Law's Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts: Essays in Honour of William Twining

Law's Ethical, Global and Theoretical Contexts examines William Twining's principal contributions to law and jurisprudence in the context of three issues which will receive significant scholarly attention over the coming decades. Part I explores human rights, including torture, the role of evidence in human rights cases, the emerging discourse on 'traditional values', the relevance of 'Southern voices' to human rights debates, and the relationship between human rights and peace agreements. Part II assesses the impact of globalization through the lenses of sociology and comparative constitutionalism, and features an analysis of the development of pluralistic ideas of law in the context of privatization. Finally, Part III addresses issues of legal theory, including whether global legal pluralism needs a concept of law, the importance of context in legal interpretation, the effect of increasing digitalization on legal theory, and the utility of feminist and postmodern approaches to globalization and legal theory.

Essays on James Clarence Mangan: The Man in the Cloak

This volume explores the extraordinary literary achievement of James Clarence Mangan (1803-1849), increasingly recognised as one of the most important Irish writers of the nineteenth century and a crucial influence on later writers such as W.B. Yeats and James Joyce. It is the first collection of essays to focus on Mangan, and features articles by leading scholars in the field (including Jacques Chuto and David Lloyd) as well as contributions from acclaimed contemporary writers, Paul Muldoon and Ciaran Carson. The collection expands existing fields of debate--translation, the supernatural, intertextuality, nationalism, romanticism-- and introduces new ones: Mangan's afterlife in the English literary canon, cosmopolitanism and Weltliteratur, antiquity and futurity, nineteenth-century spiritualism and magical thinking. 'The man in the cloak', one of Mangan's favourite pseudonyms, is still a a resonant soubriquet for a writer who has eluded sustained critical attention, and this volumes restores him to his proper place in European and British, as well as Irish literary history.

Essays on energy derivatives pricing and financial risk management

This thesis consists of an introductory chapter (essay I) and five more empirical essays on electricity markets and CO2 spot price behaviour, derivatives pricing analysis and hedging. Essay I presents the structure of the thesis and electricity markets functioning and characteristics, as well as the type of products traded, to be analyzed on the following essays. In the second essay we conduct an empirical study on co-movements in electricity markets resorting to wavelet analysis, discussing long-term dynamics and markets integration. Essay three is about hedging performance and multiscale relationships in the German electricity spot and futures markets, also using wavelet analysis. We concentrate the investigation on the relationship between coherence evolution and hedge ratio analysis, on a time-frequency-scale approach, between spot and futures which conditions the effectiveness of the hedging strategy. Essays four, five and six are interrelated between them and with the other two previous essays given the nature of the commodity analyzed, CO2 emission allowances, traded in electricity markets. Relationships between electricity prices, primary energy fuel prices and carbon dioxide permits are analyzed on essay four. The efficiency of the European market for allowances is examined taking into account markets heterogeneity. Essay five analyzes stylized statistical properties of the recent traded asset CO2 emission allowances, for spot and futures returns, examining also the relation linking convenience yield and risk premium, for the German European Energy Exchange (EEX) between October 2005 and October 2009. The study was conducted through empirical estimations of CO2 allowances risk premium, convenience yield, and their relation. Future prices from an ex-post perspective are examined to show evidence for significant negative risk premium, or else a positive forward premium. Finally, essay six analyzes emission allowances futures hedging effectiveness, providing evidence for utility gains increases with investor’s preference over risk. Deregulation of electricity markets has led to higher uncertainty in electricity prices and by presenting these essays we try to shed new lights about structuring, pricing and hedging in this type of markets.

Memorial of citizens of Chesterfield, Marlborough, and Darlington, assembled at Cheraw in South Carolina, against a further increase of duties on imported articles, February 4, 1828 : referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the state of the Union

This document contains a memorial, which was written by the citizens of Chesterfield, Marlborough, and Darlington, assembled in the town of Cheraw, on July 25, the 25, 1827 in the state of South Carolina who were engaged in agriculture and commerce and presented it to oppose the tariff increase. It was presented to the Congress of the United States.

