The long-term EU budget: size or flexibility? Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/20, November 2012

The EU is in the process of negotiating its 2014-20 financial framework. Failure to reach an agreement would imply a delay in the preparation of the strategic plans each member state puts together to explain how it will use Structural and Cohesion Funds. Even if solutions are found – for example annual renewals of the budget based on the previous year's figures – there will be political and institutional costs. EU leaders have too often and too forcefully advocated the use of the EU budget for growth to be able to drop the idea without consequences. • The overwhelming attention paid to the size of the budget is misplaced. EU leaders should instead aim to make the EU budget more flexible, safeguard it from future political power struggles, and reinforce assessment of the impact of EU funded growth policies. • To improve flexibility a commitment device should be created that places the EU budget above continuous political disagreement. We suggest the creation of a European Growth Fund, on the basis of which the European Commission should be allowed to borrow on capital markets to anticipate pre-allocated EU expenditure, such as Structural and Cohesion Funds. Markets would thus be a factor in EU budget policymaking, with a potentially disciplining effect. Attaching conditionality to this type of disbursement appears legitimate, as capital delivered in this way is a form of assistance.

Reviewing Member States’ Commitment to the European External Action Service. EPIN Working Paper No. 34, 20 November 2012

Based on interviews with diplomats from a representative cross-section of nine member states and members of the EEAS itself, the research findings of this EPIN Working Paper confirm long-standing traditions and member state perceptions of cooperation with European institutions. The paper also reveals new aspects of the intergovernmental method of foreign policy shaping and making in the European Union; in particular how different national positions can positively or negatively affect the consolidation of the EEAS and the role of the EU as an international actor. As such, the Working Paper makes an original contribution to the existing literature on one of most discussed actors in the European Union’s post-Lisbon architecture in the domain of EU external action.

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited. Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize partnership forms of. governance. Accordingly, the political representation of business interests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findings from a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. It highlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. While some of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK. Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution of political power and democratic authority. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Devolution and the political representation of business interests in the UK

The devolution of political power in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland and the developing regional agenda in England are widely read as a significant reconfiguration of the institutions and scales of economic governance. The process is furthest developed in Scotland while Wales and Northern Ireland, in their own distinct ways, provide intermediate cases. Devolution is least developed in England where regional political identities are generally weak and the historical legacy of regional institutions is limited. Within the overall context of devolution government policy has continued to emphasize partnership forms of. governance. Accordingly, the political representation of business interests has a particular salience in the new arrangements. This paper reports on findings from a study designed to examine the relationship between devolution and changes in the political representation of business interests in the territories and regions of the UK. It highlights a number of changes in the nature and extent of business representation. While some of these are significant the evidence suggests that they fail to mark a fundamental shift in the institutional foundation for sub-national business interest representation in the UK. Indeed the political geography of business representation remains dominated by an overarching centralism that is likely to provide a significant check on the further devolution of political power and democratic authority. (c) 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.