although Weil and Dewey differed on how they distinguished these 2 activities, they both advocated a type of education which involved practical experience and confronted concrete problems. Whereas Dewey viewed each problem optimistically with the hope of solving it, Weil saw wisdom in, contemplating insoluble contradictions. For both, educating for a love of wisdom meant cultivating a student's desire to keep thinking in line with acting-wanting to test ideas in action and striving to make sense of actions observed.
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A strain of Drosophila melanogaster (mid america stock culture no. hl16) has been reported to be deficient in aldehyde oxidase activity (Hickey and Singh 1982). This strain was characterized during the course of this study and compared to other mutant strains known to be deficient in aldehyde oxidase activity. During the course of this investigation, the hl16 strain was found to be temperature sensitive in its viability. It was found that the two phenotypes, the enzyme deficiency, and the temperature sensitive lethality were the result of two different mutations, both mapping to the X-chromosome. These two mutations were found to be separable by recombination. The enzyme deficiency was found to map to the same locus as the cinnamon mutation, another mutation which affects aldehyde oxidase production. The developmental profile of aldehyde oxidase in the hl16 strain was compared to the developmental profile in the Canton S wild type strain. The aldehyde oxidase activity in adult hl16 individuals was also compared to that of various other strains. It was also found that the aldehyde oxidase activity was temperature sensitive in the adult flies. The temperature sensitive lethality mutation was mapped to position 1-0.1.
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1-1 is torically, the predominan t method of reconstructing phylogenies has been through the use of morphological characters. There are new techniques now gaining acceptance, including molecular techniques al1d chromosomal information. Altl10ugh the study of behaviour has been used in a comparative framework, these analyses have, historically, been based on intuition. Hennig (1966) devised a neV\' method of reconstructing phylogenies which provided a 110ncircular method for formulating, testing and refining phylogenies. Subsequent s)Tstematists had virtually abandoned ecological and beha\lioural data as primary indicators of phylogenetic relationships (Brooks and McLennan 1991). Therefore, in a modern cladistic framework (sensu Hennig) the analysis of behavioural traits remains underrepresented as a method of reconstructing phylogenies. This thesis will reconstruct the phylogeny for species of black flies (Diptera: Simuliidae), using two steps. The first step is to thoroughl)' understand and explain the cocoon spinning in black fly larvae. There have bee115 previous descriptions of cocoon spinning, but all were incomplete or erroneous. The advances in technology, including video recorders and VCRs, have allowed this behaviour to be analyzed in great detail in 20 different species. A complete description of the cocoon spinning of Simulium \littatum is given. This description will be used as a template for the other species observed. The description and understanding of cococ)n spinning was the first step in undertaking a phylogenetic analysis using this behaviour. The behaviour was then broken down and analyzed, revealing 23 characters, 3 either qualitative and quantitative in nature. These characters were assessed in a cladistic framework (sensu Hennig) and a phylogenetic tree was reconstructed with a e.I of 0.91 and an R.I. of 0.96. This phylogenetic tree closely resembles a previously established pllylogenetic tree produced from morphological and cytological information. The importance of this result is the indication that, contrary to some authors, behavioural characters, if used properly, can add very informative characters to a data set.
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Abstract The aim of this research project is to draw on accounts of experiences ofborder crossing and regulation at the Canada/U.S. border at Niagara in order to illuminate the dynamics of differentiation and inequality at this site. The research is informed by claims that the world is turning into a global village due to transnational flows oftechnology, infonnation, capital and people. Much of the available literature on globalization shows that while the transfer of technology, information, and capital are enhanced, the transnational movement of people is both facilitated and constrained in complex and unequal ways. In this project, the workings of facilitation and constraint were explored through an analysis often interviews with people who had spent a substantial portion oftheir childhood (e.g. 5 years) in a Canadian border community. The interviewees were at the time ofthe research between the ages of 19 and 25. Because most ofthe respondents were 'white' Canadians of working to upper middle class status, my focus was to explore how 'whiteness' as privilege may translate into enhanced movement across borders and how 'white' people may internalize and enjoy this privilege but may often deny its reality. I was also interested in how inequality is perceived, understood, and legitimated by these relatively privileged people. My analysis ofthe ten accounts ofborder crossing and regulation suggests that differentially situated people experience border crossing differently. An important finding is that while relatively privileged border crossers perceived and often problernatized differential treatment based on external factors such as physical appearance, and especially race, most did not challenge such treatment but rather saw it as acceptable. These findings are located within newer literature that addresses the increasing securitization ofborders and migration in western societies.
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It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.
