Claude Elwood Shannon e a symbolic analysis of relay and switching circuits: tornando o computador uma máquina semiótica.

O nome de Claude Elwood Shannon não é totalmente estranho aos pesquisadores de Comunicação Social. No entanto, parte de sua importância para a história da comunicação no século XX é pouco conhecida. Sua dissertação de mestrado e o artigo dela derivado (A Symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits) foram essenciais para que o computador se tornasse uma máquina de comunicação e, conseqüentemente, penetrasse em nossa sociedade na forma como ocorre hoje. Este artigo revisa o primeiro grande trabalho de Shannon e explicita sua participação no contexto atual da comunicação.

Improving mutual fund market timing measures: a markov switching approach

Market timing performance of mutual funds is usually evaluated with linear models with dummy variables which allow for the beta coefficient of CAPM to vary across two regimes: bullish and bearish market excess returns. Managers, however, use their predictions of the state of nature to deÞne whether to carry low or high beta portfolios instead of the observed ones. Our approach here is to take this into account and model market timing as a switching regime in a way similar to Hamilton s Markov-switching GNP model. We then build a measure of market timing success and apply it to simulated and real world data.

The trade-off between incentives and endogenous risk

Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has not confirmed this prediction. In this paper, we propose a model with adverse selection followed by moral hazard, where effort and the degree of risk aversion are private information of an agent who can control the mean and the variance of profits. For a given contract, more risk-averse agents suppIy more effort in risk reduction. If the marginal utility of incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contractsj thus, in the optimal contract, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of reduction in risk makes the marginal utility of incentives increasing in risk aversion and, in this case, risk and incentives are negatively related.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seignorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditure GDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine two central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after hocks to either revenues or expenditures? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not;(ii) a rational Brazilian consumer can have a behavior consistent with Ricardian Equivalence (iii) seignorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.

Testing the externalities hypothesis of endogenous growth using cointegration

The initial endogenous growth models emphasized the importance of externaI effects in explaining sustainable growth across time. Empirically, this hypothesis can be confirmed if the coefficient of physical capital per hour is unity in the aggregate production function. Although cross-section results concur with theory, previous estimates using time series data rejected this hypothesis, showing a small coefficient far from unity. It seems that the problem lies not with the theory but with the techniques employed, which are unable to capture low frequency movements in high frequency data. This paper uses cointegration - a technique designed to capture the existence of long-run relationships in multivariate time series - to test the externalities hypothesis of endogenous growth. The results confirm the theory' and conform to previous cross-section estimates. We show that there is long-run proportionality between output per hour and a measure of capital per hour. U sing this result, we confmn the hypothesis that the implied Solow residual can be explained by government expenditures on infra-structure, which suggests a supply side role for government affecting productivity and a decrease on the extent that the Solow residual explains the variation of output.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and inflation inertia: preliminary version

When policy rules are changed, the effect of nominal rigidities should be modelled through endogenous pricing rules. We endogenize Taylor (1979) type pricing rule to examine the output effects of monetary disinflations. We derive optimal fixed-price time-dependent rules in inflationary steady states and during disinflations. We also develop a methodology to aggregate individual pricing rules which vary through disinflation. This allows us to reevaluate the output costs of monetary disinflation, including aspects as the role of the initial leveI of inflation and the importance of the degree of credibility of the policy change.

Endogenous collateral

We study an economy where there are two types of assets. Consumers’ promises are the primitive defaultable assets secured by collateral chosen by the consumers themselves. The purchase of these personalized assets by financial intermediaries is financed by selling back derivatives to consumers. We show that nonarbitrage prices of primitive assets are strict submartingales, whereas nonarbitrage prices of derivatives are supermartingales. Next we establish existence of equilibrium, without imposing bounds on short sales. The nonconvexity of the budget set is overcome by considering a continuum of agents.

Endogenous time-dependent rules and the costs of disinflation with imperfect credibility

This paper examines the output effects of monetary disinflation in a model with endogenous time-dependent pricing rules and imperfect credibility of the disinflation policy. We find that these features interact to generate an additional effect on top f the ones obtained with either endogenous time-dependent rules (Bonomo and Carvalho, 2003) or imperfect credibility (Ball, 1995) in isolation. This results in higher output costs of monetary disinflation.

Endogenous growth with deferred technological change

Lucas (2009) propôs um modelo com dois setores para explicar padrões observados em dados de crescimento. Entretanto, a análise de Lucas não envolve uma decisão intertemporal para o consumidor. O comportamento das variáveis é determinado à priori pela tecnologia escolhida. Rodriguez (2006) propôs um modelo com a tecnologia com dois setores apresentada por Lucas adicionando um processo de decisão intertemporal para o consumidor. Adicionalmente aos resultados obtidos por Rodriguez, nós caracterizamos suficiência e apresentamos exemplos esclarecedores de casos particulares do modelo. Ademais, nós fazemos um esforço para derivar novos insights e esclarecer alguns pontos técnicos. Finalmente, nós obtemos condições sob as quais a economia investe em capital humano mesmo com benefícios diferidos.

Posicionamento estratégico com switching costs e lock-in na economia da informação

Apresenta uma perspectiva de análise de posicionamento estratégico utilizando-se os princípios econômicos de switching costs e lock-in. Aborda as diferentes fontes de switching costs e analisa as estratégias de lock-in. Apresenta um caso prático com aplicação destes conceitos no segmento de ERP no Brasil.

Electoral rules, political competition and fiscal spending: regression discontinuity evidence from brazilian municipalities

We exploit a discontinuity in Brazilian municipal election rules to investigate whether political competition has a causal impact on policy choices. In municipalities with less than 200,000 voters mayors are elected with a plurality of the vote. In municipalities with more than 200,000 voters a run-off election takes place among the top two candidates if neither achieves a majority of the votes. At a first stage, we show that the possibility of runoff increases political competition. At a second stage, we use the discontinuity as a source of exogenous variation to infer causality from political competition to fiscal policy. Our second stage results suggest that political competition induces more investment and less current spending, particularly personnel expenses. Furthermore, the impact of political competition is larger when incumbents can run for reelection, suggesting incentives matter insofar as incumbents can themselves remain in office.

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Imperfectly credible disinflation under endogenous time-ependent pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. Therefore, the study of how policymakers’ credibility affects the outcome of an announced disinflation should not be dissociated from the analysis of the determinants of the frequency of price adjustments. In this paper we examine how credibility affects the outcome of a disinflation in a model with endogenous timedependent pricing rules. Both the initial degree of price ridigity, calculated optimally, and, more notably, the changes in contract length during disinflation play an important role in the explanation of the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially evaluate the costs of disinflation in a setup where credibility is exogenous, and then allow agents to use Bayes rule to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between the endogeneity of time-dependent rules and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation, but the pattern of the output path is more realistic in the case with learning.

Public debt sustainability and endogenous seigniorage in Brazil: time-series evidence from 1947-92: revised version

Using national accounts data for the revenue-GDP and expenditureGDP ratios from 1947 to 1992, we examine three central issues in public finance. First, was the path of public debt sustainable during this period? Second, if debt is sustainable, how has the government historically balanced the budget after shocks to either revenues or expenditures? Third, are expenditures exogenous? The results show that (i) public deficit is stationary (bounded asymptotic variance), with the budget in Brazil being balanced almost entirely through changes in taxes, regardless of the cause of the initial imbalance. Expenditures are weakly exogenous, but tax revenues are not; (ii) the behavior of a rational Brazilian consumer may be consistent with Ricardian Equivalence; (iii) seigniorage revenues are critical to restore intertemporal budget equilibrium, since, when we exclude them from total revenues, debt is not sustainable in econometric tests.