In sickness and in health: protecting and supporting public investment in Europe. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2014/02, February 2014

The long-term decline in gross public investment in European Union countries mirrors the trend in other advanced economies, but recent developments have been different: public investment has increased elsewhere, but in the EU it has declined and even collapsed in the most vulnerable countries, exaggerating the output fall. The provisions in the EU fiscal framework to support public investment are very weak.The recently inserted ‘investment clause’ is almost no help. In the short term, exclusion of national co-funding of EU-supported investments from the fiscal indicators considered in the Stability and Growth Pact would be sensible. In the medium term, the EU fiscal framework should be extended with an asymmetric ‘golden rule’ to further protect public investment in bad times, while limiting adverse incentives in good times. During a downturn, a European investment programme is needed and the European Semester should encourage greater investment by member states with healthy public finances and low public investment rates. Reform and harmonisation of budgeting, accounting, transparency and project assessment is also needed to improve the quality of public investment.

Flexibility clauses in the Stability and Growth Pact: No need for revision. CEPS Policy Brief No. 319, 24 July 2014

This Policy Brief offers an in-depth review of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) and looks at whether the margins of flexibility within existing rules are sufficient in the current climate of low growth, or whether there is a need to broaden them. The issue is especially relevant as the changing economic environment is raising fresh questions about whether the EU’s current common economic policies are able to manage dismal growth and low inflation. The fragile state of confidence in financial markets and the unresolved but inevitable questions of moral hazard linked to lax fiscal policies mean that no large-scale fiscal expansion to support the recovery of economic activity is feasible. The discussion may therefore only concern the scope within the SGP to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and to provide room for the implementation of structural reforms. Here, we analyse the flexibility clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact under three headings; namely “exceptional circumstances”, “structural reforms and other relevant factors”, and the “investment clause”. Recommendation: Our main conclusion is that the SGP contains sufficient flexibility to accommodate an unexpected drop in economic activity and has the margins needed to finance structural reforms during the transition to the new regime. We therefore see no need to change the existing rules of the SGP. We believe that the ongoing debate about a fresh growth strategy for the eurozone and the European Union would greatly benefit from removing from the Council table ill-formulated and unnecessary demands for greater flexibility in the SGP.

The eastern ‘partnership’ of gas. Gazprom and CNPC strike a deal on gas supplies to China. OSW COMMENTARY No. 139, 2014-06-16

The CEOs of Gazprom and China’s CNPC signed a contract concerning Russian gas supplies to China on 21 May 2014 in Shanghai. The contract had been under negotiation for many years and was signed in the presence of the two countries’ presidents. Under this 30-year deal, ultimately 38 billion m3 of natural gas will be exported annually from eastern Siberian fields (Chayandinskoye and Kovyktinskoye) via the Power of Siberia pipeline planned for construction in 2015–2019. The lengthy negotiation process (initial talks regarding this issue began back in the 1990s), the circumstances surrounding the signing of the contract (it was signed only on the second day of Vladimir Putin’s visit to Shanghai, and the Russian president’s personal engagement in the final phase of the talks turned out to be a key element) and information concerning the provisions of the contract (the clause determining the contract price has not been revealed) all indicate that the terms of the compromise are more favourable for China than for Russia. This contract is at present important to Russia mainly for political reasons (it will use the future diversification of gas export routes as an instrument in negotiations with the EU). However, the impact of this instrument seems to be limited since supplies cannot be redirected from Europe to Asia. It is unclear whether the contract will bring the anticipated long-term economic benefits to Gazprom. The gas price is likely to remain at a level of between US$350 and US$390 per 1000 m3. Given the high costs of gas field operation and production and transport infrastructure development, this may mean that supplies will be carried out at the margin of profitability. The Shanghai contract does not conclude the negotiation process since a legally binding agreement on gas pipeline construction has not been signed and not all of the financial aspects of the project have been agreed upon as yet (such as the issue of possible Chinese prepayments for gas supplies).

From a European to a common security and defence policy. IES WORKING PAPER 5/2010

The Lisbon Treaty has introduced significant changes in the field of EU security and defence. On the one hand, important institutional reforms, such as the creation of a renewed High Representative, have of course a great impact on this policy field. On the other hand, the Lisbon Treaty has also introduced specific innovations in the security and defence of the European Union. The mutual defence clause and the new mechanisms for flexible cooperation such as the permanent structured cooperation, are only some of the key innovations. Generally, the European Security and Defence Policy receives its own section in the Treaty on European Union and is rebranded as Common Security and Defence Policy. Thus, the Lisbon Treaty sets the objective for a common policy in this field. However, does this reform really provide for the means for the realization of such a common policy? Furthermore, does the Lisbon Treaty increase the importance of CSDP or is the increasing importance of this policy field just reflected in the Treaty text? These are the main questions that the present paper attempts to address through the analysis of the new institutional setting of the post-Lisbon security and defence policy, as well as through the examination of the specific innovations in this area.

The EU regime on biofuels in transport: Still in search of sustainability. Egmont Paper No. 68, July 2014

Like other regions of the world, the EU is developing biofuels in the transport sector to reduce oil consumption and mitigate climate change. To promote them, it has adopted favourable legislation since the 2000s. In 2009 it even decided to oblige each Member State to ensure that by 2020 the share of energy coming from renewable sources reached at least 10% of their final consumption of energy in the transport sector. Biofuels are considered the main instrument to reach that percentage since the development of other alternatives (such as hydrogen and electricity) will take much longer than expected. Meanwhile, these various legislative initiatives have driven the production and consumption of biofuels in the EU. Biofuels accounted for 4.7% of EU transport fuel consumption in 2011. They have also led to trade and investment in biofuels on a global scale. This large-scale expansion of biofuels has, however, revealed numerous negative impacts. These stem from the fact that first-generation biofuels (i.e., those produced from food crops), of which the most important types are biodiesel and bioethanol, are used almost exclusively to meet the EU’s renewable 10% target in transport. Their negative impacts are: socioeconomic (food price rises), legal (land-grabbing), environmental (for instance, water stress and water pollution; soil erosion; reduction of biodiversity), climatic (direct and indirect land-use effects resulting in more greenhouse gas emissions) and public finance issues (subsidies and tax relief). The extent of such negative impacts depends on how biofuel feedstocks are produced and processed, the scale of production, and in particular, how they influence direct land use change (DLUC) and indirect land use change (ILUC) and the international trade. These negative impacts have thus provoked mounting debates in recent years, with a particular focus on ILUC. They have forced the EU to re-examine how it deals with biofuels and submit amendments to update its legislation. So far, the EU legislation foresees that only sustainable biofuels (produced in the EU or imported) can be used to meet the 10% target and receive public support; and to that end, mandatory sustainability criteria have been defined. Yet they have a huge flaw. Their measurement of greenhouse gas savings from biofuels does not take into account greenhouse gas emissions resulting from ILUC, which represent a major problem. The Energy Council of June 2014 agreed to set a limit on the extent to which firstgeneration biofuels can count towards the 10% target. But this limit appears to be less stringent than the ones made previously by the European Commission and the European Parliament. It also agreed to introduce incentives for the use of advanced (second- and third-generation) biofuels which would be allowed to count double towards the 10% target. But this again appears extremely modest by comparison with what was previously proposed. Finally, the approach chosen to take into account the greenhouse gas emissions due to ILUC appears more than cautious. The Energy Council agreed that the European Commission will carry out a reporting of ILUC emissions by using provisional estimated factors. A review clause will permit the later adjustment of these ILUC factors. With such legislative orientations made by the Energy Council, one cannot consider yet that there is a major shift in the EU biofuels policy. Bolder changes would have probably meant risking the collapse of the high-emission conventional biodiesel industry which currently makes up the majority of Europe’s biofuel production. The interests of EU farmers would have also been affected. There is nevertheless a tension between these legislative orientations and the new Commission’s proposals beyond 2020. In any case, many uncertainties remain on this issue. As long as solutions have not been found to minimize the important collateral damages provoked by the first generation biofuels, more scientific studies and caution are needed. Meanwhile, it would be wise to improve alternative paths towards a sustainable transport sector, i.e., stringent emission and energy standards for all vehicles, better public transport systems, automobiles that run on renewable energy other than biofuels, or other alternatives beyond the present imagination.

Europe’s self-defence: Tous pour un et un pour tous? CEPS Commentary, 20 November 2015

When addressing the French Parliament following last week’s terrorist atrocities in Paris, French President François Hollande invoked Article 42(7) of the Treaty on the European Union. Never before has this EU’s ‘mutual assistance clause’ been activated by an EU member state. What does it provide and what are its practical implications?

European security after the Paris attacks. CEPS Commentary, 24 November 2015

The November 13th terrorist attacks in Paris have prompted the European Union to activate the mutual assistance clause contained in Art. 42.7 of the EU Treaty. Member states are now entering the unchartered territory of large-scale conflict: will they join a French-led coalition of the willing, or is the military intervention against Daesh being Europeanised? This Commentary explores implications of the Paris attacks on European security and recommends coordinated and comprehensive responses to be taken within the EU framework.

