895 resultados para Flexible packaging


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This paper uses examples from a Swedish study to suggest some ways in which cultural variation could be included in studies of thermal comfort. It is shown how only a slight shift of focus and methodological approach could help us discover aspects of human life that add to previous knowledge within comfort research of how human beings perceive and handle warmth and cold. It is concluded that it is not enough for buildings, heating systems and thermal control devices to be energy-efficient in a mere technical sense. If these are to help to decrease, rather than to increase, energy consumption, they have to support those parts of already existing habits and modes of thought that have the potential for low energy use. This is one reason why culture-specific features and emotional cores need to be investigated and deployed into the study and development of thermal comfort.

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The aim of this paper is to develop a flexible model for analysis of quantitative trait loci (QTL) in outbred line crosses, which includes both additive and dominance effects. Our flexible intercross analysis (FIA) model accounts for QTL that are not fixed within founder lines and is based on the variance component framework. Genome scans with FIA are performed using a score statistic, which does not require variance component estimation. RESULTS: Simulations of a pedigree with 800 F2 individuals showed that the power of FIA including both additive and dominance effects was almost 50% for a QTL with equal allele frequencies in both lines with complete dominance and a moderate effect, whereas the power of a traditional regression model was equal to the chosen significance value of 5%. The power of FIA without dominance effects included in the model was close to those obtained for FIA with dominance for all simulated cases except for QTL with overdominant effects. A genome-wide linkage analysis of experimental data from an F2 intercross between Red Jungle Fowl and White Leghorn was performed with both additive and dominance effects included in FIA. The score values for chicken body weight at 200 days of age were similar to those obtained in FIA analysis without dominance. CONCLUSION: We have extended FIA to include QTL dominance effects. The power of FIA was superior, or similar, to standard regression methods for QTL effects with dominance. The difference in power for FIA with or without dominance is expected to be small as long as the QTL effects are not overdominant. We suggest that FIA with only additive effects should be the standard model to be used, especially since it is more computationally efficient.

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This research explores the downstream perceptions of liquid carton board versus competing materials in packaging applications for juice. The methodology used is focus groups. The context is sustainability and functional performance, and related potential implications for the beverage industry value chain. The purpose is to get a deeper insight and understanding of functionality in relation to juice beverage packaging. The results confirm that there is no optimal packaging for every juice product, but a multitude, depending on the distribution channel, retail outlet, customer preferences, and context of consumption. There are some general packaging preferences, but the main deciding criteria for purchase seem to be the product characteristics in terms of quality, taste, brand, price and shelf life. For marketing reasons, packaging has to be adopted to the product and its positioning, liquid carton board packaging seem to have some functional advantages in distribution and is considered as sustainable and functional among many consumers. Major drawbacks seem to be shape limitations, lack of transparency, and lack of a “premium look”. To improve packaging performance and avoid sub-optimization, actors in the beverage industry value chain need to be integrated in development processes.

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The inability of rational expectation models with money supply rules to deliver inflation persistence following a transitory deviation of money growth from trend is due to the rapid adjustment of the price level to expected events. The observation of persistent inflation in macroeconomic data leads many economists to believe that prices adjust sluggishly and/or expectations must not be rational. Inflation persistence in U.S. data can be characterized by a vector autocorrelation function relating inflation and deviations of output from trend. In the vector autocorrelation function both inflation and output are highly persistent and there are significant positive dynamic cross-correlations relating inflation and output. This paper shows that a flexible-price general equilibrium business cycle model with money and a central bank using a Taylor rule can account for these patterns. There are no sticky prices and no liquidity effects. Agents decisions in a period are taken only after all shocks are observed. The monetary policy rule transforms output persistence into inflation persistence and creates positive cross-correlations between inflation and output.

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My dissertation focuses on dynamic aspects of coordination processes such as reversibility of early actions, option to delay decisions, and learning of the environment from the observation of other people’s actions. This study proposes the use of tractable dynamic global games where players privately and passively learn about their actions’ true payoffs and are able to adjust early investment decisions to the arrival of new information to investigate the consequences of the presence of liquidity shocks to the performance of a Tobin tax as a policy intended to foster coordination success (chapter 1), and the adequacy of the use of a Tobin tax in order to reduce an economy’s vulnerability to sudden stops (chapter 2). Then, it analyzes players’ incentive to acquire costly information in a sequential decision setting (chapter 3). In chapter 1, a continuum of foreign agents decide whether to enter or not in an investment project. A fraction λ of them are hit by liquidity restrictions in a second period and are forced to withdraw early investment or precluded from investing in the interim period, depending on the actions they chose in the first period. Players not affected by the liquidity shock are able to revise early decisions. Coordination success is increasing in the aggregate investment and decreasing in the aggregate volume of capital exit. Without liquidity shocks, aggregate investment is (in a pivotal contingency) invariant to frictions like a tax on short term capitals. In this case, a Tobin tax always increases success incidence. In the presence of liquidity shocks, this invariance result no longer holds in equilibrium. A Tobin tax becomes harmful to aggregate investment, which may reduces success incidence if the economy does not benefit enough from avoiding capital reversals. It is shown that the Tobin tax that maximizes the ex-ante probability of successfully coordinated investment is decreasing in the liquidity shock. Chapter 2 studies the effects of a Tobin tax in the same setting of the global game model proposed in chapter 1, with the exception that the liquidity shock is considered stochastic, i.e, there is also aggregate uncertainty about the extension of the liquidity restrictions. It identifies conditions under which, in the unique equilibrium of the model with low probability of liquidity shocks but large dry-ups, a Tobin tax is welfare improving, helping agents to coordinate on the good outcome. The model provides a rationale for a Tobin tax on economies that are prone to sudden stops. The optimal Tobin tax tends to be larger when capital reversals are more harmful and when the fraction of agents hit by liquidity shocks is smaller. Chapter 3 focuses on information acquisition in a sequential decision game with payoff complementar- ity and information externality. When information is cheap relatively to players’ incentive to coordinate actions, only the first player chooses to process information; the second player learns about the true payoff distribution from the observation of the first player’s decision and follows her action. Miscoordination requires that both players privately precess information, which tends to happen when it is expensive and the prior knowledge about the distribution of the payoffs has a large variance.

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Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)