Essays in environmental and happiness economics

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Three essays on game theory and bargaining

A PhD Dissertation, presented as part of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy from the NOVA - School of Business and Economics

Essays in health economics: Volume-Outcome Effect, upcoding behaviour and the evaluation of a short-term intervention program

Evidence in the literature suggests a negative relationship between volume of medical procedures and mortality rates in the health care sector. In general, high-volume hospitals appear to achieve lower mortality rates, although considerable variation exists. However, most studies focus on US hospitals, which face different incentives than hospitals in a National Health Service (NHS). In order to add to the literature, this study aims to understand what happens in a NHS. Results reveal a statistically significant correlation between volume of procedures and better outcomes for the following medical procedures: cerebral infarction, respiratory infections, circulatory disorders with AMI, bowel procedures, cirrhosis, and hip and femur procedures. The effect is explained with the practice-makes-perfect hypothesis through static effects of scale with little evidence of learning-by-doing. The centralization of those medical procedures is recommended given that this policy would save a considerable number of lives (reduction of 12% in deaths for cerebral infarction).

The new economy: Essays in network economics and two-sided markets

Following the Introduction, which surveys existing literature on the technology advances and regulation in telecommunications and on two-sided markets, we address specific issues on the industries of the New Economy, featured by the existence of network effects. We seek to explore how each one of these industries work, identify potential market failures and find new solutions at the economic regulation level promoting social welfare. In Chapter 1 we analyze a regulatory issue on access prices and investments in the telecommunications market. The existing literature on access prices and investment has pointed out that networks underinvest under a regime of mandatory access provision with a fixed access price per end-user. We propose a new access pricing rule, the indexation approach, i.e., the access price, per end-user, that network i pays to network j is function of the investment levels set by both networks. We show that the indexation can enhance economic efficiency beyond what is achieved with a fixed access price. In particular, access price indexation can simultaneously induce lower retail prices and higher investment and social welfare as compared to a fixed access pricing or a regulatory holidays regime. Furthermore, we provide sufficient conditions under which the indexation can implement the socially optimal investment or the Ramsey solution, which would be impossible to obtain under fixed access pricing. Our results contradict the notion that investment efficiency must be sacrificed for gains in pricing efficiency. In Chapter 2 we investigate the effect of regulations that limit advertising airtime on advertising quality and on social welfare. We show, first, that advertising time regulation may reduce the average quality of advertising broadcast on TV networks. Second, an advertising cap may reduce media platforms and firms' profits, while the net effect on viewers (subscribers) welfare is ambiguous because the ad quality reduction resulting from a regulatory cap o¤sets the subscribers direct gain from watching fewer ads. We find that if subscribers are sufficiently sensitive to ad quality, i.e., the ad quality reduction outweighs the direct effect of the cap, a cap may reduce social welfare. The welfare results suggest that a regulatory authority that is trying to increase welfare via regulation of the volume of advertising on TV might necessitate to also regulate advertising quality or, if regulating quality proves impractical, take the effect of advertising quality into consideration. 3 In Chapter 3 we investigate the rules that govern Electronic Payment Networks (EPNs). In EPNs the No-Surcharge Rule (NSR) requires that merchants charge at most the same amount for a payment card transaction as for cash. In this chapter, we analyze a three- party model (consumers, merchants, and a proprietary EPN) with endogenous transaction volumes and heterogenous merchants' transactional benefits of accepting cards to assess the welfare impacts of the NSR. We show that, if merchants are local monopolists and the network externalities from merchants to cardholders are sufficiently strong, with the exception of the EPN, all agents will be worse o¤ with the NSR, and therefore the NSR is socially undesirable. The positive role of the NSR in terms of improvement of retail price efficiency for cardholders is also highlighted.

