Sôbre uma fórmula para o cálculo da dose mais econômica de adubo

The authors discuss a formula for the determination of the most profitable level of fertilization (x*). This formula, presented by CAREY and ROBINSON (1953), can be written as: x*= (1/c) log cx u L10 + (1/c) log wu _______ ___ 1-10 x u t being c the growth factor in Mitscherlich's equation, x u a standard dressing of the nutrient, L 10 the Naeperian logarithm of 10, u the response to the standard dressing, w the unit price of the crop product, and i the unit price of the nutrient. This formula is a modification of one of the formulas of PIMENTEL GOMES (1953). One of its advantages is that is does not depend on A, the theoretical maximum harvest, which is not directly given by experimental data. But another advantage, proved in this. paper, is that the first term on the right hand side K= 1(/c) log cx u L 10 ____________ 1 - 10-cx u is practically independent of c, and approximately equivalent to (1/2) x u. So, we have approximately x* = (1/2) x u + (1/c) log wu . ____ x u t With experimental data we compute z = wu ____ x u t then using tables 1, 2 and 3, we may obtain Y - (1/c) log z and finally x* = (1/2) x u + Y. This is an easy way to determine the most profitable level of fertilization when experimental data on the response u to a dressing x u are available. Tables for the calculation of Y are included, for nitrogen, phosphorus, potash, and manure.

Diseño e impartición en un entorno digital de una asignatura de traducción especializada jurídica y económica

Aquest treball descriu el disseny i avaluació d’una assignatura de quart curs de traducció especialitzada de textos econòmics anglès-espanyol en la que van barrejar estudiants presencials amb assistència regular a classe i estudiants que seguien l’assignatura en format semipresencial. L’enfocament metodològic va ser el del constructivisme social. La plataforma educativa del campus virtual de la Universitat de Vic va servir com a base de la interacció del grup i de les activitats. Per a les traduccions es va utilitzar l’eina de traducció assistida Wordfast. El procediment d’avaluació de les traduccions va intentar afavorir l’autonomia dels estudiants. Es van assajar models d’avaluació en els que es va intentar que la comunitat d’aprenentatge assumís la responsabilitat de la valoració de les traduccions des de criteris professionals. L’assignatura es va impartir durant el primer quadrimestre del curs 2003-2004. Els resultats, que s’inclouen en aquest treball, s’analitzen a partir de les dades que proporcionen les eines següents: - Qüestionari previ als alumnes. - Qüestionari final als alumnes. - Fòrum de debat. - Diari del professor.

Retribution in a cheap-talk experiment

We use a two-person 3-stage game to investigate whether people choose to punish or reward another player by sacrificing money to increase or decrease the other person’s payoff. One player sends a message indicating an intended play, which is either favorable or unfavorable to the other player in the game. After the message, the sender and the receiver play a simultaneous 2x2 game. A deceptive message may be made, in an effort to induce the receiver to make a play favorable to the sender. Our focus is on whether receivers’ rates of monetary sacrifice depend on the process and the perceived sender’s intention, as is suggested by the literature on deception and procedural satisfaction. Models such as Rabin (1993), Sen (1997), and Charness and Rabin (1999) also permit rates of sacrifice to be sensitive to the sender’s perceived intention, while outcome-based models such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (1997) predict otherwise. We find that deception substantially increases the punishment rate as a response to an action that is unfavorable to the receiver. We also find that a small but significant percentage of subjects choose to reward a favorable action choice made by the sender.

Consumers' behavior and the Bertrand paradox: an ACE approach

We analyze the classical Bertrand model when consumers exhibit some strategic behavior in deciding from which seller they will buy. We use two related but different tools. Both consider a probabilistic learning (or evolutionary) mechanism, and in the two of them consumers' behavior in uences the competition between the sellers. The results obtained show that, in general, developing some sort of loyalty is a good strategy for the buyers as it works in their best interest. First, we consider a learning procedure described by a deterministic dynamic system and, using strong simplifying assumptions, we can produce a description of the process behavior. Second, we use nite automata to represent the strategies played by the agents and an adaptive process based on genetic algorithms to simulate the stochastic process of learning. By doing so we can relax some of the strong assumptions used in the rst approach and still obtain the same basic results. It is suggested that the limitations of the rst approach (analytical) provide a good motivation for the second approach (Agent-Based). Indeed, although both approaches address the same problem, the use of Agent-Based computational techniques allows us to relax hypothesis and overcome the limitations of the analytical approach.

Corrigendum stable matchings and preferences of couples

We correct an omission in the definition of our domain of weakly responsive preferences introduced in Klaus and Klijn (2005) or KK05 for short. The proof of the existence of stable matchings (KK05, Theorem 3.3) and a maximal domain result (KK05, Theorem 3.5) are adjusted accordingly.

Median stable matching for college admission

We give a simple and concise proof that so-called generalized median stable matchings are well-defined stable matchings for college admissions problems. Furthermore, we discuss the fairness properties of median stable matchings and conclude with two illustrative examples of college admissions markets, the lattices of stable matchings, and the corresponding generalized median stable matchings.

A cooperative appproach to queue allocation of indivisible objects

We consider the allocation of a finite number of indivisible objects to the same number of agents according to an exogenously given queue. We assume that the agents collaborate in order to achieve an efficient outcome for society. We allow for side-payments and provide a method for obtaining stable outcomes.

Sequencing games without initial order

In this note we study uncertainty sequencing situations, i.e., 1-machine sequencing situations in which no initial order is specified. We associate cooperative games with these sequencing situations, study their core, and provide links with the classic sequencing games introduced by Curiel et al. (1989). Moreover, we propose and characterize two simple cost allocation rules for uncertainty sequencing situations with equal processing times.

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's (1990) result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets. Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from `satisfying' blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.

Distribution center consolidation games

We study the location-inventory model as introduced by Teo et al. (2001) to analyze the impact of consolidation of distribution centers on facility and inventory costs. We extend their result on profitability of consolidation. We associate a cooperative game with each location-inventory situation and prove that this game has a non-empty core for identical and independent demand processes. This illustrates that consolidation does not only lower joint costs (which was shown by Teo et al. (2001)), but it allows for a stable division of the minimal costs as well.

Procedurally fair and stable matching

We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al., 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and "endstate'' fairness. Aldershof et al. (1999) and Ma (1996) that exist on the probability distribution induced by both mechanisms. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism.