A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program, August 2008

B-1 Monthly Report of Medical Services Provided under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, September 2008.

B-1 Medicaid Reports -- The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report Report name IAMM1800-R001--Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown; IAMM1800-R002--Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County; IAMM2200-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM2200-R003--Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM3800-R001--ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County; IAMM4400-R001--Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program; IAMM4400-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program; IAMM4600-R002--Elderly Waiver Summary by County.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, September 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program

The labor market effects of payroll taxes in a middle-income country: Evidence from Colombia

We use a panel of manufacturing plants from Colombia to analyze how the risein payroll tax rates over the 1980 s and 1990 s affected the labor market.Our estimates indicate that formal wages fall by between 1.4% and 2.3% as aresult of a 10% rise in payroll taxes. This 'less-than-full-shifting' islikely to be the result of weak linkages between benefits and taxes and thepresence of downward wage rigidities induced by a binding minimum wage inColombia. Because the costs of taxation are only partly shifted fromemployers to employees, employment should also fall. Our results indicatethat a 10% increase in payroll taxes lowered formal employment by between4% and 5%. In addition, we find less shifting and larger disemploymenteffects for production than non-production workers. These results suggestthat policies aimed at boosting the relative demand of low-skill workers byreducing social security taxes on those with low earnings may be effectivein a country like Colombia, especially if tax cuts are targeted to indirectbenefits.

Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Homeland Security and Emergency Management Division

Public Employment Relations Board Performance Plan, FY 2009

Agency Performance Plan, Public Employment Relations Board

B-1 Monthly Report of Medical Services Provided under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, October 2008.

B-1 Medicaid Reports -- The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report Report name IAMM1800-R001--Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown; IAMM1800-R002--Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County; IAMM2200-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM2200-R003--Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM3800-R001--ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County; IAMM4400-R001--Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program; IAMM4400-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program; IAMM4600-R002--Elderly Waiver Summary by County.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, October 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program

Organizational capital and employment fluctuations

In this paper I present a model in which production requires two types of labor inputs: regular productive tasks and organizational capital, which is accumulated by workers performing organizational tasks. By allocating more workers from organizational to productive tasks, firms can temporarily increase production without hiring. The availability of this intensive margin of labor adjustment, in combination with adjustment costs along the extensive margin (search frictions, firing costs, training costs), makes it optimal to delay employment adjustments. Simulations indicate that this mechanism is quantitatively important even if only a small fraction of workers perform organizational tasks, and explains why the hiring rate is persistent and why employment is slow to recover after the end of a recession.

Effects of employment protection and product market regulations on the Italian labor market

Labor market regulations have often being blamed for high and persistentunemployment in Europe, but evidence on their impact remains mixed. Morerecently, attention has turned to the impact of product market regulationson employment growth. This paper analyzes how labor and product marketregulations interact to affect turnover and employment. We present a matchingmodel which illustrates how barriers to entry in the product market mitigatethe impact of labor market deregulation. We, then, use the Italian SocialSecurity employer-employee panel to study the interaction between barriersto entry and dismissal costs. We exploit the fact that costs for unjustdismissals in Italy increased for firms below 15 employees relative to biggerfirms after 1990. We find that the increase in dismissal costs after 1990decreased accessions and separations in small relative to big firms,especially for women. Moreover, consistent with our model, we find evidencethat the increase in dismissal costs had smaller effects on turnover for womenin sectors faced with strict product market regulations.

The political economy of employment protection

This paper develops a model of job creation and job destruction in agrowing economy with embodied technical progress, that we use toanalyze the political support for employment protection legislationssuch as the ones that are observed in most European countries.We analyze the possibility of Condorcet cycles due to the fact thatworkers about to become unemployed prefer both an increase and areduction in firing costs over the status quo. Despite this problem, we show the existence of local, and sometimes global majority winners.In voting in favour of employment protection, incumbent employeestrade off lower living standards (because employment protectionmaintains workers in less productive activities) against longer job duration. We show that the gains from, and consequently the politicalsupport for employment protection (as defined by maximunjob tenure) are larger, the lower the rate of creative destruction and the largerthe worker's bargaining power. Numerical simulations suggest a hump-shaped response of firing costs to these variables, as well as negative impact of exogeneous turnover on employment protection.

Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management Strategic Plan, 2006-2008

This report outlines the strategic plan for Homeland Security and Emergency Management, goals and mission.

Downsizing, job insecurity and firm reputation

This paper studies how firms make layoff decisions in the presence of adverse shocks. In this uncertain environment, workers' expectations about their job security affect their on-the-job performance. This productivity effect on job insecurity forces firms to strike a balance between laying off redundant workers and maintaining survivors' commitment when deciding on the amount and timing of downsizing. This framework offers an explanation of conservative employment practices (such as zero or reduced layoffs) based on firms having private information about their future profits. High retention rates and wages can signal that the firm has a bright future, boosting workers' confidence. Moreover, the model provides clear predictions about when waves of downsizing will occur as opposed to one-time massive cuts.

B-1 Monthly Report of Medical Services Provided under Title XIX of the Social Security Act, November 2008.

B-1 Medicaid Reports -- The monthly Medicaid series of eight reports provide summaries of Medicaid eligibles, recipients served, and total payments by county, category of service, and aid category. These reports may also be known as the B-1 Reports. These reports are each available as a PDF for printing or as a CSV file for data analysis. Report Report name IAMM1800-R001--Medically Needy by County - No Spenddown and With Spenddown; IAMM1800-R002--Total Medically Needy, All Other Medicaid, and Grand Total by County; IAMM2200-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM2200-R003--Fiscal YTD Expenditures by Category of Service; IAMM3800-R001--ICF & ICF-MR Vendor Payments by County; IAMM4400-R001--Monthly Expenditures by Eligibility Program; IAMM4400-R002--Monthly Expenditures by Category of Service by Program; IAMM4600-R002--Elderly Waiver Summary by County.

A-1A Supplemental Security Income Program, November 2008

A-1A - Supplemental Security Income Program