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This is a Self-study about my role as a teacher, driven by the question: "How do I improve my practice?" (Whitehead, 1989)? In this study, I explored the discomfort that I had with the way that I had been teaching. Specifically, I worked to uncover the reasons behind my obsessive (mis)management of my students. I wrote of how I came to give my Self permission for this critique: how I came to know that all knowledge is a construction, and that my practice, too, is a construction. I grounded this journey within my experiences. I constructed these experiences in narrative fomi in order to reach a greater understanding of how I came to be the teacher I initially was. I explored metaphors that impacted my practice, re-constructed them, and saw more clearly the assumptions and influences that have guided my teaching. I centred my inquiry into my teaching within an Action Reflection methodology, bon-owing Jack Whitehead's (1989) term to describe my version of Action Research. I relied upon the embedded cyclical pattern of Action Reflection to understand my teaching Self: beginning from a critical moment, reflecting upon it, and then taking appropriate action, and continuing in this way, working to improve my practice. To understand these critical moments, I developed a personal definition of critical literacy. I then tumed this definition inward. In treating my practice as a textual production, I applied critical literacy as a framework in coming to know and understand the construction that is my teaching. I grounded my thesis journey within my Self, positioning my study within my experiences of being a grade 1 teacher struggling to teach critical literacy. I then repositioned my journey to that of a grade 1 teacher struggling to use critical literacy to improve my practice. This journey, then, is about the transition from critical literacyit as-subject to critical literacy-as-instmctional-method in improving my practice. I joumeyed inwards, using a critical moment to build new understandings, leading me to the next critical moment, and continued in this cyclical way. I worked in this meandering yet deliberate way to reach a new place in my teaching: one that is more inclusive of all the voices in my room. I concluded my journey with a beginning: a beginning of re-visioning my practice. In telling the stories of my journey, of my teaching, of my experiences, I changed into the teacher that I am more comfortable with. I've come to the frightening conclusion that I am the decisive element in the classroom. It's my personal approach that creates the climate. It's my daily mood that makes the weather As a teacher, I possess a tremendous power to make a person's life miserable or joyous. I can be a tool of torture or an instrument of inspiration. I can humiliate or humour, hurt or heal. In all situations, it is my response that decides whether a crisis will be escalated or de-escalated and a person humanized or de-humanized. (Ginott, as cited in Buscaglia, 2002, p. 22)
Resumo:
Floral nectar is thought to be the primary carbohydrate source for most dipteran species. However, it has been shown that black flies (Burgin & Hunter 1997 a,b,c), mosquitoes (Foster 1995; Burkett et al. 1999; Russell & Hunter 2002), deer flies (Magnarelli & Burger 1984; Janzen & Hunter 1998; Ossowski & Hunter 2000), horse flies (Schutz & Gaugler 1989; Hunter & Ossowski 1999) and sand flies (MacVicker et al. 1990; Wallbanks et al. 1990; Cameron et al. 1992, 1995; Schlein & Jacobson 1994, 1999; Hamilton & EI Naiem 2000) feed on homopteran honeydew as well as floral nectar. Prior to 1997 floral nectar was thought to be the main source of carbohydrates for black flies. However, Burgin & Hunter (1 997a) demonstrated that up to 35% of black flies had recently consumed meals of homo pte ran honeydew. This information has necessitated a re-assessment of many life history aspects of black flies. Attempts are being made to examine the effects of nectar versus honeydew on black fly fecundity and parasite transmission (Hazzard 2003). Recently, Stanfield and Hunter (unpublished data) have shown that in female black flies, honeydew sugars produce flights of longer distance and duration than do nectar sugars. This thesis examines two aspects of black fly biology as it relates to sugar meal consumption. First, the effects of honeydew and nectar on black fly longevity are examined. Second, the proximate causation behind longer flight performances in honeydew-fed flies will be examined. The comparison between these two sources is important because nectar is composed of mainly simple sugars (monosaccharides and disaccharides) whereas honeydew is composed of both simple and complex sugars (including trisaccharides and tetrasaccharides ).
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The goal of the present study was to examine the barriers to access in health services faced by individuals with intellectual disabilities (ID), as well as the nature of communication between people with ID and those who are directly involved in supporting their health and well being. The study included in-depth interviews with five adults who have been identified as having ID and are supported by a community agency, five community agency support staff and four physicians who are specialists in supporting people who have ID. A qualitative content analysis approach facilitated the comparative exploration of key themes that each participant group saw as positive or negative influences on health care access and on effective health care communication. Themes drawn from the findings emphasize the unique roles each of these groups plays within the dialogical framework of the health care encounter. Of particular importance to informants was the issue of people with ID being seen as full participants in their own health care who, like all people, are unique individuals and not simply members of an identified or marginalized group. Participants across groups emphasized the need for the health care recipient to be known as an individual who is an expert in her/his own health and well being and, therefore, entitled to full participation with the support of but not control by others.