Essays on bounded rationality: Individual decision and strategic interaction

Economics is a social science which, therefore, focuses on people and on the decisions they make, be it in an individual context, or in group situations. It studies human choices, in face of needs to be fulfilled, and a limited amount of resources to fulfill them. For a long time, there was a convergence between the normative and positive views of human behavior, in that the ideal and predicted decisions of agents in economic models were entangled in one single concept. That is, it was assumed that the best that could be done in each situation was exactly the choice that would prevail. Or, at least, that the facts that economics needed to explain could be understood in the light of models in which individual agents act as if they are able to make ideal decisions. However, in the last decades, the complexity of the environment in which economic decisions are made and the limits on the ability of agents to deal with it have been recognized, and incorporated into models of decision making in what came to be known as the bounded rationality paradigm. This was triggered by the incapacity of the unboundedly rationality paradigm to explain observed phenomena and behavior. This thesis contributes to the literature in three different ways. Chapter 1 is a survey on bounded rationality, which gathers and organizes the contributions to the field since Simon (1955) first recognized the necessity to account for the limits on human rationality. The focus of the survey is on theoretical work rather than the experimental literature which presents evidence of actual behavior that differs from what classic rationality predicts. The general framework is as follows. Given a set of exogenous variables, the economic agent needs to choose an element from the choice set that is avail- able to him, in order to optimize the expected value of an objective function (assuming his preferences are representable by such a function). If this problem is too complex for the agent to deal with, one or more of its elements is simplified. Each bounded rationality theory is categorized according to the most relevant element it simplifes. Chapter 2 proposes a novel theory of bounded rationality. Much in the same fashion as Conlisk (1980) and Gabaix (2014), we assume that thinking is costly in the sense that agents have to pay a cost for performing mental operations. In our model, if they choose not to think, such cost is avoided, but they are left with a single alternative, labeled the default choice. We exemplify the idea with a very simple model of consumer choice and identify the concept of isofin curves, i.e., sets of default choices which generate the same utility net of thinking cost. Then, we apply the idea to a linear symmetric Cournot duopoly, in which the default choice can be interpreted as the most natural quantity to be produced in the market. We find that, as the thinking cost increases, the number of firms thinking in equilibrium decreases. More interestingly, for intermediate levels of thinking cost, an equilibrium in which one of the firms chooses the default quantity and the other best responds to it exists, generating asymmetric choices in a symmetric model. Our model is able to explain well-known regularities identified in the Cournot experimental literature, such as the adoption of different strategies by players (Huck et al. , 1999), the inter temporal rigidity of choices (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003) and the dispersion of quantities in the context of di cult decision making (Bosch-Dom enech & Vriend, 2003). Chapter 3 applies a model of bounded rationality in a game-theoretic set- ting to the well-known turnout paradox in large elections, pivotal probabilities vanish very quickly and no one should vote, in sharp contrast with the ob- served high levels of turnout. Inspired by the concept of rhizomatic thinking, introduced by Bravo-Furtado & Côrte-Real (2009a), we assume that each per- son is self-delusional in the sense that, when making a decision, she believes that a fraction of the people who support the same party decides alike, even if no communication is established between them. This kind of belief simplifies the decision of the agent, as it reduces the number of players he believes to be playing against { it is thus a bounded rationality approach. Studying a two-party first-past-the-post election with a continuum of self-delusional agents, we show that the turnout rate is positive in all the possible equilibria, and that it can be as high as 100%. The game displays multiple equilibria, at least one of which entails a victory of the bigger party. The smaller one may also win, provided its relative size is not too small; more self-delusional voters in the minority party decreases this threshold size. Our model is able to explain some empirical facts, such as the possibility that a close election leads to low turnout (Geys, 2006), a lower margin of victory when turnout is higher (Geys, 2006) and high turnout rates favoring the minority (Bernhagen & Marsh, 1997).

Leniency programs, antitrust enforcement and multimarket contact : three essays in industrial organization

The Layout of My Thesis This thesis contains three chapters in Industrial Organization that build on the work outlined above. The first two chapters combine leniency programs with multimarket contact and provide a thorough analysis of the potential effects of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus. The third chapter puts the whole discussion on leniency programs into perspective by examining other enforcement tools available to an antitrust authority. The main argument in that last chapter is that a specific instrument can only be as effective as the policy in which it is embedded. It is therefore important for an antitrust authority to know how it best accompanies the introduction or modification of a policy instrument that helps deterrence. INTRODUCTION Chapter 1 examines the efféct of Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus on the incentives of firms to report cartel activities. The main question is whether the inclusion of these policies in a leniency program undermine the effectiveness of the latter by discouraging the firms to apply for amnesty. The model is static and focus on the ex post incentives of firms to desist from collusion. The results suggest that, because Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus encourage the reporting of a second cartel after a first detection, a firm, anticipating this, may be reluctant to seek leniency and to report in the first place. However, the effect may also go in the opposite direction, and Amnesty Plus and Penalty Plus may encourage the simultaneous reporting of two cartels. Chapter 2 takes this idea further to the stage of cartel formation. This chapter provides a complete characterization of the potential anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of Amnesty Plus in a infinitely repeated game framework when the firms use their multimarket contact to harshen punishment. I suggest a clear-cut policy rule that prevents potential adverse effects and thereby show that, if policy makers follow this rule, a leniency program with Amnesty Plus performs better than one without. Chapter 3 characterizes the socially optimal enforcement effort of an antitrust authority and shows how this effort changes with the introduction or modification of specific policy instruments. The intuition is that the policy instrument may increase the marginal benefit of conducting investigations. If this effect is strong enough, a more rigorous detection policy becomes socially desirable.