Labor clauses in regional trade agreements and effects on labor conditions : an empirical analysis

An increasing number of bilateral or plurilateral trade agreements (or regional trade agreements: RTAs) include "labor clauses" that require or urge the signatory countries to commit to maintaining a certain level of labor standards. This paper performs an empirical analysis of the impacts of such labor clauses provided in RTAs on working conditions that laborers in the RTA signatory countries actually face, using macro-level data for a wide variety of countries. The paper first examines the texts of labor provisions in more than 220 effective RTAs and (re-)classifies "RTAs with labor clauses" according to two criteria: (i) the agreement urges or expects the signatory countries to harmonize their domestic labor standards with internationally recognized standards, and (ii) the agreement stipulates the procedures for consultations and/or dispute settlement on labor-condition issues between the signatory countries. Based on this labor-clause RTA classification, the paper estimates the impacts of RTA labor clauses on working conditions in countries with two empirical specifications using the sample covering 136 countries or economies and years from 1995 through 2011. The estimation is extended to takes into account possible lags in the labor-condition effects of labor clauses as well as to consider potential difference in the impacts for countries in different income levels. The empirical results for the four measures of labor conditions (mean monthly real earnings, mean weekly work hours per employee, fatal occupational injury rate, and the number of the ILO's Core Conventions ratified) find no evidence for possible pro-labor-condition effects of RTA labor clauses overall, which should be consistent with the view of economics literature that questions the relevance of linking trade policy with issues in the domestic labor standards.

The Problem Sensitization Robotic Complex Drilling and Milling of Sandwich Shells of Polymer Composites

In clause is given robotic a complex for drilling and milling sandwich shells from polymeric composites. The machining of polymeric composite materials has technological problems. At drilling sandwich shells there is a probability of destruction of a drill from hit of the tool in a partition. The system sensibilization robotic complex for increase of reliability of work of the cutting tool of the small size is offered.

Decomposing hierarchical alignment: Co-arguments as conditions on alignment and the limits of referential hierarchies as explanations in verb agreement

Apart from common cases of differential argument marking, referential hierarchies affect argument marking in two ways: (a) through hierarchical marking, where markers compete for a slot and the competition is resolved by a hierarchy, and (b) through co-argument sensitivity, where the marking of one argument depends on the properties of its co-argument. Here we show that while co-argument sensitivity cannot be analyzed in terms of hierarchical marking, hierarchical marking can be analyzed in terms of co-argument sensitivity. Once hierarchical effects on marking are analyzed in terms of co-argument sensitivity, it becomes possible to examine alignment patterns relative to referential categories in exactly the same way as one can examine alignment patterns relative to referential categories in cases of differential argument marking and indeed any other condition on alignment (such as tense or clause type). As a result, instances of hierarchical marking of any kind turn out not to present a special case in the typology of alignment, and there is no need for positing an additional non-basic alignment type such as “hierarchical alignment”. While hierarchies are not needed for descriptive and comparative purposes, we also cast doubt on their relevance in diachrony: examining two families for which hierarchical agreement has been postulated, Algonquian and Kiranti, we find only weak and very limited statistical evidence for agreement paradigms to have been shaped by a principled ranking of person categories.

Amending the Export-import bank act of 1945 with respect to credit to Communist countries : hearings before the Subcommittee on International Trade, Investment, and Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, first session, on H.R. 1908 ... July 23 and 24, 1979.

"Serial no. 96-24."

Federal money laundering cases.

"February 1997"--Cover.

Political pamphlets

A collection of miscellaneous pamphlets on politics.

Germanic philology pamphlets

A collection of miscellaneous pamphlets.

The revision of the state constitution.

--pt. II. City and county government: Home rule for cities, by H. L. McBain. A proposal for a revision of the municipal article, by L. A. Tanzer. Local government and the state constitution, by M. H. Glynn. The city and the state constitution, by J. P. Mitchel. The organization of county government, by G. S. Buck. Regulation of economic and social conditions: Constitutional limitations on governmental powers, by S. McC. Lindsay. The future of the workmen's compensation amendment, by T. I. Parkinson. Labor legislation, by A. I. Elkus. State policy of forest and water-power conservation, by J. G. Agar. Public service commissions and the state constitution, by J. N. Carlisle. Charitable and correctional institutions and public health, by H. Folks. The Constitution and public franchises, by D. F. Wilcox. Report of the meeting.